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Preface
There is, I think, a gap between what many students learn in their first course in
formal logic, and what they are expected to know for their second. While courses in
mathematical logic with metalogical components often cast only the barest glance
at mathematical induction or even the very idea of reasoning from definitions, a first
course may also leave these untreated, and fail explicitly to lay down the definitions
upon which the second course is based. The aim of this text is to integrate material
from these courses and, in particular, to make serious mathematical logic accessible to
students I teach. The first parts introduce classical symbolic logic as appropriate for
beginning students; the last parts build to Gödel’s completeness and incompleteness
results. A distinctive feature of the last section is a complete development of Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem.
Accessibility, in this case, includes components which serve to locate this text
among others: First, assumptions about background knowledge are minimal. I do
not assume particular content about computer science, or about mathematics much
beyond high school algebra. Officially, everything is introduced from the ground up.
No doubt, the material requires a certain sophistication—which one might acquire
from other courses in critical reasoning, mathematics, or computer science. But the
requirement does not extend to particular contents from any of these areas.
Second, I aim to build skills, and to keep conceptual distance for different applications of ‘so’ relatively short. Authors of books that are completely correct and precise
may assume skills and require readers to recognize connections not fully explicit.
It may be that this accounts for some of the reputed difficulty of the material. The
results are often elegant. But this can exclude a class of students capable of grasping
and benefiting from the material, if only it is adequately explained. Thus I attempt
explanations and examples to put the student at every stage in a position to understand
the next. In some cases, I attempt this by introducing relatively concrete methods for
reasoning. The methods are, no doubt, tedious or unnecessary for the experienced
logician. However, I have found that they are valued by students, insofar as students
iii
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are presented with an occasion for success. These methods are not meant to wash over
or substitute for understanding details, but rather to expose and clarify them. Clarity,
beauty, and power come, I think, by getting at details, rather than burying or ignoring
them.
Third, the discussion is ruthlessly directed at core results. Results may be rendered
inaccessible to students, who have many constraints on their time and schedules,
simply because the results would come up in, say, a second course rather than a first.
My idea is to exclude side topics and problems, and to go directly after (what I see as)
the core. One manifestation is the way definitions and results from earlier sections
feed into ones that follow. Thus simple integration is a benefit. Another is the way
predicate logic with identity is introduced as a whole in part I. Though it is possible to
isolate sentential logic from the first parts of chapter 2 through chapter 7, and so to use
the text for separate treatments of sentential and predicate logic, the guiding idea is to
avoid repetition that would be associated with independent treatments for sentential
logic, or perhaps monadic predicate logic, the full predicate logic, and predicate logic
with identity.
Also (though it may suggest I am not so ruthless about extraneous material as I
would like to think), I try to offer some perspective about what is accomplished along
the way. Some of this is by organization; some by asides to the main text; and some
built into the main content. So for example the text may be of particular interest to
those who have, or desire, an exposure to natural deduction in formal logic. In this
case, insight arises from the nature of the system. In the first part, I introduce both
axiomatic and natural derivation systems; and in ??, show how they are related.
There are different ways to organize a course around this text. Chapters locate
and order material conceptually. But in many contexts the conceptual order will be
other than the best pedagogical order, and content may be taken in different ways. For
students who are likely to complete the whole, a straightforward option is to proceed
sequentially through the text from beginning to end (but postponing chapter 3 until
after chapter 6). Taken as wholes, part II depends on part I; parts ?? and ?? on parts I
and II. At the level of whole chapters, dependencies are as in the box on the next page.
At a more fine-grained level, one might construct a sequence, like one I have regularly
offered, as follows:
informal notions:
sentential logic:
predicate logic:
transitional:
advanced topics:

chapter 1
first parts of chapters 2, 4, 5, 6
latter parts of chapters 2, 4, 5, 6
chapters 3, 7, first parts of ??
metalogic: ??, ??; and/or incompleteness: ??, ??
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For predicate logic I have preferred to cover material in the order 2, 6, 4, 5 to convey a
sense of the formal language “by immersion” prior to chapters 4 and 5. Thus the text
is compatible with different course organizations—and may (should) be customized
to your own needs!
Chapter dependencies. Though there are cross references throughout, the following
represent reasonable sequences for study:
chapter 1
chapter 2
%
%
%chapter 4
%
%

chapter 5

%
%
chapter
... 6
% ...............
........
.%
chapter
3
chapter 7
``
```
```
`
??
```
```
```
??
??
```
```
```
??
??
??
%

??
The relation between chapter 6 and chapter 3 is pedagogical rather than logical, and might
be ignored for students with sufficient technical background.

A remark about chapter 7 especially for the instructor: By a formally restricted
system for reasoning with semantic definitions, chapter 7 aims to leverage derivation
skills from earlier chapters to informal reasoning with definitions. I have had a difficult
time convincing instructors to try this material—and even been told flatly that these
skills “cannot be taught.” In my experience, this is false (and when I have been able
to convince others to try the chapter, they have quickly seen its value). Perhaps the
difficulty is just that the strategy is unfamiliar. Of course, if one is presented with
students whose mathematical sophistication is sufficient for advanced work, it is not
necessary. But if (as is often the case, especially for students in philosophy) one
obtains one’s mathematical sophistication from courses in logic, this chapter is an
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important part of the bridge from earlier material to later. Additionally, the chapter
is an important “takeaway” even for students who will not continue to later material.
The chapter closes an open question from chapter 4—how it is possible to demonstrate
quantificational validity. But further, the ability to reason closely with definitions is a
skill from which students in (sentential or) predicate logic, even though they never
go on to formalize another sentence or do another derivation, will benefit both in
philosophy and more generally.
Another remark about the (long) sections ??, ??, and ??. These develop in PA the
“derivability conditions” for Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. They are perhaps
for enthusiasts. Still, in my experience many students are enthusiasts and, especially
from an introduction, benefit by seeing the conditions derived—else the very idea of
proving in a formal theory results about provability may remain mysterious. There
are different ways to treat the sections. One might work through them in some detail.
However, even if you skim demonstrations lightly, there is an advantage having a
panorama at which to wave and say “thus it is accomplished!”
Naturally, results in this book are not innovative. If there is anything original,
it is in presentation. Even here, I am greatly indebted to others, especially perhaps
Bergmann, Moor, and Nelson, The Logic Book, Mendelson, Introduction to Mathematical Logic, and Smith, An Introduction to Gödel’s Theorems. I thank my first
logic teacher, G.J. Mattey, who communicated to me his love for the material. And
I thank especially my colleagues John Mumma and Darcy Otto for many helpful
comments. Hannah Baehr and Catlin Andrade provided comments and some of the
answers to exercises. In addition I have received helpful feedback from Ramachandran
Venkataraman and Steve Johnson, along with students in different logic classes at
California State University San Bernardino.
This text evolved over a number of years starting modestly from notes originally
provided as a supplement to other texts. It is now long (!) and perhaps best conceived
in separate volumes for Parts I and II and then Parts ?? and ??. Answers to selected
exercises are available at https://tonyroyphilosophy.net/symbolic-logic/.
The website includes also a forum for comment and discussion. A few matters of
formatting and such to the side, the current version 10.x is (at least very close to)
the completed project—although of course it still might be improved, especially in
response to your comments.
I think this is fascinating material, and consider it great reward when students
respond “cool!” as they sometimes do. I hope you will have that response more than
once along the way.
T.R. Fall 2022

Contents
Preface

iii

Contents

vii

Quick Reference Guides

ix

I The Elements: Four Notions of Validity

1

1

Logical Validity and Soundness
1.1 Consistent Stories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 The Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 Some Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5
6
12
24

2

Formal Languages
2.1 Introductory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Sentential Languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3 Quantificational Languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33
33
35
49

3

Axiomatic Deduction
3.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 Sentential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3 Quantificational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50
51
55
63

4

Semantics
4.1 Sentential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 Quantificational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

64
64
82

5

Translation

83

vii

CONTENTS
5.1
5.2
5.3
6

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Sentential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Quantificational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

Natural Deduction
117
6.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.2 Sentential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.3 Quantificational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

II Transition: Reasoning About Logic
7

viii

190

Direct Semantic Reasoning
192
7.1 Introductory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
7.2 Sentential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
7.3 Quantificational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

Bibliography

212

Index

213

Quick Reference Guides
Negation and Quantity . . . . . . . . . . .
Classical Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Countability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Parts of a Formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greek Characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Semantics Quick Reference (sentential) . .
Definitions for Translation . . . . . . . . .
‘Neither nor’ and ‘Not both’ . . . . . . . .
Cause and Conditional . . . . . . . . . . .
Definitions for Auxiliary Assumptions . . .
NDs Quick Reference . . . . . . . . . . . .
NDs+ Quick Reference . . . . . . . . . . .
Metalinguistic Quick Reference (sentential)

ix

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

22
30
37
42
73
80
90
106
111
125
148
185
208

Part I

The Elements: Four Notions of
Validity

1

Introductory
Symbolic logic is a tool for argument evaluation. In this part of the text we introduce
the basic elements of that tool. Those parts are represented in the following diagram:


Ordinary
Arguments

-

Symbolic
Language

Truth and
Validity

@
@
@
R Metalogical
@
 Consideration

@
@
@
R
@

Proof and
Validity

The starting point is ordinary arguments. Such arguments come in various forms and
contexts—from politics and ordinary living, to mathematics and philosophy. Here is a
classic, simple case:

(A)

All humans are mortal.
Socrates is a human.
Socrates is mortal.

This argument has premises listed above a line, with a conclusion listed below. The
premises are supposed to demonstrate the conclusion. Here is another case which may
seem less simple:

(B)

If the maid did it, then it was done with a revolver only if it was done in the
parlor. But if the butler is innocent, then the maid did it unless it was done in
the parlor. The maid did it only if it was done with a revolver, while the butler is
guilty if it did happen in the parlor. So the butler is guilty.

It is fun to think about this; from the given evidence, it follows that the butler did it!
Here is an argument that is both controversial and significant:
2
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There is evil. If god is good, then there is no evil unless god has morally
sufficient reasons for allowing it. If god is both omnipotent and omniscient,
then god does not have morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil. So god is
not good, omnipotent, and omniscient.

A being is omnipotent if it is all-powerful, and omniscient if all-knowing. This is a
version of the famous “problem of evil” for traditional theism. It matters whether
the conclusion is true! Roughly, an argument is good if it does what it is supposed
to do, if its premises demonstrate the conclusion, and bad if they do not. So a theist
(someone who accepts that there is a god) may want to hold that (C) is a bad argument,
but an atheist (someone who denies that there is a god) that it is good.
We begin in chapter 1 with an account of success for ordinary arguments (the
leftmost box). So we say what it is for an argument to be good or bad. This introduces
us to the fundamental notions of logical validity and logical soundness. These will
be our core concepts for argument evaluation. But just as it is one thing to know
what honesty is, and another to know whether someone is honest, so it is one thing to
know what logical validity and logical soundness are, and another to know whether
an argument is valid or sound. In some cases, it may be obvious. But others are not
so clear—as, for example, cases (B) or (C) above, along with complex arguments in
mathematics and philosophy. Thus symbolic logic is introduced as a sort of machine
or tool to identify validity and soundness.
This machine begins with certain symbolic representations of ordinary arguments
(the box second from the left). That is why it is symbolic logic. We introduce these
representations in chapter 2, and translate from ordinary arguments to the symbolic
representations in chapter 5. Once arguments have this symbolic representation, there
are different methods of operating upon them. We develop three such methods, each
with its own distinctive advantages and disadvantages.
An account of truth and validity is developed for the symbolic representations
in chapter 4 and chapter 7 (the upper box). On this account, truth and validity are
associated with clearly defined criteria for their evaluation. And validity from this
upper box implies logical validity for the ordinary arguments that are symbolically
represented. Thus we obtain clearly defined criteria to identify the logical validity
of arguments we care about. Evaluation of validity for the butler and evil cases is
entirely routine given the methods from chapter 2, chapter 4, and chapter 5—though
the soundness of (C) will remain controversial!
One account of proof and validity is developed for the symbolic representations
in chapter 3, and another in chapter 6. So there are separate applications of the proof
method (the lower box). Again, on these accounts, proof and validity are associated
with clearly defined criteria for their evaluation. And validity by the proof methods

PART I.

THE ELEMENTS

4

implies logical validity for the ordinary arguments that are symbolically represented.
In each case the result is another well-defined approach to the identification of logical validity. Evaluation of validity for the butler and evil cases is entirely routine
given the methods from, say, chapter 2, chapter 3, and chapter 5, or alternatively,
chapter 2, chapter 5, and chapter 6—though, again, the soundness of (C) will remain
controversial.
These, then, are the elements of our logical “machine”—we start with the fundamental notion of logical validity, then there are symbolic representations of ordinary
reasonings, along with approaches to evaluation from truth and validity, and from
proof and validity. These elements are developed in this part. In later parts we turn
to thinking about how these parts work together (the right-hand box). In particular,
we begin thinking how to reason about logic (part II), demonstrate that the same
arguments come out valid by the truth method as by the proof methods (??), and
establish limits on application of logic and computing to arithmetic (??). But first we
have to say what the elements are. And that is the task we set ourselves in this part.

Chapter 1

Logical Validity and Soundness
We have said that symbolic logic is a tool or machine for the identification of argument
goodness. In this chapter we begin, not with the machine, but with an account of this
“argument goodness” that the machinery is supposed to identify. In particular, we
introduce the notions of logical validity and logical soundness.
An argument is made up of sentences one of which is taken to be supported by
the others.
AR An argument is some sentences, one of which (the conclusion) is taken to be
supported by the remaining sentences (the premises).
(Important definitions are often offset and given a short name as above; then there
may be appeal to the definition by its name, in this case, ‘AR’.) So an argument has
premises which are taken to support a conclusion. Such support is often indicated
by words or phrases of the sort, ‘so’, ‘it follows’, ‘therefore’, or the like. We will
typically represent arguments in standard form with premises listed as complete
sentences above a line, and the conclusion under. Roughly, an argument is good if
the premises do what they are taken to do, if they actually support the conclusion. An
argument is bad if they do not accomplish what they are taken to do, if they do not
actually support the conclusion.
Logical validity and soundness correspond to different ways an argument can go
wrong. Consider the following two arguments:

(A)

Only citizens can vote
Hannah is a citizen

All citizens can vote
(B) Hannah is a citizen

Hannah can vote

Hannah can vote
5
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The line divides premises from conclusion, indicating that the premises are supposed
to support the conclusion. Thus these are arguments. But these arguments go wrong
in different ways. The premises of argument (A) are true; as a matter of fact, only
citizens can vote, and Hannah (my daughter) is a citizen. But she cannot vote; she
is not old enough. So the conclusion is false. Thus, in argument (A), the relation
between the premises and the conclusion is defective. Even though the premises
are true, there is no guarantee that the conclusion is true as well. We will say that
this argument is logically invalid. In contrast, argument (B) is logically valid. If its
premises were true, the conclusion would be true as well. So the relation between the
premises and conclusion is not defective. The problem with this argument is that the
premises are not true—not all citizens can vote. So argument (B) is defective, but in a
different way. We will say that it is logically unsound.
The task of this chapter is to define and explain these notions of logical validity
and soundness. I begin with some preliminary notions in section 1.1, then turn to
official definitions of logical validity and soundness (section 1.2), and finally to some
consequences of the definitions (section 1.3).

1.1

Consistent Stories

Given a certain notion of a possible or consistent story, it is easy to state definitions
for logical validity and soundness. So I begin by identifying the kind of stories that
matter. Then we will be in a position to state the definitions, and apply them in some
simple cases.
Let us begin with the observation that there are different sorts of possibility. Consider, say, ‘Hannah could make it in the WNBA’. This seems true. She is reasonably
athletic, and if she were to devote herself to basketball over the next few years, she
might very well make it in the WNBA. But wait! Hannah is only a kid—she rarely
gets the ball even to the rim from the top of the key—so there is no way she could
make it in the WNBA. So we have said both that she could and that she could not
make it. But this cannot be right. What is going on? Here is a plausible explanation:
Different sorts of possibility are involved. When we hold fixed current abilities, we
are inclined to say there is no way she could make it. When we hold fixed only
general physical characteristics, and allow for development, it is natural to say that
she might. Similarly, I sometimes ask students if it is possible to drive the 60 miles
from our campus in San Bernardino to Los Angeles in 30 minutes. From natural
assumptions about Los Angeles traffic, law enforcement, and the like, most say it
is not. But some, under different assumptions, allow that it can be done! In each
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example, the scope of what is possible varies with whatever constraints are in play:
the weaker the constraints, the broader the range of what is possible. In ordinary
contexts, constraints are understood—so when you ask a friend if she can make it to
your party in thirty minutes, rocket ships and jet cars are not an option. That is how
we manage to communicate.
The sort of possibility we are interested in is very broad, and constraints are
correspondingly weak. We will allow that a story is possible or consistent so long as
it involves no internal contradiction. A story is impossible when it collapses from
within. For this it may help to think about the way you respond to ordinary fiction.
Consider, say, J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban (much loved
by my youngest daughter). Harry and his friend Hermione are at wizarding school.
Hermione acquires a “time turner” which allows time travel, and uses it in order to
take classes that are offered at the same time. Such devices are no part of the actual
world, but they fit into the wizarding world of Harry Potter. So far, then, the story
does not contradict itself. So you go along.
At one stage, though, Harry is at a lakeshore under attack by a bunch of fearsome
“dementors.” His attempts to save himself appear to have failed when a figure across
the lake drives the dementors away. But the figure who saves Harry is Harry himself
who has come back from the future. Somehow then, as often happens in these stories,
the past depends on the future, at the same time as the future depends on the past:
Harry is saved only insofar as he comes back from the future, but he comes back from
the future only insofar as he is saved. This, rather than the time travel itself, generates
an internal conflict. The story makes it the case that you cannot have Harry’s rescue
apart from his return, and cannot have Harry’s return apart from his rescue. This
might make sense if time were always repeating in an eternal loop. But, according to
the story, there were times before the rescue and after the return. So the story faces
internal collapse. Notice: the objection does not have anything to do with the way
things actually are—with existence of time turners or the like; it has rather to do with
the way the story hangs together internally.1 Similarly, we want to ask whether stories
hold together internally. If a story holds together internally, it counts for our purposes
as consistent and possible. If a story does not hold together, it is not consistent or
1 In more consistent cases of time travel (in fiction) time seems to move on different paths so that
after today and tomorrow, there is another today and another tomorrow. So time does not return to the
very point at which it first turns back. In the trouble cases, time seems to move in a sort of “loop” so that
a point on the path to today (this very day) goes through tomorrow. With this in mind, it is interesting to
think about say, the Terminator (1984, 1991) and Back to the Future (1985, 1989, 1990) films along
with, maybe more consistent, Groundhog Day (1993) and, very much like it, Happy Death Day (2017).
Even if I am wrong, and the Potter story is internally consistent, the overall point should be clear. And it
should be clear that I am not saying anything serious about time travel.
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possible.
In some cases, stories may be consistent with things we know are true in the real
world. Thus Hannah could grow up to play in the WNBA. There is nothing about our
world that rules this out. But stories may remain consistent though they do not fit with
what we know to be true in the real world. Here are cases of time travel and the like.
Stories become inconsistent when they collapse internally—as when a story says that
some time both can and cannot happen apart from another.
As with a movie or novel, we can say that different things are true or false in our
stories. In Harry Potter it is true that Harry and Hermione travel through time with a
timer turner, but false that they go through time in a DeLorean (as in the Back to the
Future films). In the real world, of course, it is false that there are time turners, and
false that DeLoreans go through time. Officially, a complete story is always maximal
in the sense that any sentence is either true or false in it. A story is inconsistent when
it makes some sentence both true and false. Since, ordinarily, we do not describe
every detail of what is true and what is false when we tell a story, what we tell is only
part of a maximal story. In practice, however, it will be sufficient for us merely to give
or fill in whatever details are relevant in a particular context.
But there are a couple of cases where we cannot say when sentences are true or
false in a story. The first is when stories we tell do not fill in relevant details. In The
Wizard of Oz (film, 1939) it is true that Dorothy wears red shoes. But the film has
nothing to say about whether she likes Twinkies. By itself, then, the film does not give
us enough information to say that ‘Dorothy likes Twinkies’ is either true or false in the
story. Similarly, there is a problem when stories are inconsistent. Suppose according
to some story,
(a) All dogs can fly
(b) Fido is a dog
(c) Fido cannot fly
Given (a), all dogs fly; but from (b) and (c), it seems that not all dogs fly. Given (b),
Fido is a dog; but from (a) and (c) it seems that Fido is not a dog. Given (c), Fido
cannot fly; but from (a) and (b) it seems that Fido can fly. The problem is not that
inconsistent stories say too little, but rather that they say too much. When a story is
inconsistent, we will refuse to say that it makes any sentence (simply) true or false.2
2 The

intuitive picture developed above should be sufficient for our purposes. However, we are
on the verge of vexed issues. For further discussion, you may want to check out the vast literature
on “possible worlds.” Contributions of my own include the introductory article, “Modality,” in The
Continuum Companion to Metaphysics.
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It will be helpful to consider some examples of consistent and inconsistent stories:
(a) The real story, “Everything is as it actually is.” Since no contradiction is
actually true, this story involves no contradiction; so it is internally consistent and
possible.
(b) “All dogs can fly: over the years, dogs have developed extraordinarily
large and muscular ears; with these ears, dogs can fly.” It is bizarre, but not obviously
inconsistent. If we allow the consistency of stories according to which monkeys fly,
as in The Wizard of Oz, or elephants fly, as in Dumbo (films 1941, 2019), then we
should allow that this story is consistent as well.
(c) “All dogs can fly, but my dog Fido cannot; Fido’s ear was injured while he was
chasing a helicopter, and he cannot fly.” This is not internally consistent. If all dogs
can fly and Fido is a dog, then Fido can fly. You might think that Fido retains a sort of
flying nature—just because Fido remains a dog. In evaluating internal consistency,
however, we require that meanings remain the same.
F


(C)

able to fly



All dogs can fly Q T

Q
Q
Q



Fido is a dog


Q
Q
Q
TQ

Fido cannot fly

flying nature


F

If ‘can fly’ means ‘is able to fly’ then in the story it is true that Fido cannot fly, but not
true that all dogs can fly (since Fido cannot). If ‘can fly’ means ‘has a flying nature’
then in the story it is true that all dogs can fly, but not true that Fido cannot (because
he remains a dog). The only way to keep both ‘all dogs fly’ and ‘Fido cannot fly’ true
is to switch the sense of ‘can fly’ from one use to another. So long as ‘can fly’ means
the same in each use, the story is sure to fall apart insofar as it says both that Fido is
and is not that sort of thing.
(d) “Germany won WWII; the United States never entered the war; after a long
and gallant struggle, England and the rest of Europe surrendered.” It did not happen;
but the story does not contradict itself. For our purposes, then, it counts as possible.
(e) “1 1 = 3; the numerals ‘2’ and ‘3’ are switched (the numerals are ‘1’, ‘3’,
‘2’, ‘4’, ‘5’, ‘6’, . . . ); so that one and one are three.” This story does not hang together.
Of course numerals can be switched—so that people would correctly say, ‘1 1 = 3’.
But this does not make it the case that one and one are three! We tell stories in our
own language (imagine that you are describing a foreign-language film in English).
Take a language like English except that ‘fly’ means ‘bark’; and consider a movie
where dogs are ordinary, so that people in the movie correctly assert, in their language,
‘dogs fly’. But changing the words people use to describe a situation does not change
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the situation. It would be a mistake to tell a friend, in English, that you saw a movie
in which there were flying dogs. Similarly, according to our story, people correctly
assert, in their language, ‘1 1 = 3’. But it is a mistake to say in English (as our story
does), that this makes one and one equal to three.

Last notes:
 Some authors prefer talk of “possible worlds,” “possible situations,” or the
like to that of consistent stories. It is conceptually simpler to stick with
stories, as I have, than to have situations and distinct descriptions of them.
However, it is worth recognizing that our consistent stories are or describe
possible situations, so that the one notion matches up directly with the others.
 It is essential to success that you work a significant body of exercises successfully and independently: In learning logic, you acquire a skill. Just as a coach
might help you to understand how to hit a baseball—but you learn to hit
only by practice—so an instructor (or this book) may help you to understand
concepts of logic, but you gain the skill only by practice. So do not neglect
exercises!
 As you approach the following exercises, note that answers to problems
indicated by star are available at https://tonyroyphilosophy.net/
symbolic-logic/.
E1.1. Say whether each of the following stories is internally consistent or inconsistent. In either case, explain why.
*a. Smoking cigarettes greatly increases the risk of lung cancer, although most
people who smoke cigarettes do not get lung cancer.
b. Joe is taller than Mary, but Mary is taller than Joe.
*c. Abortion is always morally wrong, though abortion is morally right in order
to save a woman’s life.
d. Mildred is Dr. Saunders’s daughter, although Dr. Saunders is not Mildred’s
father.
*e. No rabbits are nearsighted, though some rabbits wear glasses.
f. Ray got an ‘A’ on the final exam in both Phil 200 and Phil 192. But he got a
‘C’ on the final exam in Phil 192.
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*g. Barack Obama was never president of the United States, although Michelle is
president right now.
h. Egypt, with about 100 million people is the most populous country in Africa,
and Africa contains the most populous country in the world. But the United
States has over 200 million people.
*i. The death star is a weapon more powerful than that in any galaxy, though
there is, in a galaxy far, far away, a weapon more powerful than it.
j. Luke and the Rebellion valiantly battled the evil Empire, only to be defeated.
The story ends there.

E1.2. For each of the following, (i) say whether the sentence is true or false in
the real world and then (ii) say, if you can, whether the sentence is true or false
according to the accompanying story. In each case, explain your answers. Do not
forget about contexts where we refuse to say whether sentences are simply true or
false. The first problem is worked as an example.
a. Sentence: Aaron Burr was never a president of the United States.
Story: Aaron Burr was the first president of the United States, however he
turned traitor and was impeached and then executed.
(i) It is true in the real world that Aaron Burr was never a president of the
United States. (ii) But the story makes the sentence false, since the story says
Burr was the first president.
b. Sentence: In 2006, there were still buffalo.
Story: A thundering herd of buffalo overran Phoenix, Arizona in early 2006.
The city no longer exists.
*c. Sentence: After overrunning Phoenix in early 2006, a herd of buffalo overran
Newark, New Jersey.
Story: A thundering herd of buffalo overran Phoenix, Arizona in early 2006.
The city no longer exists.
d. Sentence: There has been an all-out nuclear war.
Story: After the all-out nuclear war, John Connor organized the Resistance
against the machines—who had taken over the world for themselves.
*e. Sentence: Barack Obama has swum the Atlantic.
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Story: No human being has swum the Atlantic. Barack Obama and Bill
Clinton and you are all human beings, and at least one of you swam all the
way across.
f. Sentence: Some people have died as a result of nuclear explosions.
Story: As a result of a nuclear blast that wiped out most of this continent, you
have been dead for over a year.
*g. Sentence: Your instructor is not a human being.
Story: No beings from other planets have ever made it to this country. However,
your instructor made it to this country from another planet.
h. Sentence: Lassie is both a television and movie star.
Story: Dogs have super-big ears and have learned to fly. Indeed, all dogs can
fly. Among the many dogs are Lassie and Rin Tin Tin.
*i. Sentence: The Yugo is the most expensive car in the world.
Story: Jaguar and Rolls Royce are expensive cars. But the Yugo is more
expensive than either of them.
j. Sentence: Lassie is a bird who has learned to fly.
Story: Dogs have super-big ears and have learned to fly. Indeed, all dogs can
fly. Among the many dogs are Lassie and Rin Tin Tin.

1.2

The Definitions

The definition of logical validity depends on what is true and false in consistent stories.
The definition of soundness builds directly on the definition of validity. Note: in
offering these definitions, I stipulate the way the terms are to be used; there is no
attempt to say how they are used in ordinary conversation; rather, we say what they
will mean for us in this context.
LV An argument is logically valid if and only if (iff) there is no consistent story in
which all the premises are true and the conclusion is false.
LS An argument is logically sound iff it is logically valid and all of its premises are
true in the real world.
Observe that logical validity has entirely to do with what is true and false in consistent
stories. Only with logical soundness is validity combined with premises true in the
real world.
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Logical (deductive) validity and soundness are to be distinguished from inductive
validity and soundness or success. For the inductive case, it is natural to focus on the
plausibility or the probability of stories—where an argument is relatively strong when
stories that make the premises true and conclusion false are relatively implausible.
Logical (deductive) validity and soundness are thus a sort of limiting case, where
stories that make premises true and conclusion false are not merely implausible, but
impossible. In a deductive argument, conclusions are supposed to be guaranteed;
in an inductive argument, conclusions are merely supposed to be made probable or
plausible. For mathematical logic, we set the inductive case to the side, and focus on
the deductive.
Also, do not confuse truth with validity and soundness. A sentence is true in
the real world when it correctly represents how things are in the real world, and true
in a story when it correctly represents how things are in the story. An argument is
valid when there is no consistent story that makes the premises true and conclusion
false, and sound when it is valid and all its premises are true in the real world. The
definitions for validity and soundness depend on truth and falsity for the premises
and conclusion in stories and then in the real world. But truth and falsity do not even
apply to arguments: just as it is a “category” mistake to say that the number three is
tall or short, so it is a mistake to say that an argument is true or false.3

1.2.1

Invalidity

It will be easiest to begin thinking about invalidity. From the definition, if an argument is logically valid, there is no consistent story that makes the premises true and
conclusion false. So to show that an argument is invalid, it is enough to produce even
one consistent story that makes premises true and conclusion false. Perhaps there
are stories that result in other combinations of true and false for the premises and
conclusion; this does not matter for the definition. However, if there is even one story
that makes premises true and conclusion false then, by definition, the argument is not
logically valid—and if it is not valid, by definition, it is not logically sound.
We can work through this reasoning by means of a simple invalidity test. Given
an argument, this test has the following four stages:
IT

a. List the premises and negation of the conclusion.
b. Produce a consistent story in which the statements from (a) are all true.

3 From

an introduction to philosophy of language, one might wonder (with good reason) whether the
proper bearers of truth are sentences rather than, say, propositions. This question is not relevant to the
simple point made above.
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c. Apply the definition of validity.
d. Apply the definition of soundness.
We begin by considering what needs to be done to show invalidity. Then we do it.
Finally we apply the definitions to get the results. For a simple example, consider the
following argument:

(D)

Eating brussels sprouts results in good health
Ophelia has good health
Ophelia has been eating brussels sprouts

The definition of validity has to do with whether there are consistent stories in which
the premises are true and the conclusion false. Thus, in the first stage, we simply write
down what would be the case in a story of this sort.
a. List premises and
negation of conclusion.

In any story with the premises true and conclusion false,
1. Eating brussels sprouts results in good health
2. Ophelia has good health
3. Ophelia has not been eating brussels sprouts

Observe that the conclusion is reversed! At this stage we are not giving an argument.
Rather we merely list what is the case when the premises are true and conclusion
false. Thus there is no line between premises and the last sentence, insofar as there
is no suggestion of support. It is easy enough to repeat the premises for (1) and (2).
Then for (3) we say what is required for the conclusion to be false. Thus, ‘Ophelia has
been eating brussels sprouts’ is false if Ophelia has not been eating brussels sprouts. I
return to this point below, but that is enough for now.
An argument is invalid if there is even one consistent story that makes the premises
true and the conclusion false—so, since the conclusion is reversed, an argument is
invalid if there is even one consistent story in which the statements from (a) are all
true. Thus, to show invalidity, it is enough to produce a consistent story that “hits the
target” from (a).
b. Produce a consistent story in which
the statements from
(a) are all true.

Story: Eating brussels sprouts results in good health, but
eating spinach does so as well; Ophelia is in good health
but has been eating spinach, not brussels sprouts.

For the statements listed in (a): the story satisfies (1) insofar as eating brussels sprouts
results in good health; (2) is satisfied since Ophelia is in good health; and (3) is
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satisfied since Ophelia has not been eating brussels sprouts. The story explains
how she manages to maintain her health without eating brussels sprouts, and so the
consistency of (1)–(3) together. The story does not have to be true—and, of course,
many different stories will do. All that matters is that there is a consistent story in
which the premises of the original argument are true, and the conclusion is false.
Producing a story that makes the premises true and conclusion false is the creative
part. What remains is to apply the definitions of validity and soundness. By LV, an
argument is logically valid only if there is no consistent story in which the premises
are true and the conclusion is false. So if, as we have demonstrated, there is such a
story, the argument cannot be logically valid.
c. Apply the definition
of validity.

This is a consistent story that makes the premises true and
the conclusion false; thus, by definition, the argument is not
logically valid.

By LS, for an argument to be sound, it must have its premises true in the real world
and be logically valid. Thus if an argument fails to be logically valid, it automatically
fails to be logically sound.
d. Apply the definition
of soundness.

Since the argument is not logically valid, by definition, it is
not logically sound.

Given an argument, the definition of validity depends on stories that make the premises
true and the conclusion false. Thus, in step (a) we simply list claims required of any
such story. To show invalidity, in step (b), we produce a consistent story that satisfies
each of those claims. Then in steps (c) and (d) we apply the definitions to get the final
results.
It may be helpful to think of stories as a sort of “wedge” to pry the premises of
an argument off its conclusion. We pry the premises off the conclusion if there is a
consistent way to make the premises true and the conclusion not. If it is possible to
insert such a wedge between the premises and conclusion, then a defect is exposed in
the way premises are connected to the conclusion. Observe that the flexibility we allow
in consistent stories (with flying dogs and the like) corresponds directly to the strength
of the required connection between premises and conclusion. If the connection is
sufficient to resist all such attempts to wedge the premises off the conclusion, then it is
significant indeed. Observe also that our method reflects what we did with argument
(A) at the beginning of the chapter: Faced with the premises that only citizens can
vote and Hannah is a citizen, it was natural to worry that she might be underage and
so cannot vote. But this is precisely to produce a story that makes the premises true
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and conclusion false. Thus our method is not “strange” or “foreign”! Rather, it makes
explicit what has seemed natural from the start.
Here is another example of our method. Though the argument may seem on its
face not to be a very good one, we can expose its failure by our methods—in fact,
again, our method may formalize or make rigorous a way you very naturally think
about cases of this sort. Here is the argument:
I shall run for president
(E)
I shall be one of the most powerful men on earth
To show that the argument is invalid, we turn to our standard procedure:
a. In any story with the premise true and conclusion false,
1. I shall run for president
2. I shall not be one of the most powerful men on earth
b. Story: I do run for president, but get no financing and gain no votes; I lose the
election. In the process, I lose my job as a professor and end up begging for
scraps outside a Domino’s Pizza restaurant. I fail to become one of the most
powerful men on earth.
c. This is a consistent story that makes the premise true and the conclusion false;
thus, by definition, the argument is not logically valid.
d. Since the argument is not logically valid, by definition, it is not logically sound.
This story forces a wedge between the premise and the conclusion. Thus we use the
definition of validity to explain why the conclusion does not properly follow from
the premises. It is, perhaps, obvious that running for president is not enough to make
me one of the most powerful men on earth. Our method forces us to be very explicit
about why: running for president leaves open the option of losing, so that the premise
does not force the conclusion. Once you get used to it, then, our method may appear
as a natural approach to argument evaluation.
If you follow this method for showing invalidity, the place where you are most
likely to go wrong is stage (b), telling stories where the premises are true and the
conclusion false. Be sure that your story is consistent, and that it verifies each of the
claims from stage (a). If you do this, you will be fine.
E1.3. Use our invalidity test to show that each of the following arguments is not
logically valid, and so not logically sound. Understand terms in their most natural
sense.
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*a. If Joe works hard, then he will get an ‘A’
Joe will get an ‘A’
Joe works hard
b. Harry had his heart ripped out by a government agent
Harry is dead
c. Everyone who loves logic is happy
Jane does not love logic
Jane is not happy
d. Our car will not run unless it has gasoline
Our car has gasoline
Our car will run
e. Only citizens can vote
Hannah is a citizen
Hannah can vote

1.2.2

Validity

Suppose I assert that no student at California State University San Bernardino is
from Beverly Hills, and attempt to prove it by standing in front of the library and
buttonholing students to ask if they are from Beverly Hills—I do this for a week and
never find anyone from Beverly Hills. Is the claim that no CSUSB student is from
Beverly Hills thereby proved? Of course not, for there may be students I never meet.
Similarly, failure to find a story to make the premises true and conclusion false does
not show that there is not one—for all we know, there might be some story we have
not thought of yet. So, to show validity, we need another approach. If we could show
that every story which makes the premises true and conclusion false is inconsistent,
then we could be sure that no consistent story makes the premises true and conclusion
false—and so, from the definition of validity, we could conclude that the argument is
valid. Again, we can work through this by means of a procedure, this time a validity
test.
VT

a. List the premises and negation of the conclusion.
b. Expose the inconsistency of such a story.
c. Apply the definition of validity.
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d. Apply the definition of soundness.
In this case, we begin in just the same way. The key difference arises at stage (b). For
an example, consider this argument:
No car is a person
(F) My mother is a person
My mother is not a car
Since LV has to do with stories where the premises are true and the conclusion false, as
before, we begin by listing the premises together with the negation of the conclusion.
a. List premises and
negation of conclusion.

In any story with the premises true and conclusion false,
1. No car is a person
2. My mother is a person
3. My mother is a car

Any story where ‘My mother is not a car’ is false, is one where my mother is a car
(perhaps along the lines of the 1965 TV series, My Mother the Car).
For invalidity, we would produce a consistent story in which (1)–(3) are all true.
In this case, to show that the argument is valid, we show that this cannot be done.
That is, we show that no story that makes each of (1)–(3) true is a consistent story.
b. Expose the inconsistency of such a
story.

In any such story,
Given (1) and (3),
4. My mother is not a person
Given (2) and (4),
5. My mother is and is not a person

The reasoning should be clear if you focus just on the specified lines. Given (1) and
(3), if no car is a person and my mother is a car, then my mother is not a person. But
then my mother is a person from (2) and not a person from (4). So we have our goal:
any story with (1)–(3) as members contradicts itself and therefore is not consistent.
Observe that we could have reached this result in other ways. For example, we might
have reasoned from (1) and (2) that (40 ), my mother is not a car; and then from (3) and
(40 ) to the result that (50 ) my mother is and is not a car. Either way, an inconsistency is
exposed. Thus, as before, there are different options for this creative part.
Now we are ready to apply the definitions of logical validity and soundness. First,
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So no consistent story makes the premises true and conclusion false; so by definition, the argument is logically
valid.

For the invalidity test, we produce a consistent story that “hits the target” from stage
(a) to show that the argument is invalid. For the validity test, we show that any attempt
to hit the target from stage (a) must collapse into inconsistency: No consistent story
includes each of the elements from stage (a) so that there is no consistent story in
which the premises are true and the conclusion false. So by application of LV the
argument is logically valid.
Given that the argument is logically valid, LS makes logical soundness depend on
whether the premises are true in the real world. Suppose we think the premises of our
argument are in fact true. Then,
d. Apply the definition
of soundness.

In the real world no car is a person and my mother is a
person, so all the premises are true; so since the argument
is also logically valid, by definition, it is logically sound.

Observe that LS requires for logical soundness that an argument is logically valid and
that its premises are true in the real world. Validity depends just on truth and falsity
in consistent stories; setting stories to the side, soundness requires in addition that
premises really are true. And we do not say anything at this stage about claims other
than the premises of the original argument. Thus we do not make any claim about the
truth or falsity of the conclusion, ‘My mother is not a car’. Rather, the observations
have entirely to do with the two premises, ‘No car is a person’ and ‘My mother is a
person’. When an argument is valid and the premises are true in the real world, by LS,
it is logically sound.
But it will not always be the case that a valid argument has true premises. Say
My Mother the Car is (surprisingly) a documentary about a person reincarnated as
a car (the premise of the show) and therefore a true account of some car that is a
person. Then some cars are persons and the first premise is false; so you would have
to respond as follows:
d0 . Since in the real world some cars are persons, the first premise is not true. So,
though the argument is logically valid, by definition it is not logically sound.
Another option is that you are in doubt about reincarnation into cars, and in particular
about whether some cars are persons. In this case you might respond as follows:
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d00 . Although in the real world my mother is a person, I cannot say whether no car is
a person; so I cannot say whether the first premise is true. So though the argument
is logically valid, I cannot say whether it is logically sound.
So once we decide that an argument is valid, for soundness there are three options:
(i) You are in a position to identify all of the premises as true in the real world. In this
case, you should do so, and apply the definition for the result that the argument is
logically sound.
(ii) You are in a position to say that one or more of the premises is false in the real
world. In this case, you should do so, and apply the definition for the result that
the argument is not logically sound.
(iii) You cannot identify any premise as false, but neither can you identify them all as
true. In this case, you should explain the situation and apply the definition for the
result that you are not in a position to say whether the argument is logically sound.
So given a valid argument, there remains a substantive question about soundness. In
some cases, as for example (C) on page 3, this can be the most controversial part.
Again, given an argument, we say in step (a) what would be the case in any story
that makes the premises true and the conclusion false. Then, at step (b), instead of
finding a consistent story in which the premises are true and conclusion false, we show
that there is no such thing. Steps (c) and (d) apply the definitions for the final results.
Notice that there is an “inverse relation” between stories and validity: Stories with
premises true and conclusion false attack an argument. If some attack succeeds, the
argument fails; and if all attacks fail, the argument succeeds. So IT shows that an
argument fails by finding a successful attack; VT shows that an argument succeeds by
showing that attacks fail. Observe also that only one method can be correctly applied
in a given case. If we can produce a consistent story according to which the premises
are true and the conclusion is false, then it is not the case that no consistent story
makes the premises true and the conclusion false. Similarly, if no consistent story
makes the premises true and the conclusion false, then we will not be able to produce
a consistent story that makes the premises true and the conclusion false.
For showing validity, the most difficult steps are (a) and (b), where we say what
happens in every story where the premises true and the conclusion false. For an
example, consider the following argument:
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All collies can fly
All collies are dogs
All dogs can fly

It is invalid. We can easily tell a story that makes the premises true and the conclusion
false—say one where collies fly but dachshunds do not. Suppose, however, that we
proceed with the validity test as follows:
a. In any story with the premises true and conclusion false,
1. All collies can fly
2. All collies are dogs
3. No dogs can fly
b. In any such story,
Given (1) and (2),
4. Some dogs can fly
Given (3) and (4),
5. Some dogs can and cannot fly
c. So no consistent story makes the premises true and conclusion false; so by
definition, the argument is logically valid.
d. Since in the real world collies cannot fly, the first premise is not true. So, though
the argument is logically valid, by definition it is not logically sound.
The reasoning at (b), (c), and (d) is correct. Any story with (1)–(3) is inconsistent. But
something is wrong. (Can you see what?) There is a mistake at (a): It is not the case
that every story that makes the premises true and conclusion false includes (3). The
negation of ‘All dogs can fly’ is not ‘No dogs can fly’, but rather, ‘Not all dogs can fly’
(or ‘Some dogs cannot fly’). All it takes to falsify the claim that all dogs fly is some
dog that does not. Thus, for example, all it takes to falsify the claim that everyone
in your class will get an ‘A’ is one person who does not (on this, see the extended
discussion on the following page). So for argument (G) we have indeed shown that
every story of a certain sort is inconsistent, but have not shown that every story which
makes the premises true and conclusion false is inconsistent. In fact, as we have seen,
there are consistent stories that make the premises true and conclusion false.
Similarly, in step (b) it is easy to get confused if you consider too much information
at once. Ordinarily, if you focus on sentences singly or in pairs, it will be clear what
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Negation and Quantity
In general you want to be careful about negations. To negate any claim P it is
always correct to write simply, it is not the case that P . So ‘It is not the case that
all dogs can fly’ negates ‘All dogs can fly’. You may choose this approach for
conclusions in the first step of our procedures. At some stage, however, you will
need to understand what the negation comes to. It is easy enough to see that,
My mother is a car

and

My mother is not a car

negate one another. However, there are cases where caution is required. This is
particularly the case with terms involving quantities.
Say the conclusion of your argument is, ‘There are at least ten apples in the basket’.
Clearly a story according to which there are, say, three apples in the basket makes
this conclusion false. However, there are other ways to make the conclusion false—
as if there are two apples or seven. Any of these are fine for showing invalidity.
But when you show that an argument is valid, you must show that any story that
makes the premises true and conclusion false is inconsistent. So it is not sufficient to
show that stories with (the premises true and) three apples in the basket contradict.
Rather, you need to show that any story that includes the premises and fewer than
ten apples fails. Thus in step (a) of our procedure we always say what is so in every
story that makes the premises true and conclusion false. So in (a) you would have
the premises and, ‘There are fewer than ten apples in the basket’.
If a statement is included in some range of consistent stories, then its negation says
what is so in all the others—all the ones where it is not so.
not-P

all consistent stories

P

That is why the negation of ‘there are at least ten’ is ‘there are fewer than ten’.
The same point applies with other quantities. Consider some grade examples:
First, if a professor says that everyone will not get an ‘A’, she says something
disastrous—nobody in your class will get an ‘A’. In order too deny it, to show that
she is wrong, all you need is at least one person that gets an ‘A’. In contrast, if
she says that someone will not get an ‘A’, she says only what you expect from the
start—that not everyone will get an ‘A’. To deny this, you would need that everyone
gets an ‘A’. Thus the following pairs negate one another:
Everyone will not get an ‘A’

and

Someone will get an ‘A’

Someone will not get an ‘A’

and

Everyone will get an ‘A’

It is difficult to give rules to cover all the cases. The best is just to think about what
you are saying, perhaps with reference to examples like these.
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must be the case in every story including those sentences. It does not matter which
sentences you consider in what order, so long as in the end, you reach a contradiction
according to which something is and is not so.
So far, we have seen our procedures applied in contexts where it is given ahead
of time whether an argument is valid or invalid. But not all situations are so simple.
In the ordinary case, it is not given whether an argument is valid or invalid. In this
case, there is no magic way to say ahead of time which of our two tests, IT or VT
applies. The only thing to do is to try one way—if it works, fine. If it does not, try the
other. It is perhaps most natural to begin by looking for stories to pry the premises
off the conclusion. If you can find a consistent story to make the premises true and
conclusion false, the argument is invalid. If you cannot find any such story, you may
begin to suspect that the argument is valid. This suspicion does not itself amount
to a demonstration of validity. But you might try to turn your suspicion into such a
demonstration by attempting the validity method. Again, if one procedure works, the
other better not!
E1.4. Use our validity procedure to show that each of the following is logically valid,
and decide (if you can) whether it is logically sound.
*a. If Bill is president, then Hillary is first lady
Hillary is not first lady
Bill is not president
b. Only fools find love
Elvis was no fool
Elvis did not find love
c. If there is a good and omnipotent god, then there is no evil
There is evil
There is no good and omnipotent god
d. All sparrows are birds
All birds fly
All sparrows fly
e. All citizens can vote
Hannah is a citizen
Hannah can vote
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E1.5. Use our procedures to say whether the following are logically valid or invalid,
and sound or unsound. Hint: You may have to do some experimenting to decide whether the arguments are logically valid or invalid—and so decide which
procedure applies.
a. If Bill is president, then Hillary is first lady
Bill is president
Hillary is first lady
b. Most professors are insane
TR is a professor
TR is insane
*c. Some dogs have red hair
Some dogs have long hair
Some dogs have long, red hair
d. If you do not strike the match, then it does not light
The match lights
You strike the match
e. Brittney is taller than Steph
Steph is at least as tall as TR
Steph is taller than TR

1.3

Some Consequences

We now know what logical validity and soundness are, and should be able to identify
them in simple cases. Still, it is one thing to know what validity and soundness are,
and another to know why they matter. So in this section I turn to some consequences
of the definitions.

1.3.1

Soundness and Truth

First, a consequence we want: The conclusion of every sound argument is true in the
real world. Observe that this is not part of what we require to show that an argument
is sound. LS requires just that an argument is valid and that its premises are true.
However it is a consequence of validity plus true premises that the conclusion is true
as well.
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valid true premises
true conclusion

By themselves, neither validity nor true premises guarantee a true conclusion. However, taken together they do. To see this, consider a two-premise argument. Say the
real story describes the real world; so the sentences of the real story are all true in the
real world. Then in the real story, the premises and conclusion of our argument must
fall into one of the following combinations of true and false:
1
T
T
T

2
T
T
F

3
T
F
T

4
F
T
T

5
T
F
F

6
F
T
F

7
F
F
T

8
F
F
F

combinations for
the real story

These are all the combinations of T and F. Say the premises are true in the real story;
this leaves open that the real story has the conclusion true as in (1) or false as in (2);
so the conclusion of an argument with true premises may or may not be true in the real
world. Say the argument is logically valid; then no consistent story makes the premises
true and the conclusion false; but the real story is a consistent story; so we can be sure
that the real story does not result in combination (2); again, though, this leaves open
any of the other combinations and so that the conclusion of a valid argument may or
may not be true in the real world. Now say the argument is sound; then it is valid and
all its premises are true in the real world; again, since it is valid, the real story does not
result in combination (2); and since the premises of a sound argument are true in the
real world, the premises do not fall into any of the combinations (3)–(8); (1) is the only
combination left: in the real story, and so in the real world, the conclusion of a sound
argument is true. And not only in this case but in general, if an argument is sound
then its conclusion is true in the real world: Since a sound argument is valid, there is
no consistent story where its premises are true and conclusion false; so the real story
does not have the premises true and conclusion false; and since the premises really
are true, the conclusion is not false—and so (given the maximality of our stories) true.
Put another way, if an argument is sound, its premises are true in the real story; but
then if the conclusion is not true, and so false, the real story has the premises true and
conclusion false—and since there is such a story, the argument is not valid. So if an
argument is sound, if it is valid and its premises are true, it has a true conclusion.
Note again: We do not need that the conclusion is true in the real world in order
to decide that an argument is sound; saying that the conclusion is true is no part of
our procedure for validity or soundness. Rather, by discovering that an argument is
logically valid and that its premises are true, we establish that it is sound; this gives us
the result that its conclusion therefore is true. And that is just what we want.
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Validity and Form

It is worth observing a connection between what we have done and argument form.
Some of the arguments we have seen so far are of the same general form. Thus both
arguments at (H) have the form on the right.

(H)

If Joe works hard, then
he will get an ‘A’
Joe works hard

If Hannah is a citizen,
then she can vote
Hannah is a citizen

Joe will get an ‘A’

Hannah can vote

If P then Q
P
Q

As it turns out, all arguments of this form are valid. In contrast, the following
arguments with the indicated form are not.

(I)

If Joe works hard, then
he will get an ‘A’
Joe will get an ‘A’

If Hannah can vote,
then she is a citizen
Hannah is a citizen

Joe works hard

Hannah can vote

If P then Q
Q
P

There are stories where, say, Joe cheats for the ‘A’, or Hannah is a citizen but not old
enough to vote. In these cases, it may be that P results in Q, although there are ways
to have Q without P —this is what the stories bring out. And, generally, it is often
possible to characterize arguments by their forms, where a form is valid iff it has no
instance that makes the premises true and the conclusion false. On this basis, form
(H) above is valid, and (I) is not.
In chapters to come, we take advantage of certain very general formal or structural
features of arguments to identify ones that are valid and ones that are invalid. For now,
though, it is worth noting that some presentations of critical reasoning (which you
may or may not have encountered), take advantage of patterns like those above, listing
typical ones that are valid, and typical ones that are not (for example, Cederblom
and Paulsen, Critical Reasoning). A student may then identify valid and invalid
arguments insofar as they match the listed forms. This approach has the advantage of
simplicity—and one may go quickly to applications of the logical notions for concrete
cases. But the approach is limited to application of listed forms, and so to a very
narrow range of arguments. LV has application to any argument whatsoever. And for
our logical machine, within a certain range, we shall develop an account of validity
for quite arbitrary forms. So we are pursuing a general account or theory of validity
that goes well beyond the mere lists of these other more traditional approaches.
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Relevance

Another consequence seems less welcome. Consider the following argument:
Snow is white
Snow is not white

(J)

All dogs can fly
It is natural to think that the premises are not connected to the conclusion in the right
way—for the premises have nothing to do with the conclusion—and that this argument
therefore should not be logically valid. But if it is not valid, by definition, there is a
consistent story that makes the premises true and the conclusion false. And in this
case there is no such story, for no consistent story makes the premises true; so no
consistent story makes the premises true and the conclusion false; so, by definition,
this argument is logically valid. The procedure applies in a straightforward way.
Thus,
a. In any story that makes the premises true and conclusion false,
1. Snow is white
2. Snow is not white
3. Some dogs cannot fly
b. In any such story,
Given (1) and (2),
4. Snow is and is not white
c. So no consistent story makes the premises true and conclusion false; so by
definition, the argument is logically valid.
d. Since in the real world snow is white, the second premise is not true. So, though
the argument is logically valid, by definition it is not logically sound.
This seems bad! Intuitively, there is something wrong with the argument. But, on
our official definition, it is logically valid. One might rest content with the observation
that, even though the argument is logically valid, it is not logically sound. But this
does not remove the general worry. For this argument,
There are fish in the sea
(K)
Nothing is round and not round
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has all the problems of the other and is logically sound as well. (Why?) One might,
on the basis of examples of this sort, decide to reject the (classical) account of validity
with which we have been working. Some do just this.4 But, for now, let us see
what can be said in defense of the classical approach. (And the classical approach is,
no doubt, the approach you have seen or will see in any standard course on critical
thinking or logic.)
As a first line of defense, one might observe that the conclusion of every sound
argument is true and ask, “What more do you want?” We use arguments to demonstrate
the truth of conclusions. And nothing we have said suggests that sound arguments
do not have true conclusions: An argument whose premises are inconsistent is sure
to be unsound. And an argument whose conclusion cannot be false is sure to have a
true conclusion. So soundness may seem sufficient for our purposes. Even though we
accept that there remains something about argument goodness that soundness leaves
behind, we can insist that soundness is useful as an intellectual tool. Whenever it is
the truth or falsity of a conclusion that matters, we can profitably employ the classical
notions.
But one might go further, and dispute even the suggestion that there is something
about argument goodness that soundness leaves behind. Consider the following two
argument forms:
(ds)

P or Q, not-P
Q

(add)

P
P or Q

According to ds (disjunctive syllogism), if you are given that P or Q and that not-P ,
you can conclude that Q. If you have cake or ice cream, and you do not have cake, you
have ice cream; if you are in California or New York, and you are not in California,
you are in New York; and so forth. Thus ds seems hard to deny. And similarly for
add (addition). Where ‘or’ means ‘one or the other or both’, when you are given that
P , you can be sure that P or anything. Say you have cake, then you have cake or ice
cream, cake or brussels sprouts, and so forth; if grass is green, then grass is green or
pigs have wings, grass is green or dogs fly, and so forth.
Return now to our problematic argument. As we have seen, it is valid according
to the classical definition LV. We get a similar result when we apply the ds and add
principles.
4 Especially

the so-called “relevance” logicians. For an introduction, see Graham Priest, NonClassical Logics. But his text presumes mastery of material corresponding to part I and part II of this
one. So the non-classical approaches develop or build on the classical one developed here.
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Snow is white
Snow is not white
Snow is white or all dogs can fly
All dogs can fly
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premise
premise
from 1 and add
from 2 and 3 and ds

If snow is white, then snow is white or anything. So snow is white or dogs fly. So we
use line 1 with add to get line 3. But if snow is white or dogs fly, and snow is not
white, then dogs fly. So we use lines 2 and 3 with ds to reach the final result. So our
principles ds and add go hand in hand with the classical definition of validity. The
argument is valid on the classical account; and with these principles, we can move
from the premises to the conclusion. If we want to reject the validity of this argument,
we will have to reject not only the classical notion of validity, but also one of our
principles ds or add. And it is not obvious that one of the principles should go. If we
decide to retain both ds and add then, seemingly, the classical definition of validity
should stay as well. If we have intuitions according to which ds and add should stay,
and also that the definition of validity should go, we have conflicting intuitions. Thus
our intuitions might, at least, sensibly be resolved in the classical direction.
These issues are complex, and a subject for further discussion. For now, it is
enough for us to treat the classical approach as a useful tool: It is useful in contexts
where what we care about is whether conclusions are true. And alternate approaches
to validity typically develop or modify the classical approach. So it is natural to begin
where we are, with the classical account. At any rate, this discussion constitutes a
sort of acid test: If you understand the validity of the “snow is white” and “fish in the
sea” arguments (J) and (K), you are doing well—you understand how the definition of
validity works, with its results that may or may not now seem controversial. If you
do not see what is going on in those cases, then you have not yet understood how the
definitions work and should return to section 1.2 with these cases in mind.
E1.6. Use our procedures to say whether the following are logically valid or invalid,
and sound or unsound. Hint: You may have to do some experimenting to decide whether the arguments are logically valid or invalid—and so decide which
procedure applies.
a. Bob is over six feet tall
Bob is under six feet tall
Bob is disfigured
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Classical Validity
As we have mentioned, there are approaches to validity other than classical. But
the classical account remains the one developed in any standard course on critical
reasoning or logic. Not every course “exposes” cases like (J) but, insofar as the
classical definition is employed, all have the same result. Still, there are different
formulations of the classical account which may obscure underlying equivalence.
Here are some different formulations, the first three bad, the last three good:
(1) Sometimes it is said that an argument is valid iff the premises logically entail
the conclusion. On its face, this defines validity by a notion equally in need
of definition. It might be made adequate by an account of logical entailment,
perhaps along the lines of one of the accounts below.
(2) It will not do to characterize valid arguments saying, “if the premises are true
then the conclusion is true.” For consider a true conclusion, as ‘Dogs bark’;
then any premises are such that if they are true then the conclusion is true.
But, say, the argument “There are fish in the sea, so Dogs bark” has stories
with the premise true and conclusion false and so is not logically valid.
(3) Similarly it is a mistake to characterize valid arguments saying “if the
premises are true then the conclusion must be true. For consider a valid
argument as, “I am less than 100 miles from Los Angeles, so I am less than
200 miles from Los Angeles.” The premise is true (of me now); so on this
account, the conclusion must be true; but the conclusion ‘I am less than 200
miles from Los Angeles’ is not such that it must be true—there are consistent
stories where I am, say, in London right now.
(4 ) Perhaps, though, (3) is a sloppy way of saying, “it must be that if the premises
are true then the conclusion is true.” So the conditional, not the conclusion,
is true in all consistent stories. This is equivalent to LV. The conditional
is necessarily true iff every consistent story with the premises true has the
conclusion true; and this is so just in case none has the premises true and
conclusion false.
(5 ) Given the match between stories and possibility, LV is straightforwardly
equivalent to an account on which an argument is logically valid iff it is
not possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false—although,
by the appeal to stories, we have attempted to give some substance to the
relevant notion of possibility.
(6 ) Another option is to say an argument is valid iff it has some valid form
(see section 1.3.2). This is not equivalent to LV, but remains a version of
the classical account. Formally valid arguments are logically valid. But an
argument can be logically valid without being formally valid. Return to the
example from (3). It is valid by LV. But it has form “P so Q” of which there
are (many) instances with the premise true and conclusion false. Still, (J)
has form “P , not-P , so Q” of which there are no instances that make the
premises true—thus the form comes out valid, and (J) as well.
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b. Marilyn is not over six feet tall
Marilyn is not under six feet tall
Marilyn is not in the WNBA
c. There are fish in the sea
Nothing is round and not round
*d. Cheerios are square
Chex are round
There is no round square
e. All dogs can fly
Fido is a dog
Fido cannot fly
I am blessed
E1.7. Respond to each of the following.
*a. Create another argument of the same form as the first set of examples (H)
from section 1.3.2, and then use our regular procedures to decide whether it is
logically valid and sound. Is the result what you expect? Explain.
b. Create another argument of the same form as the second set of examples (I)
from section 1.3.2, and then use our regular procedures to decide whether it is
logically valid and sound. Is the result what you expect? Explain.

E1.8. Which of the following are true, and which are false? In each case, explain
your answers, with reference to the relevant definitions. The first is worked as an
example.
a. A logically valid argument is always logically sound.
False. An argument is sound iff it is logically valid and all of its premises are
true in the real world. Thus an argument might be valid but fail to be sound if
one or more of its premises is false in the real world.
b. A logically sound argument is always logically valid.
*c. If the conclusion of an argument is true in the real world, then the argument
must be logically valid.

CHAPTER 1. LOGICAL VALIDITY AND SOUNDNESS

32

d. If the premises and conclusion of an argument are true in the real world, then
the argument must be logically sound.
*e. If a premise of an argument is false in the real world, then the argument cannot
be logically valid.
f. If an argument is logically valid, then its conclusion is true in the real world.
*g. If an argument is logically sound, then its conclusion is true in the real world.
h. If an argument has contradictory premises (its premises are true in no consistent story), then it cannot be logically valid.
*i. If the conclusion of an argument cannot be false (is false in no consistent
story), then the argument is logically valid.
j. The premises of every logically valid argument are relevant to its conclusion.

E1.9. For each of the following concepts, explain in an essay of about two pages,
so that (high-school age) Hannah could understand. In your essay, you should
(i) identify the objects to which the concept applies, (ii) give and explain the
definition, and give and explicate examples of your own construction (iii) where
the concept applies, and (iv) where it does not. Your essay should exhibit an
understanding of methods from the text.
a. Logical validity
b. Logical soundness

E1.10. Do you think we should accept the classical account of validity? In an essay
of about two pages, explain your position, with special reference to difficulties
raised in section 1.3.3.

Chapter 2

Formal Languages
Having said in chapter 1 what validity and soundness are, we now turn to our logical
machine. As depicted in the picture of elements for symbolic logic on page 2, this
machine begins with symbolic representations of ordinary reasoning. In this chapter
we introduce the formal languages by introducing their grammar or syntax. After
some brief introductory remarks in section 2.1, the chapter divides into sections that
introduce grammar for a sentential language Ls (section 2.2), and then the grammar
for an extended quantificational language Lq (section 2.3).

2.1

Introductory

There are different ways to introduce a formal language. It is natural to introduce
expressions of a new language in relation to expressions of one that is already familiar.
Thus a traditional course in a foreign language is likely to present vocabulary lists of
the sort,
cabbage
small

chou:
petit:
::
:

But the terms of a foreign language are not originally defined by such lists. Rather
French, in this case, has conventions of its own such that sometimes ‘chou’ corresponds to ‘cabbage’ and sometimes it does not. It is not a legitimate criticism of
a Frenchman who refers to his sweetheart as mon petit chou to observe that she is
no cabbage! (Indeed, in this context, chou is chou à la crème—a “cabbage-shaped”
cream puff—and works like ‘sweet’ or ‘honey’ in English.) Although it is possible
to use such lists to introduce the conventions of a new language, it is also possible
33
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to introduce a language “as itself”—the way a native speaker learns it. In this case,
one avoids the danger of importing conventions and patterns from one language onto
the other. Similarly, the expressions of a formal language might be introduced in
correlation with expressions of, say, English. But this runs the risk of obscuring just
what the official definitions accomplish. Since we will be concerned extensively with
what follows from the definitions, it is best to introduce our languages in their “pure”
forms.
In this chapter, we develop the grammar of our formal languages. Consider the
following algebraic expressions:
a

b=c

a

= c

Until we know what numbers are assigned to the terms (as a = 1; b = 2; c = 3/, we
cannot evaluate the first for truth or falsity. Still, we can say that it is grammatical
and so capable of truth and falsity in a way that the other is not. Similarly, we
shall be able to evaluate the grammar of formal expressions apart from truth and
falsity—we do not have to know what the language represents in order to decide if its
expressions are grammatically correct. Or, again, just as a computer can check the
spelling and grammar of English without reference to meaning, so we can introduce
the vocabulary and grammar of our formal languages without reference to what their
expressions mean or what makes them true. The grammar, taken alone, is completely
straightforward. Taken this way, we work directly from the definitions, without
“pollution” from associations with English or whatever.
So we want the definitions. Even so, it may be helpful to offer some hints that
foreshadow how things will go. Do not take these as defining anything! Still, it is nice
to have a sense of how it fits together. Consider some simple sentences of an ordinary
language, say, ‘The butler is guilty’ and ‘The maid is guilty’. It will be convenient to
introduce capital letters corresponding to these, say, B and M . Such sentences may
combine to form ones that are more complex as, ‘It is not the case that the butler is
guilty’ or ‘If the butler is guilty, then the maid is guilty’. We shall find it convenient
to express these, ‘the butler is guilty’ and ‘the butler is guilty ! the maid is guilty’,
with operators  and !. Putting these together we get, B and B ! M . Operators
may be combined in obvious ways so that B ! M says that if the butler is guilty
then the maid is not. And so forth. We shall see that incredibly complex expressions
of this sort are possible!
In this case, simple sentences, ‘The butler is guilty’ and ‘The maid is guilty’
are “atoms” and complex sentences are built out of them. This is characteristic of
the sentential languages to be considered in section 2.2. For the quantificational
languages of section 2.3, certain sentence parts are taken as atoms. So quantificational
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languages expose structure beyond that for the sentential case. Perhaps, though, this
will be enough to give you a glimpse of the overall strategy and aims for the formal
languages of which we are about to introduce the grammar.

2.2

Sentential Languages

Just as algebra or English have their own vocabulary or symbols and then grammatical
rules for the way the vocabulary is combined, so our formal language has its own
vocabulary and then grammatical rules for the way the vocabulary is combined. In
this section we introduce the vocabulary for a sentential language, introduce the
grammatical rules, and conclude with some discussion of abbreviations for official
expressions.

2.2.1

Vocabulary

We begin, then, with the vocabulary. In this section, we say which symbols are
included in the language, and introduce some conventions for talking about the
symbols.
For any sentential language L, vocabulary includes,
VC

(p) Punctuation symbols: . /
(o) Operator symbols:  !
(s) A non-empty countable collection of sentence letters

And that is all.  is tilde and ! is arrow.1 In order to fully specify the vocabulary
of any particular sentential language, we need to identify its sentence letters—so far
as definition VC goes, different languages may differ in their collections of sentence
letters. The only constraint on such specifications is that the collections of sentence
letters be non-empty and countable. A collection is non-empty iff it has at least one
member. So any sentential language has at least one sentence letter. A collection
is countable iff its members can be matched one-to-one with all (or some) of the
non-negative integers. Thus we might let the sentence letters be A; B; : : : ; Z, where
these correlate with the integers 1 : : : 26. Or we might let there be infinitely many
1 Sometimes

sentential languages are introduced with different symbols, for example, : for , or
 for !. It should be easy to convert between presentations of the different sorts. And sometimes
sentential languages include operators in addition to  and ! (for example, _, ^, $). Such symbols
will be introduced in due time—but as abbreviations for complex official expressions.
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sentence letters, S0 ; S1 ; S2 ; : : : where the letters are correlated with the integers by
their subscripts.
So there is room for different sentential languages. Having made this point,
though, we immediately focus on a standard sentential language Ls whose sentence
letters are Roman italics A : : : Z with or without positive integer subscripts. Thus,
A

B

K

B3

K7

Z

are sentence letters of Ls . Similarly,
A1

Z23

are sentence letters of Ls . We will not use the subscripts very often, but they do
guarantee that we never run out of sentence letters. Perhaps surprisingly, as described
in the box on the next page (and E2.2), these letters too can be correlated with the
non-negative integers. Official sentences of Ls are built out of this vocabulary.
To proceed, we need some conventions for talking about expressions of a language
like Ls . Here, Ls is an object language—the thing we want to talk about; and we
require conventions for the metalanguage—for talking about the object language. In
general, for any formal object language L, an expression is a sequence of one or more
elements of its vocabulary. Thus .A ! B/ is an expression of Ls , but .A ? B/ is
not. (What is the difference?) We shall use script characters A : : : Z as variables that
range over expressions. ‘’, ‘!’, ‘.’, and ‘/’ represent themselves. Concatenated or
joined symbols in the metalanguage represent the concatenation of the symbols they
represent.
To see how this works, think of metalinguistic expressions as “mapping” to objectlanguage ones. Thus, for example, where S represents an arbitrary sentence letter,
S may represent any of, A, B, or Z. But S does not represent .A ! B/,
for it does not consist of a tilde followed by a sentence letter. With S restricted to
sentence letters, there is a straightforward map from S onto A, B, or Z, but
not from S onto .A ! B/.
S

S

S

(A)
??

A

??

B

??

Z

S
‹
?‚ …„
ƒ

 .A ! B/

In the first three cases,  maps to itself, and S to a sentence letter. In the last case there
is no map. We might try mapping S to A or B; but this would leave the rest of the
expression unmatched. While there is no map from S to .A ! B/, there is a map
from P to .A ! B/ if we let P represent any arbitrary expression, for .A ! B/
consists of a tilde followed by an expression of some sort. Metalinguistic expressions
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Countability
To see the full range of languages which are allowed under VC, observe how
multiple infinite series of sentence letters may satisfy the countability constraint.
Thus, for example, suppose we have two series of sentence letters, A0 ; A1 ; : : : and
B0 ; B1 ; : : : : These can be correlated with the non-negative integers as follows:
A0 B0 A1 B1 A2 B2
j
j
j
j
j
j 
0
1
2
3
4
5
For any non-negative integer n, An is matched with 2n, and Bn with 2n 1. So
each sentence letter is matched with some non-negative integer; so the sentence
letters are countable. If there are three series, they may be correlated,
A0 B0 C0 A1 B1 C1
j
j
j
j
j
j 
0
1
2
3
4
5
so that every sentence letter is matched to some non-negative integer. And similarly
for any finite number of series. And there might be 26 such series, as for our
language Ls .
In fact even this is not the most general case. If there are infinitely many series of
sentence letters, we can still line them up and correlate them with the non-negative
integers. Here is one way to proceed. Order the letters as follows:
A0
B0
#
C0

!
.

A1

A2
%

B1

!
.

A3

B2

B3

C1

C2

C3

D1

D2

D3

%



.

.

D0
::
:

so that any letter appears somewhere along the arrows. Then following the arrows,
match them accordingly with the non-negative integers,
A0 A1 B0 C0 B1 A2
j
j
j
j
j
j 
0
1
2
3
4
5
so that, again, any sentence letter is matched with some non-negative integer. It
may seem odd that we can line symbols up like this, but it is hard to dispute that
we have done so. Thus we may say that VC is compatible with a wide variety of
specifications, but also that all legitimate specifications have something in common:
If a collection is countable, it is possible to sort its members into a series with a
first member, a second member, and so forth.
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give the form of ones in the object language. An object-language expression has some
form just when there is a complete map from the metalinguistic expression to it.
Say P represents any arbitrary expression. Then by similar reasoning, .A !
B/ ! .A ! B/ is of the form P ! P .
P !P
(B)

R
? @

‚ …„ ƒ
‚ …„ ƒ
.A ! B/ ! .A ! B/
In this case, P maps to all of .A ! B/ and ! to itself. A constraint on our maps is
that the use of the metavariables A : : : Z must be consistent within a given map. Thus
.A ! B/ ! .B ! B/ is not of the form P ! P .
P !P
(C)

?

P !P
‹

‚ …„ ƒ
‚ …„ ƒ
.A ! B/ ! .B ! B/

or

‹

R
? @

‚ …„ ƒ
‚ …„ ƒ
.A ! B/ ! .B ! B/

We are free to associate P with whatever we want. However, within a given map,
once P is associated with some expression, we have to use it consistently within that
map.
Observe again that S and P ! P are not expressions of Ls . Rather, we use
them to talk about expressions of Ls . And it is important to see how we can use the
metalanguage to make claims about a range of expressions all at once. Given that A,
B, and Z are all of the form S, when we make some claim about expressions
of the form S, we say something about each of them—but not about .A ! B/.
Similarly, if we make some claim about expressions of the form P ! P , we say
something with application to a range of expressions. In the next section, for the
specification of formulas, we use the metalanguage in just this way.
E2.1. Assuming that S may represent any sentence letter, and P any arbitrary
expression of Ls , use maps to determine whether each of the following expressions
is (i) of the form .S ! P / and then (ii) whether it is of the form .P ! P /.
In each case, explain your answers.
a. .A ! A/
b. .A ! .R ! Z//
c. .A ! .R ! Z//

CHAPTER 2. FORMAL LANGUAGES

39

d. ..R ! Z/ ! .R ! Z//
*e. ..! / ! .! //
E2.2. On the pattern of examples from the countability guide on page 37, show that
the sentence letters of Ls are countable—that is, that they can be correlated with
the non-negative integers. On the scheme you produce, what numbers correlate
with A, B1 , and C10 ? Hint: Supposing that A without subscript is like A0 , for
any subscript n, you should be able to produce a formula for the position of An ,
and similarly for Bn , Cn , and the like. Then it will be easy to find the position of
any letter, even if the question is about, say, L125 .

2.2.2

Formulas

We are now in a position to say which expressions of a sentential language are its
grammatical formulas and sentences. The specification itself is easy. We will spend a
bit more time explaining how it works. For a given sentential language L,
FR

(s) If S is a sentence letter, then S is a formula.
() If P is a formula, then P is a formula.
(!) If P and Q are formulas, then .P ! Q/ is a formula.
(CL) Any formula may be formed by repeated application of these rules.

And we simply identify the formulas with the sentences. For any sentential language
L, an expression is a sentence iff it is a formula.
FR is a first example of a recursive definition. Such definitions always build from
the parts to the whole. Frequently we can use “tree” diagrams to see how they work.
Thus, for example, by repeated applications of the definition, .A ! .B ! A// is
a formula and sentence of Ls .
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These are formulas by FR(s)

A
A
A
A
A

B

@
@

A
A
A

(D)

Since B is a formula, this is a formula by FR()

@
.B ! A/

Since B and A are formulas, this is a formula by FR(!)

A
AA

.A ! .B ! A//

Since A and .B ! A/ are formulas, this is a formula by FR(!)

.A ! .B ! A//

Since .A ! .B ! A// is a formula, this is a formula by FR()

By FR(s), the sentence letters, A, B, and A are formulas; given this, clauses FR()
and FR(!) let us conclude that other, more complex, expressions are formulas as well.
Notice that, in the definition, P and Q may be any expressions that are formulas: By
FR (), if B is a formula, then tilde followed by B is a formula; but similarly, if B
and A are formulas, then an opening parenthesis followed by B, followed by !
followed by A and then a closing parenthesis is a formula; and so forth as on the tree
above. You should follow through each step very carefully.
A recursive definition always involves some “basic” starting elements, in this
case, sentence letters. These occur across the top row of our tree. Other elements
are constructed, by the definition, out of ones that come before. The last, closure,
clause tells us that any formula is built this way. To demonstrate that an expression is
a formula and a sentence, it is sufficient to construct it, according to the definition, on
a tree. If an expression is not a formula, there will be no way to construct it according
to the rules. Thus .AB/ for example, is not a formula. A is a formula and B is
a formula; but there is no way to put them together, by the definition, without ! in
between.
Here are a couple of last examples which emphasize the point that you must
maintain and respect parentheses in the way you construct a formula. Thus consider,
A

B

These are formulas by FR(s)

@

(E)

@
@

.A ! B/

Since A and B are formulas, this is a formula by FR(!)

.A ! B/

Since .A ! B/ is a formula, this is a formula by FR()

And compare it with,
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These are formulas by FR(s)

(F) A

Since A is a formula, this is a formula by FR()

@
@
@
Since A and B are formulas, this is a formula by FR(!)

.A ! B/

Once you have .A ! B/ as in the first case, the only way to apply FR() puts the
tilde on the outside. To get the tilde inside the parentheses it has to go on first, as in
the second case. The significance of this point emerges immediately below.
It will be helpful to have some additional definitions, each of which may be
introduced in relation to the trees. Restrict attention to trees that branch in the usual
way: without extraneous nodes not required for the result, and without nodes used
more than once (so for every node, there is a unique upward path from the root to it).
Then for any formula P , each formula which appears in the tree for P including P
itself is a subformula of P . Thus .A ! B/ has subformulas:
A

B

.A ! B/

.A ! B/

A

.A ! B/

In contrast, .A ! B/ has subformulas:
A

B

So it matters for the subformulas how the tree is built. The immediate subformulas
of a formula P are the subformulas to which P is directly connected by lines. Thus
.A ! B/ has one immediate subformula, .A ! B/; .A ! B/ has two, A and
B. The atomic subformulas of a formula P are the sentence letters that appear across
the top row of its tree. Thus both .A ! B/ and .A ! B/ have A and B as their
atomic subformulas. Finally, the main operator of a formula P is the last operator
added in its tree. Thus  is the main operator of .A ! B/, and ! is the main
operator of .A ! B/. So, again, it matters how the tree is built. We sometimes
speak of a formula by means of its main operator: A formula of the form P is a
negation; a formula of the form .P ! Q/ is a (material) conditional, where P is the
antecedent of the conditional and Q is the consequent. Because it operates on the two
immediate subformulas, ! is a binary operator; because it has just one  is unary.
E2.3. For each of the following expressions, demonstrate that it is a formula and a
sentence of Ls with a tree. Then on the tree (i) bracket all the subformulas, (ii)
box the immediate subformula(s), (iii) star the atomic subformulas, and (iv) circle
the main operator. A first case for ..A ! B/ ! A/ is worked as an example.
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These are formulas by FR(s)






A

@
@
@

.A ! B/


@

@ 
@





From A, formula by FR()

From A and B, formula by FR(!)



..A ! B/ ! A/

From .A ! B/ and A, formula by FR(!)

*a. A
b. A
c. .A ! B/
d. .C ! .A ! B//
e. ..A ! B/ ! .C ! A//
E2.4. Explain why the following expressions are not formulas or sentences of Ls .
Hint: You may find that an attempted tree will help you see what is wrong.
a. .A  B/
*b. .P ! Q/

Parts of a Formula
The parts of a formula are here defined in relation to its tree.
SB

Each formula which appears in the tree for formula P including P itself is a
subformula of P .

IS

The immediate subformulas of a formula P are the subformulas to which P
is directly connected by lines.

AS

The atomic subformulas of a formula P are the sentence letters that appear
across the top row of its tree.

MO

The main operator of a formula P is the last operator added in its tree.
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c. .B/
d. .A ! B ! C /
e. ..A ! B/ ! .A ! C / ! D/
E2.5. For each of the following expressions, determine whether it is a formula and
sentence of Ls . If it is, show it on a tree, and exhibit its parts as in E2.3. If it is
not, explain why as in E2.4.
*a. ..A ! B/ ! ..A ! B/ ! A//
b. .A ! B ! ..A ! B/ ! A//
*c. .A ! B/ ! ..A ! B/ ! A/
d. .A ! A/
e. ...A ! B/ ! .C ! D// ! ..E ! F / ! G//

2.2.3

Abbreviations

We have completed the official grammar for our sentential languages. So far, the
languages are relatively simple. When we turn to reasoning about logic (in later parts),
it will be good to have our languages as simple as we can. However, for applications of
logic it will be advantageous to have additional expressions which, though redundant
with expressions of the language already introduced, simplify the work. I begin by
introducing these additional expressions, and then turn to the question about how to
understand the redundancy.
Abbreviating. As may already be obvious, formulas of a sentential language like
Ls can get complicated quickly. Abbreviated forms give us ways to manipulate
official expressions without undue pain. First, for any formulas P and Q,
AB

(_) .P _ Q/ abbreviates .P ! Q/
(^) .P ^ Q/ abbreviates .P ! Q/
($) .P $ Q/ abbreviates ..P ! Q/ ! .Q ! P //
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The last of these is easier than it looks; I say something about this below. _ is wedge, ^
is caret, and $ is double arrow. An expression of the form .P _ Q/ is a disjunction
with P and Q as disjuncts; it has the standard reading, (P or Q). An expression of the
form .P ^ Q/ is a conjunction with P and Q as conjuncts; it has the standard reading,
(P and Q). An expression of the form .P $ Q/ is a (material) biconditional; it has
the standard reading, (P iff Q).2 Again, we do not use ordinary English to define our
symbols. All the same, this should suggest how the extra operators extend the range
of what we are able to say in a natural way.
With the abbreviations, we are in a position to introduce derived clauses for FR.
Suppose P and Q are formulas; then by FR(), P is a formula; so by FR(!),
.P ! Q/ is a formula; but this is just to say that .P _ Q/ is a formula. And
similarly in the other cases. (If you are confused by such reasoning, work it out on a
tree.) Thus we arrive at the following conditions:
FR 0

(_) If P and Q are formulas, then .P _ Q/ is a formula.
(^) If P and Q are formulas, then .P ^ Q/ is a formula.
($) If P and Q are formulas, then .P $ Q/ is a formula.

Once FR is extended in this way, the additional conditions may be applied directly in
trees. Thus, for example, if P is a formula and Q is a formula, we can safely move in
a tree to the conclusion that .P _ Q/ is a formula by FR0 (_). Similarly, for a more
complex case, ..A $ B/ ^ .A _ B// is a formula.
A

B

A

@
@
@

.A $ B/

(G)

\

A

@
\
@
@
\
.A _ B/
\

\

\\


..A $ B/ ^ .A _ B//

B

These are formulas by FR(s)

These are formulas by FR0 ($) and FR()

This is a formula by FR0 (_)

This is a formula by FR0 (^)

In a derived sense, expressions with the new symbols have subformulas, atomic
subformulas, immediate subformulas, and main operator all as before. Thus on the
diagram immediately above, with notation from exercises—bracket for subformulas,
2 Common

alternatives are & for ^, and  for $. Less common nowadays is a dot (period) for ^.
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star for atomic subformulas, box for immediate subformulas, and circle for main
operator:
A?

(H)

s
u
b
f
o
r
m
u
l
a
s

B?

A?

B?

These are formulas by FR(s)

@
@
@

.A $ B/

A

@
@
@

e
e

.A _ B/

e
e
e
!!
e!

These are formulas by FR0 ($) and FR()

This is a formula by FR0 (_)

!!

..A $ B/ ^ .A _ B//

This is a formula by FR0 (^)

In the derived sense, ..A $ B/ ^ .A _ B// has immediate subformulas .A $ B/
and .A _ B/, and main operator ^.
Return to the case of .P $ Q/ and observe that it can be thought of as based on a
simple abbreviation of the sort we expect. That is, ..P ! Q/ ^ .Q ! P // is of the
sort .A ^ B/; so by AB(^), it abbreviates .A ! B/; but with .P ! Q/ for A
and .Q ! P / for B, this is just, ..P ! Q/ ! .Q ! P // as in AB($). So you
may think of .P $ Q/ as an abbreviation of ..P ! Q/ ^ .Q ! P //, which in turn
abbreviates the more complex ..P ! Q/ ! .Q ! P //. This is what we expect:
a double arrow is like an arrow going from P to Q and an arrow going from Q to P .
A couple of additional abbreviations concern parentheses. First, it is sometimes
convenient to use a pair of square brackets [ ] in place of parentheses ( ). This is
purely for visual convenience; for example ((()())) may be more difficult to absorb
than ([()()]). Second, if the very last step of a tree for some formula P is justified by
FR (!), FR 0 (^), FR 0 (_), or FR 0 ($), we feel free to abbreviate P with the outermost
set of parentheses or brackets dropped. Again, this is purely for visual convenience.
Thus, for example, we might write, A ! .B ! C / in place of .A ! .B ! C //.
As it turns out, where A, B, and C are formulas, there is a difference between
..A ! B/ ! C/ and .A ! .B ! C //, insofar as the main operator shifts from one
case to the other. In .A ! B ! C/, however, it is not clear which arrow should be
the main operator. That is why we do not count the latter as a grammatical formula or
sentence. Similarly there is a difference between .A ! B/ and .A ! B/; again,
the main operator shifts. However, there is no room for ambiguity when we drop just
an outermost pair of parentheses and write .A ! B/ ! C for ..A ! B/ ! C/; and
similarly when we write A ! .B ! C / for .A ! .B ! C//. The same reasoning
applies for abbreviations with ^, _, or $. So dropping outermost parentheses counts
as a legitimate abbreviation.
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An expression which uses the extra operators, square brackets, or drops outermost
parentheses is a formula just insofar as it is a sort of shorthand for an official formula
which does not. But we will not usually distinguish between the shorthand expressions
and official formulas. Thus, again, the new conditions may be applied directly
in trees and, for example, the following is a legitimate tree to demonstrate that
A _ .ŒA ! B ^ B/ is a formula:
A

A

S
S

B

Formulas by FR(s)

@
@

ŒA ! B

S
S

(I)

B

@
Formula by FR(!), with [ ]

H
HH
H

S
S
S
S

H
H

.ŒA ! B ^ B/

Formula by FR0 (^)


S

S

S
Formula by FR0 (_), with outer ( ) dropped

A _ .ŒA ! B ^ B/
FR 0 ,

So we use our extra conditions for
introduce square brackets instead of parentheses, and drop parentheses in the very last step. The only case where you can omit
parentheses is if they would have been added in the very last step of the tree. So long
as we do not distinguish between shorthand expressions and official formulas, we
regard a tree of this sort as sufficient to demonstrate that an expression is a formula
and a sentence.
Unabbreviating. As we have suggested, there is a certain tension between the
advantages of a simple language, and one that is more complex. When a language
is simple, it is easier to reason about; when it has additional resources, it is easier to
use. Expressions with ^, _, and $ are redundant with expressions that do not have
them—though it is easier to work with a language that has ^, _, and $ than with one
that does not (something like reciting the Pledge of Allegiance in English, and then in
Morse code; you can do it in either, but it is easier in the former). If all we wanted was
a simple language to reason about, we would forget about the extra operators. If all
we wanted was a language easy to use, we would forget about keeping the language
simple. To have the advantages of both, we have adopted the position that expressions
with the extra operators abbreviate, or are a shorthand for, expressions of the original
language. It will be convenient to work with abbreviations in many contexts. But
when it comes to reasoning about the language, we set the abbreviations to the side
and focus on the official language itself.
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For this to work, we have to be able to undo abbreviations when required. It is, of
course, easy enough to substitute parentheses back for square brackets, or to replace
outermost dropped parentheses. For formulas with the extra operators, it is always
possible to work through trees, using AB to replace formulas with unabbreviated
forms, one operator at a time. Consider an example:
A

B

A

@
@

.A $ B/

(J)

B

A

B

A

B

@
@
@

@
A

\
@
\
@
@
\
.A _ B/
\

\

\ 
..A $ B/ ^ .A _ B//

..A ! B/ ! .B ! A//

\
\
\
\

A

@
@
@

.A ! B/


\

\ 

...A ! B/ ! .B ! A// ! .A ! B//

The tree on the left is (G) from above. The tree on the right uses AB to “unpack”
each of the expressions on the left. Atomics remain as before. Then, at each stage,
given an unabbreviated version of the parts, we give an unabbreviated version of the
whole. First, .A $ B/ abbreviates ..A ! B/ ! .B ! A//; this is a simple
application of AB($). A is not an abbreviation and so remains as before. From
AB (_), .P _ Q/ abbreviates .P ! Q/; in this case, P is A and Q is B; so we
take tilde the P arrow the Q (so that we get two tildes). For the final result, we
combine the input formulas according to the unabbreviated form for ^. It is more a
bookkeeping problem than anything: There is one formula P that is the unabbreviated
version of .A $ B/, another Q that is the unabbreviated version of .A _ B/; these
are combined into .P ^ Q/ and so by AB(^) into .P ! Q/. You should be able
to see that this is just what we have done. There is a tilde and a parenthesis; then the
P ; then an arrow and a tilde; then the Q; and a closing parenthesis. Not only is the
abbreviation more compact but, as we shall see, there is a corresponding advantage
when it comes to grasping what an expression says.
Here is another example, this time from (I). In this case, we replace also square
brackets and restore dropped outer parentheses.
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ŒA ! B

S
S
S
S

S

S
S 
S

HH

S
HH

.ŒA ! B ^ B/

S

.A ! B/

S

HH
H




A _ .ŒA ! B ^ B/

B

@
@
@

S

@
@

S

B

A

A

S

@

S

(K)

B

B

A

A
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S

HH
H

..A ! B/ ! B/

S
S


S 
S

.A ! ..A ! B/ ! B//

In the right-hand tree, we reintroduce parentheses for the square brackets. Similarly,
we apply AB(^) and AB(_) to unpack shorthand symbols. And outer parentheses are
reintroduced at the very last step. Thus A _ .ŒA ! B ^ B/ is a shorthand for the
unabbreviated expression, .A ! ..A ! B/ ! B//.
Observe that these right-hand trees are not ones of the sort you would use directly
to show that an expression is a formula by FR! FR does not let you move directly from
that .A ! B/ is a formula and B is a formula, to the result that ..A ! B/ ! B/
is a formula as just above. Of course, if .A ! B/ and B are formulas, then ..A !
B/ ! B/ is a formula, and nothing stops a tree to show it. This is the point of
our derived clauses for FR0 . In fact, this is a good check on your unabbreviations: If
the result is not a formula, you have made a mistake. But you should not think of
trees as on the right as involving application of FR. Rather they are unabbreviating
trees, having exactly one node corresponding to each node on the left; by AB the
unabbreviating tree unpacks each expression from the left into its unabbreviated form.
The combination of a formula constructed with FR0 and then unabbreviated by AB
always results in an expression that meets all the requirements from FR.
E2.6. For each of the following expressions, demonstrate that it is a formula and a
sentence of Ls with a tree. Then on the tree (i) bracket all the subformulas, (ii)
box the immediate subformula(s), (iii) star the atomic subformulas, and (iv) circle
the main operator.
*a. .A ^ B/ ! C
b. .ŒA ! K14  _ C3 /
c. B ! .A $ B/
d. .B ! A/ ^ .C _ A/
e. .A _ B/ $ .C ^ A/
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*E2.7. For each of the formulas in E2.6a–e, produce an unabbreviating tree to find
the unabbreviated expression it represents.

*E2.8. For each of the unabbreviated expressions from E2.7a–e, produce a complete
tree to show by direct application of FR that it is an official formula.

E2.9. In the text, we introduced derived clauses to FR by reasoning as follows:
“Suppose P and Q are formulas; then by FR(), P is a formula; so by FR(!),
.P ! Q/ is a formula; but this is just to say that .P _ Q/ is a formula. And
similarly in the other cases” (page 44). Supposing that P and Q are formulas,
produce the similar reasoning to show that .P ^ Q/ and .P $ Q/ are formulas.
Hint: Again, it may help to think about trees.

E2.10. For each of the following concepts, explain in an essay of about two pages,
so that (high-school age) Hannah could understand. In your essay, you should
(i) identify the objects to which the concept applies, (ii) give and explain the
definition, and give and explicate examples of your own construction (iii) where
the concept applies, and (iv) where it does not. Your essay should exhibit an
understanding of methods from the text.
a. The vocabulary for a sentential language, and use of the metalanguage.
b. A formula of a sentential language.
c. The parts of a formula.
d. The abbreviation and unabbreviation for an official formula of a sentential
language.

2.3

Quantificational Languages

Chapter 3

Axiomatic Deduction
We have not yet said what our sentences mean. This is just what we do in the next
chapter. However, just as it is possible to do grammar without reference to meaning, so
it is possible to do derivations without reference to meaning. Derivations are defined
purely in relation to the syntax of formal expressions. That is why it is crucial to show
that derivations stand in important relations to validity and truth, as we do in ??. And
that is why it is possible to do derivations without knowing what the expressions mean.
In this chapter we develop an axiomatic derivation system without any reference to
meaning and truth. Apart from relations to meaning and truth, derivations are perfectly
well-defined—counting at least as a sort of puzzle or game with, perhaps, a related
“thrill of victory” and “agony of defeat.” And as with a game, it is possible to build
derivation skills to become a better player. Later, we will show how derivation games
matter.1
Derivation systems are constructed for different purposes. Introductions to mathematical logic typically employ an axiomatic approach. We will see a natural deduction
system in chapter 6. The advantage of axiomatic systems is their extreme simplicity.
From a practical point of view, when we want to think about logic, it is convenient to
have a relatively simple object to think about. Axiomatic systems have this advantage,
though they can be relatively difficult to apply. The axiomatic approach makes it
natural to build toward increasingly complex and powerful results. However, in the
beginning at least, axiomatic derivations can be challenging!
We will introduce our system in stages: After some general remarks in section 3.1
1 This

chapter has its place to crystallize the point about form. However it is out of order from
a learning point of view. Having developed the grammar of our formal languages, a sensible course
in mathematical logic will skip to chapter 4 and return only after chapter 6. (But you might attempt
section 3.1 to get the basic idea.)
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about what an axiom system is supposed to be, we will introduce the sentential
component of our system (section 3.2). After that, we will turn to the full system
for forms with quantifiers and equality (section 3.3), and finally to a mathematical
application (??).

3.1

General

Before turning to the derivations themselves, it will be helpful to make a point about
the metalanguage and form. We are familiar with the idea that different formulas may
be of the same form. Thus, for example, where P and Q are formulas, A ! B and
A ! .B _ C / are both of the form P ! Q—in the one case Q maps to B, and in the
other to .B _ C /. But, similarly, one form may map to another. Thus, for example,
P ! Q maps to A ! .B _ C/.
P !Q


?

‚ …„ ƒ
A ! .B _ C/

(A)

@
R QQ
s

‚ …„ ƒ
‚ …„ ƒ
.R ^ S / ! ..R ^ T / _U /
And, by a sort of derived map, any formula of the form A ! .B _ C/ is of the form
P ! Q as well. In this chapter we frequently apply one form to another—depending
on the fact that all formulas of one form are of another.
Given a formal language L, an axiomatic logic AL consists of two parts. There
is a set of axioms and a set of rules. Different axiomatic logics result from different
axioms and rules. For now, the set of axioms is just some privileged collection of
formulas. A rule tells us that one formula follows from some others. One way to
specify axioms and rules is by form. Thus, for example, modus ponens may be
included among the rules.
MP

P ! Q; P

Q
According to this rule, for any formulas P and Q, the formula Q follows from P ! Q
together with P . Thus, as applied to Ls , B follows by MP from A ! B and A; but
also .B $ D/ follows from .A ! B/ ! .B $ D/ and .A ! B/. And for a case
put in the metalanguage, quite generally, a formula of the form .B _ C/ follows from
A ! .B _ C/ and A—for any formulas of the form A ! .B _ C/ and A are of
the forms P ! Q and P as well. Axioms also may be specified by form. Thus, for
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some language with formulas P and Q, a logic might include among its axioms all
formulas of the forms,
^1 .P ^ Q/ ! P

^2

.P ^ Q/ ! Q

^3 P ! .Q ! .P ^ Q//

Then in Ls ,
.A ^ B/ ! A,

.A ^ A/ ! A

..A ! B/ ^ C / ! .A ! B/

are all axioms of form ^1. Insofar as each has indefinitely many instances, ^1–^3
are axiom schemas (or schemata). So far, for a given axiomatic logic AL, there are
no constraints on just which formulas will be the axioms, and just which rules are
included. The point is only that we specify an axiomatic logic when we specify some
collection of axioms and rules.
Suppose we have specified some axioms and rules for an axiomatic logic AL. Then
where  (Gamma) is a set of formulas—taken as the formal premises of an argument,
AV

(p) If P is a premise (a member of ), then P is a consequence in AL of .
(a) If P is an axiom of AL, then P is a consequence in AL of .
(r) If Q1 : : : Qn are consequences in AL of , and there is a rule of AL such
that P follows from Q1 : : : Qn by the rule, then P is a consequence in AL
of .
(CL) Any consequence in AL of  may be obtained by repeated application of
these rules.

The first two clauses make premises and axioms consequences in AL of . And if,
say, MP is a rule of an AL and P ! Q and P are consequences in AL of , then by
AV(r), Q is a consequence in AL of  as well. If P is a consequence in AL of some
premises , then the premises prove P in AL and equivalently the argument is valid
in AL; in this case we write  `AL P . The ` symbol is the single turnstile (to contrast
with a double turnstile  from chapter 4). If Q1 : : : Qn are the members of , we
sometimes write Q1 : : : Qn `AL P in place of  `AL P . If  has no members and
 `AL P , then P is a theorem of AL. In this case we simply write, `AL P .
Before turning to our official axiomatic system AD, it will be helpful to consider
a preliminary example. Suppose an axiomatic derivation system AP has MP as its
only rule, and just formulas of the forms ^1, ^2, and ^3 as axioms. AV is a recursive
definition like ones we have seen before. Thus nothing stops us from working out its
consequences on trees. Thus we can show that A ^ .B ^ C/ `AP C ^ B as follows:
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A
A
A
A

(B)

.B ^ C/ ! C

A ^ .B ^ C /

\
\
\
\
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.A ^ .B ^ C // ! .B ^ C /


HH 
H
B^C

.B ^ C / ! B

,
,
,
,

,
HH
HH ,
\ 
A
\
H,
A
C
B
A


,

A

,
A 
,
B ! .C ^ B/
,
XXX
,
XXX
XXX ,
X,
C ^B

In this case, the only member of  is the premise, A ^ .B ^ C/. For definition AV,
the basic elements are the premises and axioms. These occur across the top row. Thus,
reading from the left, the first form is an instance of ^3. The second is of type ^2.
The third is the premise. Any formula of the form .A ^ .B ^ C// ! .B ^ C/ is
of the form, .P ^ Q/ ! Q; so the fourth is of the type ^2. And the last is of the
type ^1. So by AV(a) and AV(p) they are all consequences in AP of . After that,
all the results are by MP, and so consequences by AV(r). Thus for example, in the
second row, .A ^ .B ^ C// ! .B ^ C/ and A ^ .B ^ C / are of the sort P ! Q
and P , with A ^ .B ^ C/ for P and .B ^ C/ for Q; thus B ^ C follows from them
by MP. So B ^ C is a consequence in AP of  by AV(r). And similarly for the other
consequences. Notice that applications of MP and of the axiom forms are independent
from one use to the next. The expressions that count as P or Q must be consistent
within a given application of the axiom or rule, but may vary from one application
of the axiom or rule to the next. If you are familiar with another derivation system,
perhaps the one from chapter 6, you may think of an axiom as a rule without inputs.
Then the axiom applies to expressions of its form in the usual way.
These diagrams can get messy, and it is traditional to represent the same information as follows, using annotations to indicate relations among formulas:

(C)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

A ^ .B ^ C/
.A ^ .B ^ C // ! .B ^ C /
B^C
.B ^ C/ ! B
B
.B ^ C/ ! C
C
C ! .B ! .C ^ B//
B ! .C ^ B/
C ^B

prem(ise)
^2
2,1 MP
^1
4,3 MP
^2
6,3 MP
^3
8,7 MP
9,5 MP
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Each of the forms (1)–(10) is a consequence of A ^ .B ^ C/ in AP. As indicated
on the right, the first is a premise, and so a consequence by AV(p). The second is
an axiom of the form ^2, and so a consequence by AV(a). The third follows by MP
from the forms on lines (2) and (1), and so is a consequence by AV(r). And so forth.
Such a demonstration is an axiomatic derivation. This derivation contains the very
same information as the tree diagram (B), only with geometric arrangement replaced
by line numbers to indicate relations between forms. Observe that we might have
accomplished the same end with a different arrangement of lines. For example, we
might have listed all the axioms first, with applications of MP after. The important
point is that in an axiomatic derivation, each line is either an axiom, a premise, or
follows from previous lines by a rule. Just as a tree is sufficient to demonstrate that
 `AL P , that P is a consequence of  in AL, so an axiomatic derivation is sufficient
to show the same. In fact, we shall typically use derivations rather than trees to show
that  `AL P .
Notice that we have been reasoning with sentence forms, and so have shown that a
formula of the form C ^ B follows in AP from one of the form A ^ .B ^ C/. Given
this, we freely appeal to results of one derivation in the process of doing another.
Thus, if we were to encounter a formula of the form A ^ .B ^ C/ in an AP derivation,
we might simply cite the derivation (C) completed above, and move directly to the
conclusion that C ^ B. The resultant derivation would be an abbreviation of an
official one which includes each of the above steps to reach C ^ B. In this way,
derivations remain manageable, and we are able to build toward results of increasing
complexity. (Compare your high school experience of Euclidian geometry.) All of this
should become more clear as we turn to the official and complete axiomatic system,
AD.
E3.1. Where AP is as above with rule MP and axioms ^1–^3, construct derivations
to show each of the following.
*a. A ^ .B ^ C/ `AP B
b. A; B; C `AP A ^ .B ^ C/
c. A ^ .B ^ C/ `AP .A ^ B/ ^ C
d. .A ^ B/ ^ .C ^ D/ `AP B ^ C
e. `AP ..A ^ B/ ! A/ ^ ..A ^ B/ ! B/
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E3.2. Demonstrate E3.1a by a tree diagram, as for (B) above.
On a course in symbolic logic: Unless you have a special reason for studying axiomatic
systems, or are just looking for some really challenging puzzles, you should pass over the
rest of this chapter until you have completed chapter 6. At that stage, you will be better
prepared for this one. Chapter 3 is not required for any of chapters 4–7. It makes sense here
to locate derivations in the conceptual order, and so to underline the point that derivations
are defined apart from notions of validity and truth as we encounter them in chapter 4. But
it is completely out of order from a learning point of view. After chapter 6 you can return
to this chapter, while recognizing its place in the conceptual order (see note 1).

3.2

Sentential

We begin by focusing on sentential forms, forms involving just  and ! (and so ^,
_, and $). The sentential component ADs of our official axiomatic logic AD tells us
how to manipulate such forms, whether they be forms for expressions in a sentential
language like Ls , or in a quantificational language like Lq . ADs includes three axiom
forms and one rule.
ADs A1. P ! .Q ! P /
A2. .O ! .P ! Q// ! ..O ! P / ! .O ! Q//
A3. .Q ! P / ! ..Q ! P / ! Q/
MP. Q follows from P ! Q and P
We have already encountered MP. To take some cases to appear immediately below,
the following are both of the sort A1:
A ! .A ! A/

.B ! C/ ! ŒA ! .B ! C/

Observe that P and Q need not be different. You should be clear about these cases.
Although MP is the only rule, we allow free movement between an expression and its
abbreviated forms, with justification, “abv.” That is it! As above,  `ADs P just in
case P is a consequence of  in ADs.  `ADs P just in case there is an ADs derivation
of P from premises in .
The following is a series of derivations where, as we shall see, each may depend
on ones from before. At first, do not worry so much about strategy, as about the
mechanics of the system.
T3.1. `ADs A ! A
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.A ! .ŒA ! A ! A// ! ..A ! ŒA ! A/ ! .A ! A//
A ! .ŒA ! A ! A/
.A ! ŒA ! A/ ! .A ! A/
A ! ŒA ! A
A!A

A2
A1
1,2 MP
A1
3,4 MP

Line (1) is an axiom of the form A2 with A for O, A ! A for P , and A for Q.
Notice again that O and Q may be any formulas, so nothing prevents them from being
the same. Line (2) is an axiom of the form A1 with A ! A for Q. Similarly, line (4)
is an axiom of form A1 with A in place of both P and Q. The applications of MP
should be straightforward.
T3.2. A ! B; B ! C `ADs A ! C
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

ŒA ! .B ! C/ ! Œ.A ! B/ ! .A ! C/
.B ! C / ! ŒA ! .B ! C/
B!C
A ! .B ! C /
.A ! B/ ! .A ! C /
A!B
A!C

A2
A1
prem
2,3 MP
1,4 MP
prem
5,6 MP

Line (1) is an instance of A2 which gives us our goal with two applications of MP—
that is, from (1), A ! C follows by MP if we have A ! .B ! C/ and A ! B. But
the second of these is a premise, so the only real challenge is getting A ! .B ! C/.
But since B ! C is a premise, we can use A1 to get anything arrow it—and that is
just what we do on lines (2)–(4).
T3.3. A ! .B ! C/ `ADs B ! .A ! C /
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

ŒA ! .B ! C/ ! Œ.A ! B/ ! .A ! C/
A ! .B ! C /
.A ! B/ ! .A ! C /
B ! .A ! B/
B ! .A ! C /

A2
prem
1,2 MP
A1
4,3 T3.2

In this case, the first four steps are very much like ones you have seen before. But
the last is not. T3.2 lets us move from A ! B and B ! C to A ! C ; it is a sort of
transitivity or “chain” principle which lets us move from a first form to a last through
some middle term. We have B ! .A ! B/ on line (4), and .A ! B/ ! .A ! C /
on line (3). These are of the form to be inputs to T3.2—with B for A, A ! B for
B, and A ! C for C. In this case, A ! B is the middle term. So at line (5), we
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simply observe that lines (4) and (3), together with the reasoning from T3.2, give us
the desired result.
T3.2 is an important principle, of significance comparable to MP for the way you
think about derivations. If you have X ! A and want A, it makes sense to go for X
towards an application of MP. But if you have A ! X and want A ! B, it makes
sense to go for X ! B toward an application of T3.2. And similarly if you have
X ! B and want A ! B, it makes sense to go for A ! X for T3.2. At (3) of the
above derivation we are in a situation of this latter sort, and so obtain (4).
What we have produced above is not an official derivation where each step is a
premise, an axiom, or follows from previous lines by a rule. But we have produced an
abbreviation of one. And nothing prevents us from unabbreviating by including the
routine from T3.2 to produce a derivation in the official form. To see this, first observe
that the derivation for T3.2 has its premises at lines (3) and (6), where lines with the
corresponding forms in the derivation for T3.3 appear at (3) and (4). However, it is a
simple matter to reorder the derivation for T3.2 so that it takes its premises from those
same lines. Thus here is another demonstration for T3.2:

(D)

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

B!C
A!B
ŒA ! .B ! C/ ! Œ.A ! B/ ! .A ! C /
.B ! C / ! ŒA ! .B ! C/
A ! .B ! C /
.A ! B/ ! .A ! C/
A!C

prem
prem
A2
A1
6,3 MP
5,7 MP
8,4 MP

Compared to the original derivation for T3.2, all that is different is the order of a few
lines, and corresponding line numbers. The reason for reordering the lines is for a
merge of this derivation with the one for T3.3.
But now, although we are after expressions of the form A ! B and B ! C, the
actual forms we want for T3.3 are B ! .A ! B/ and .A ! B/ ! .A ! C/. But
we can convert derivation (D) to one with those very forms by uniform substituation
of B for every A; .A ! B/ for every B; and .A ! C/ for every C—that is, we
apply our original map to the entire derivation (D). The result is as follows:

(E)

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

.A ! B/ ! .A ! C/
B ! .A ! B/
ŒB ! ..A ! B/ ! .A ! C // ! Œ.B ! .A ! B// ! .B ! .A ! C //
..A ! B/ ! .A ! C // ! ŒB ! ..A ! B/ ! .A ! C //
B ! ..A ! B/ ! .A ! C//
.B ! .A ! B// ! .B ! .A ! C //
B ! .A ! C /

prem
prem
A2
A1
6,3 MP
5,7 MP
8,4 MP
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You should trace the parallel between derivations (D) and (E) all the way through. And
you should verify that (E) is a derivation on its own. This is an application of the point
that our derivation for T3.2 applies to any premises and conclusions of that form. The
result is a direct demonstration that B ! .A ! B/; .A ! B/ ! .A ! C/ `ADs
B ! .A ! C/.
And now it is a simple matter to merge the lines from (E) into the derivation for
T3.3 to produce a complete demonstration that A ! .B ! C/ `ADs B ! .A ! C/.

(F)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

ŒA ! .B ! C/ ! Œ.A ! B/ ! .A ! C /
A ! .B ! C /
.A ! B/ ! .A ! C/
B ! .A ! B/
ŒB ! ..A ! B/ ! .A ! C // ! Œ.B ! .A ! B// ! .B ! .A ! C //
..A ! B/ ! .A ! C // ! ŒB ! ..A ! B/ ! .A ! C //
B ! ..A ! B/ ! .A ! C//
.B ! .A ! B// ! .B ! .A ! C //
B ! .A ! C /

A2
prem
1,2 MP
A1
A2
A1
6,3 MP
5,7 MP
8,4 MP

Lines (1)–(4) are the same as from the derivation for T3.3, and include what are the
premises to (E). Lines (5)–(9) are the same as from (E). The result is a demonstration
for T3.3 in which every line is a premise, an axiom, or follows from previous lines
by MP. Again, you should follow each step. It is hard to believe that we could think
up this last derivation—particularly at this early stage of our career. However, if we
can produce the simpler derivation, we can be sure that this more complex one exists.
Thus we can be sure that the final result is a consequence of the premise in AD. That is
the point of our direct appeal to T3.2 in the original derivation of T3.3. And similarly
in cases that follow. In general, we are always free to appeal to prior results in any
derivation—so that our toolbox gets bigger at every stage. With this in mind, you may
find the AD summary on page ?? helpful.
T3.4. `ADs .B ! C/ ! Œ.A ! B/ ! .A ! C/
1. ŒA ! .B ! C/ ! Œ.A ! B/ ! .A ! C/
2. .B ! C / ! ŒA ! .B ! C/
3. .B ! C / ! Œ.A ! B/ ! .A ! C/

A2
A1
2,1 T3.2

Again we have an application of T3.2. In this case, the middle term (the B) from T3.2
maps to A ! .B ! C /. Once we see that the consequent of what we want is like
the consequent of A2, we should be “inspired” by T3.2 to go for (2) as a link between
the antecedent of what we want and antecedent of A2. As it turns out, this is easy to
get as an instance of A1. It is helpful to say to yourself in words, what the various
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axioms and theorems do. Thus, given some P , A1 yields anything arrow it. And T3.2
is a simple transitivity principle.
T3.5. `ADs .A ! B/ ! Œ.B ! C/ ! .A ! C/
1. .B ! C / ! Œ.A ! B/ ! .A ! C/
2. .A ! B/ ! Œ.B ! C / ! .A ! C/

T3.4
1 T3.3

T3.5 is like T3.4 except that A ! B and B ! C switch places. But T3.3 precisely
switches terms in those places—with B ! C for A, A ! B for B, and A ! C for
C. Again, often what is difficult about these derivations is “seeing” what you can
do. Thus it is good to say to yourself in words what the different principles give you.
Once you realize what T3.3 does, it is obvious that you have T3.5 immediately from
T3.4.
T3.6. B; A ! .B ! C/ `ADs A ! C
Hint: You can get this in the basic system using just A1 and A2. But you can get
it in just four lines if you use T3.3.
T3.7. `ADs .A ! A/ ! A
Hint: This follows in just three lines from A3, with an instance of T3.1.
T3.8. `ADs .B ! A/ ! .A ! B/
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

.B ! A/ ! Œ.B ! A/ ! B
ŒA ! .B ! A/ ! Œ..B ! A/ ! B/ ! .A ! B/
A ! .B ! A/
..B ! A/ ! B/ ! .A ! B/
.B ! A/ ! .A ! B/

A3
T3.5
A1
2,3 MP
1,4 T3.2

The idea behind this derivation is that the antecedent of A3 is the antecedent of our goal.
So we can get the goal by T3.2 with (1) and (4). That is, given .B ! A/ ! X,
what we need to get the goal by an application of T3.2 is X ! .A ! B/. But that
is just what (4) is. The challenge is to get (4). Our strategy uses T3.5 with A1. This
derivation is not particularly easy to see. Here is another approach, which is not all
that easy either:

(G)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

.B ! A/ ! Œ.B ! A/ ! B
.B ! A/ ! Œ.B ! A/ ! B
A ! .B ! A/
A ! Œ.B ! A/ ! B
.B ! A/ ! .A ! B/

A3
1 T3.3
A1
3,2 T3.2
4 T3.3
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This derivation also begins with A3. The idea this time is to use T3.3 to “swing”
B ! A out, “replace” it by A with T3.2 and A1, and then use T3.3 to “swing” A
back in.
T3.9. `ADs A ! .A ! B/
Hint: You can do this in three lines with T3.8 and an instance of A1.
T3.10. `ADs A ! A
Hint: You can do this in three lines wih instances of T3.7 and T3.9.
T3.11. `ADs A ! A
Hint: You can do this in three lines with instances of T3.8 and T3.10.
*T3.12. `ADs .A ! B/ ! .A ! B/
Hint: Use T3.5 and T3.10 to get .A ! B/ ! .A ! B/; then use T3.4
and T3.11 to get .A ! B/ ! .A ! B/; the result follows easily by
T3.2.
T3.13. `ADs .A ! B/ ! .B ! A/
Hint: You can do this in three lines with instances of T3.8 and T3.12.
T3.14. `ADs .A ! B/ ! .B ! A/
Hint: Use T3.4 and T3.10 to get .B ! A/ ! .B ! A/; the result follows easily with an instance of T3.13.
T3.15. `AD .A ! B/ ! .B ! A/
Hint: This time you will be able to use T3.5 and T3.11 with T3.13.
T3.16. `ADs .A ! B/ ! Œ.A ! B/ ! B
Hint: Use T3.13 and A3 to get .A ! B/ ! Œ.B ! A/ ! B; then use T3.5
and T3.14 to get Œ.B ! A/ ! B ! Œ.A ! B/ ! B; the result follows
easily by T3.2.

CHAPTER 3. AXIOMATIC DEDUCTION

61

*T3.17. `ADs A ! ŒB ! .A ! B/
Hint: Use T3.1 and T3.3 to get A ! Œ.A ! B/ ! B; then use T3.13 to “turn
around” the consequent. This idea of deriving conditionals in “reversed” form,
and then using one of T3.13–T3.15 to turn them around, is frequently useful for
getting tilde outside of a complex expression.
T3.18. `ADs A ! .A _ B/
1. A ! .A ! B/
2. A ! .A ! B/
3. A ! .A _ B/

T3.9
1 T3.3
2 abv

We set as our goal the unabbreviated form. We have this at (2). Then, in the last line,
simply observe that the goal abbreviates what has already been shown.
T3.19. `ADs A ! .B _ A/
Hint: Go for A ! .B ! A/. Then, as above, you can get the desired result in
one step by abv.
T3.20. `ADs .A ^ B/ ! B
T3.21. `ADs .A ^ B/ ! A
*T3.22. A ! .B ! C / `ADs .A ^ B/ ! C
T3.23. .A ^ B/ ! C `ADs A ! .B ! C /
T3.24. A; A $ B `ADs B
Hint: A $ B abbreviates the same thing as .A ! B/ ^ .B ! A/; you may
thus move to this expression from A $ B by abv.
T3.25. B; A $ B `ADs A
T3.26. A; A $ B `ADs B
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T3.27. B; A $ B `ADs A
*E3.3. Provide derivations for T3.6–T3.7, T3.9–T3.17, and T3.19–T3.27. Again,
as you are working these problems, you may find it helpful to refer to the AD
summary on page ??.
E3.4. For each of the following, expand derivations to include all the steps from
theorems. The result should be a derivation in which each step is either a premise
an axiom, or follows from previous lines by a rule. Hint: It may be helpful to
proceed in stages as for (D), (E), and then (F) above.
a. Expand your derivation for T3.7.
*b. Expand the above derivation for T3.4.
E3.5. Consider an axiomatic system A which takes ^ and  as primitive operators,
and treats P ! Q as an abbreviation for .P ^ Q/. Forms for the axioms and
rule are,
A A1.
A2.
A3.
MP.

P ! .P ^ P /
.P ^ Q/ ! P
.O ! P / ! Œ.P ^ Q/ ! .Q ^ O/
.P ^ Q/; P `A Q (so that P ! Q; P `A Q)

Provide derivations for each of the following, where derivations may appeal to
any prior result (no matter what you have done).
*a. A ! B; B ! C `A .C ^ A/

*b. `A .A ^ A/

*c. `A A ! A

*d. `A .A ^ B/ ! .B ! A/

e. `A A ! A

f. `A .A ! B/ ! .B ! A/

*g. A ! B `A B ! A

h. A ! B `A .C ^ A/ ! .B ^ C /

*i. A ! B; B ! C ; C ! D `A A ! D

j. `A A ! A

k. `A .A ^ B/ ! .B ^ A/

l. A ! B; B ! C `A A ! C

m. B ! B `A B

n. B ! B `A B

o. `A .A ^ B/ ! B

p. A ! B; C ! D `A .A ^ C / ! .B ^ D/
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q. B ! C `A .A ^ B/ ! .A ^ C/

r. A ! B; A ! C `A A ! .B ^ C/

s. `A Œ.A ^ B/ ^ C  ! ŒA ^ .B ^ C /

t. `A ŒA ^ .B ^ C / ! Œ.A ^ B/ ^ C 

*u. `A ŒA ! .B ! C / ! Œ.A ^ B/ ! C/ v. `A Œ.A ^ B/ ! C  ! ŒA ! .B ! C/
w. A ! .B ! C / `A B ! .A ! C /
y. `A A ! ŒB ! .A ^ B/

*x. A ! B; A ! .B ! C/ `A A ! C
z. `A A ! .B ! A/

Hints: (i): Apply (a) to the first two premises and (f) to the third; then recognize that you
have the makings for an application of A3. (j): Apply A1, two instances of (h), and an
instance of (i) to get A ! ..A ^ A/ ^ .A ^ A//; the result follows easily with A2 and
(i). (m): B ! B is equivalent to .B ^ B/; and B ! .B ^ B/ is immediate
from A1; you can turn this around by (f) to get .B ^ B/ ! B; then it is easy.
(u): Use abv so that you are going for ŒA ^ .B ^ C/ ! Œ.A ^ B/ ^ C ;
plan on getting to this by (f). (v): Structure your proof very much as with (u). (x): Use (u)
to set up a “chain” to which you can apply transitivity.

3.3

Quantificational

Chapter 4

Semantics
Having introduced the grammar for our formal languages and even (if you did not
skip the last chapter) done derivations in them, we need to say something about
semantics—about the conditions under which their expressions are true and false. In
addition to logical validity from chapter 1 and validity in AD from chapter 3, this
will lead to a third, semantic notion of validity. Again, the discussion divides into the
relatively simple sentential case (section 4.1), and then the full quantificational version
(section 4.2). Recall that we are introducing formal languages in their “pure” form,
apart from associations with ordinary language. Having discussed, in this chapter,
conditions under which formal expressions are true and not, in the next chapter, we
will finally turn to translation, and so to ways formal expressions are associated with
ordinary ones.

4.1

Sentential

For any sentential or quantificational language, starting with a sentence and working
up its tree, let us say that its basic sentences are the first sentences that do not have
an operator from the sentential language (, !, _, ^, $) as main operator. For a
sentential language basic sentences are the sentence letters, as the atomics are the
first and only sentences without a main operator from the sentential language. In the
quantificational case, basic sentences may be more complex.1 In this section, we treat
basic sentences as atomic. Our initial focus is on forms with just operators  and
!. We begin with an account of the conditions under which sentences are true and
1 Thus the basic sentences of A ^ B are just the atomic subformulas A and B. But F a ^ 9xGx has
atomic subformulas F a and Gx, but basic sentences F a and 9xGx since the latter does not have an
operator from the sentential language as its main operator.
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not true, learn to apply that account in arbitrary conditions, and turn to validity. The
section concludes with applications to our abbreviations, ^, _, and $.

4.1.1

Interpretations and Truth

Sentences are true and false relative to an interpretation of basic sentences. In the
sentential case, the notion of an interpretation is particularly simple. For any formal
language L, a sentential interpretation assigns a truth value true or false, T or F, to
each of its basic sentences. Thus, for Ls we might have interpretations I and J,
I

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

T

T

F

F

T

T

F

F



(A)
J



When a sentence A is T on an interpretation I, we write I[A] = T, and when it is F, we
write, I[A] = F. Thus, in the above case, J[B] = T and J[C ] = F.
Truth for complex sentences depends on truth and falsity for their parts. In
particular, for any interpretation I,
ST

() For any sentence P , I[P ] = T iff I[P ] = F; otherwise I[P ] = F.
(!) For any sentences P and Q, I[.P ! Q/] = T iff I[P ] = F or I[Q] = T (or
both); otherwise I[.P ! Q/] = F.

Thus a basic sentence is true or false depending on the interpretation. For complex
sentences, P is true iff P is not true; and .P ! Q/ is true iff P is not true or Q is.
It is traditional to represent the information from ST() and ST(!) in the following
truth tables:
P Q P !Q
P P

T()

T F
F T

T(!)

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
F
T
T

From ST(), we have that if P is F then P is T; and if P is T then P is F. This is
just the way to read table T() from left to right in the bottom row, and then the top
row. Similarly, from ST(!), we have that P ! Q is T in conditions represented by
the first, third, and fourth rows of T(!). The only way for P ! Q to be F is when
P is T and Q is F as in the second row.
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ST works recursively. Whether a basic sentence is true comes directly from
the interpretation; truth for other sentences depends on truth for their immediate
subformulas—and can be read directly off the tables. As usual, we can use trees to
see how it works. As we build a formula from its parts to the whole, so now we
calculate truth from parts to the whole. Suppose I[A] = T, I[B] = F, and I[C ] = F.
Then I[.A ! B/ ! C ] = T.

A.T/

(B)

B .F/

L
L
L
L
L
LL

C .F/

From I



B .T/

By T(), row 2







.A ! B/.T/

By T(!), row 1






.A ! B/.F/

H
HH

By T(), row 1



H
H
H

.A ! B/ ! C .T/

By T(!), row 4

The basic tree is the same as the one that shows .A ! B/ ! C is a formula.
From the interpretation, A is T, B is F, and C is F. These are across the top. Since B
is F, from the bottom row of table T(), B is T. Since A is T and B is T, reading
across the top row of the table T(!), A ! B is T. And similarly, according to the
tree, for the rest. You should carefully follow each step.
Here is the same formula considered on another interpretation. With the interpretation J on the preceding page, J[.A ! B/ ! C ] = F.
A.T/

(C)

B .T/

L
L
L
L
L
LL

C .F/

From J



B .F/







.A ! B/.F/

By T(), row 1

By T(!), row 2






.A ! B/.T/

H
HH

By T(), row 2



H
H
H

.A ! B/ ! C .F/

By T(!), row 2
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This time, for both applications of ST(!), the antecedent is T and the consequent is F;
thus we are working on the second row of table T(!), and the conditionals evaluate
to F. Again, you should follow each step in the tree.
E4.1. Where the interpretation is J on page 65, with JŒA = T, JŒB = T and JŒC  = F,
use trees to decide whether the following sentences of Ls are T or F.
*a. A

b. C

c. A ! C
*e. .A ! A/

d. C ! A
*f. .A ! A/

g. .A ! C / ! C

h. .A ! C / ! C

*i. .A ! B/ ! .B ! A/

j. .B ! A/ ! .A ! B/

4.1.2

Arbitrary Interpretations

Sentences are true and false relative to an interpretation. But whether an argument
is semantically valid depends on truth and falsity relative to every interpretation. As
a first step toward determining semantic validity, in this section, we generalize the
method of the last section to calculate truth values relative to arbitrary interpretations.
First, any sentence has a finite number of basic sentences as components. It is thus
possible simply to list all the possible interpretations of those basic sentences. If an
expression has just one basic sentence A, then on any interpretation whatsoever, that
basic sentence must be T or F.
A

(D)

T
F

If an expression has basic sentences A and B, then the possible interpretations of its
basic sentences are,
A B

(E)

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

B can take its possible values, T and F when A is true, and B can take its possible
values, T and F when A is false. And similarly, every time we add a basic sentence,
we double the number of possible interpretations, so that n basic sentences always
have 2n possible interpretations. Thus the possible interpretations for three and four
basic sentences are,
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A B C D

(F)

A B C

T
T
T
T

T
T
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
T
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
T
T
T

F
F
F
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

(G)

Extra horizontal lines are added purely for visual convenience. There are 8 = 23
combinations with three basic sentences and 16 = 24 combinations with four. In
general, to write down all the possible combinations for n basic sentences, begin by
finding the total number r = 2n of combinations or rows. Then write down a column
with half that many (r=2) Ts and half that many (r=2) Fs; then a column alternating
half again as many (r=4) Ts and Fs; and a column alternating half again as many (r=8)
Ts and Fs—continuing to the nth column alternating groups of just one T and one F.
Thus, for example, with four basic sentences, r = 24 = 16; so we begin with a column
consisting of r=2 = 8 Ts and r=2 = 8 Fs; this is followed by a column alternating
groups of 4 Ts and 4 Fs, a column alternating groups of 2 Ts and 2 Fs, and a column
alternating groups of 1 T and 1 F. The result lists all the possible interpretations of the
basic sentences. And similarly in other cases.
Given an expression involving, say, four basic sentences, we could imagine doing
trees for each of the 16 possible interpretations. But, to exhibit truth values for each
of the possible interpretations, we can reduce the amount of work a bit—or at least
represent it in a relatively compact form. Suppose I[A] = T, I[B] = F, and I[C ] = F,
and consider the tree from (B) above, along with a “compressed” version of the same
information.
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C .F/



B .T/






(H) .A ! B/.T/

A B C  .A !  B/ ! C





T F F F T T TF

T F




.A ! B/.F/


HH

H
HH
H

.A ! B/ ! C .T/

In the table on the right, we begin by simply listing the interpretation we will consider
in its left-hand part: A is T, B is F, and C is F. Then, under each basic sentence we
put its truth value, and for a non-basic sentence place its truth value under its main
operator. Notice that the calculation must proceed precisely as it does in the tree. It is
because B is F, that we put T under the second . It is because A is T and B is T
that we put a T under the first !. It is because .A ! B/ is T that we put F under
the first . And it is because .A ! B/ is F and C is F that we put a T under the
second !. In effect, then, we work “down” through the tree, only in this compressed
form. Or we might think of truth values from the tree as “squished” up into the one
row. Because there is a T under its main operator, we conclude that the whole formula,
.A ! B/ ! C is T when I[A] = T, I[B] = F, and I[C ] = F. In this way, we might
conveniently calculate and represent the truth value of .A ! B/ ! C for all
eight of the possible interpretations of its basic sentences.
A B C  .A !  B/ ! C

(I)

T
T
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
T
F
F

T
T
T
T

F
F
T
T

F
F
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
T

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
T
T

F
F
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
T
T
T

T
F
T
F

The emphasized column under the second ! indicates the truth value of .A !
B/ ! C for each of the interpretations on the left—which is to say, for every
possible interpretation of the three basic sentences. So the only way for .A !
B/ ! C to be F is for C to be F, and A and B to be T. Our above tree (H) represents
just the fourth row of this table.
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In practice, it is easiest to work these truth tables “vertically.” For this, begin
with the basic sentences in some standard order along with all their possible interpretations in the left-hand column. For Ls let the standard order be alphanumeric
(A; A1 ; A2 ; : : : ; B; B1 ; B2 ; : : : ; C; : : :). And repeat truth values for basic sentences
under their occurrences in the formula (this is not crucial, since truth values for basic
sentences are already listed on the left; it will be up to you whether to repeat values
for basic sentences). This is done in table (J) below.

(J)

A B C  .A !  B/ ! C

A B C  .A !  B/ ! C

T
T
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
T
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
T
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
T
T
T

F
F
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

F
F
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

(K)

Now, given the values for B as in (J), we are in a position to calculate the values for
B; so get the T() table in you mind, put your eye on the column under B in the
formula (or on the left if you have decided not to repeat the values for B under its
occurrence in the formula). Then fill in the column under the second , reversing the
values from under B. This is accomplished in (K). Given the values for A and B,
we are now in a position to calculate values for A ! B; so get the T(!) table in
your head, and put your eye on the columns under A and B. Then fill in the column
On alphanumeric order: It is worth asking what happens if basic sentences are
listed in some order other than alphanumeric.
AB
T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

B A

X
y
:


X
9X

z
X

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

All the combinations are still listed, but their locations in a
table change.

Each of the above tables lists all of the combinations for the basic sentences. But
the first table has the interpretation I with I[A] = T and I[B] = F in the second
row, where the second table has this combination in the third. Similarly, the tables
exchange rows for the interpretation J with J[A] = F and J[B] = T. As it turns out,
the only real consequence of switching rows is that it becomes difficult to compare
tables as, for example, with the Answers to Selected Exercises. And it may matter
as part of the standard of correctness for exercises!
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under the first !, going with F only when A is T and B is F. This is accomplished
in (L).

(L)

A B C  .A !  B/ ! C

A B C  .A !  B/ ! C

T
T
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
T
T
T

F
F
T
T

F
F
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
T
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
T
F
F

T
T
T
T

F
F
T
T

F
F
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
T
T

F
F
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
T
T

F
F
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

(M)

Now we are ready to fill in the column under the first . So get the T() table in your
head, and put your eye on the column under the first !. The column is completed
in table (M). And the table is finished as in (I) by completing the column under the
last !, based on the columns under the first  and under the C . Notice again that the
order in which you work the columns exactly parallels the order from the tree.
As another example, consider these tables for .B ! A/, the first with truth
values repeated under basic sentences, the second without.
A B  .B ! A/

(N)

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
T
F

T
F
T
F

T
T
F
T

T
T
F
F

A B  .B ! A/

(O)

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
T
F

T
T
F
T

We complete the table as before. First, with our eye on the columns under B and
A, we fill in the column under !. Then, with our eye on that column, we complete
the one under . For this, first, notice that  is the main operator. You would not
calculate B and then the arrow! Rather, your calculations move from the smaller
parts to the larger; so the arrow comes first and then the tilde. Again, the order is
the same as on a tree. Second, if you do not repeat values for basic formulas, be
careful about B ! A; the leftmost column of table (O), under A, is the column for the
consequent and the column immediately to its right, under B, is for the antecedent; in
this case, then, the second row under arrow is T and the third is F. Though it is fine to
omit columns under basic sentences, as they are already filled in on the left side, you
should not skip other columns, as they are essential building blocks for the final result.

E4.2. For each of the following sentences of Ls construct a truth table to determine
its truth value for each of the possible interpretations of its basic sentences.
*a. A
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b. .A ! A/
c. .A ! A/
*d. .B ! A/ ! B
e. .B ! A/ ! B
f. .A ! B/ ! .B ! A/
*g. C ! .A ! B/
h. ŒA ! .C ! B/ ! Œ.A ! C / ! .A ! B/
*i. .A ! B/ ! .C ! D/
j. .A ! B/ ! .C ! D/

4.1.3

Validity

As we have seen, sentences are true and false relative to an interpretation. For any
interpretation, a sentence has some definite value. Now consider an argument whose
premises and conclusion are some formal sentences. So, for example, perhaps the
premises are A ! B and A and the conclusion is B. A formal argument is sententially
valid depending on all the interpretations of the sentences that are its premises and
conclusion. Suppose a formal argument has premises P1 : : : Pn and conclusion Q.
Then,
P1 : : : Pn sententially entail Q (P1 : : : Pn s Q) iff there is no sentential interpretation I such that IŒP1  = T and . . . and IŒPn  = T but IŒQ = F.
Premises entail a conclusion when no interpretation makes all the premises true and
the conclusion false (or, equivalently, when every interpretation is such that it does
not make the premises true and conclusion false). We can put the definition more
generally as follows: Suppose  (Gamma) is a set of formulas—these are the premises.
Say I[] = T iff I[P ] = T for each P in . Then,
SV  sententially entails Q ( s Q) iff there is no sentential interpretation I such
that I[] = T but I[Q] = F.
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Greek Characters
Greek characters frequently appear in logical contexts. In order to read them (as something
besides “funny squiggle”) unique characters and their names are listed here.
˛
ˇ
,
ı, 



, ‚

alpha
beta
gamma, Gamma
delta, Delta
epsilon
zeta
eta
theta, Theta



, ƒ


, „
, …


iota
kappa
lambda, Lambda
mu
nu
xi, Xi
pi, Pi
rho

, †

, ‡
, ˆ

,‰
!, 

sigma, Sigma
tau
upsilon, Upsilon
phi, Phi
chi
psi, Psi
omega, Omega

Where the members of  are P1 : : : Pn , this says the same as before.  sententially
entails Q when there is no sentential interpretation that makes each member of  true
and Q false.  does not sententially entail Q ( ²s Q) when there is some sentential
interpretation on which all the members of  are true, but Q is false.2
If  sententially entails Q we say the argument whose premises are the members
of  and conclusion is Q is sententially valid. To say that an argument is sententially
valid and that its premises sententially entail its conclusion is to say the same thing
only with a different grammatical subject: an argument is sententially valid just in
case its premises sententially entail the conclusion. We can think of the premises as
constraining the interpretations that matter: For validity it is just the interpretations
where the members of  are all true on which the conclusion Q cannot be false. If
 has no members then there are no constraints on relevant interpretations, and the
conclusion is valid iff it is true on every interpretation. In the case where there are no
premises, we simply write s Q, and if Q is valid it is a tautology. Notice the new
double turnstile  for this semantic notion, in contrast to the single turnstile ` for
derivations.
Given that we are already in a position to exhibit truth values for arbitrary interpretations, it is a simple matter to determine whether an argument is sententially valid.
Where the premises and conclusion of an argument include basic sentences B1 : : : Bn ,
begin by calculating the truth values of the premises and conclusion for each of the
possible interpretations for B1 : : : Bn . Then look to see if any interpretation makes
2 Definition SV allows any collection of premises, and so relaxes the supposition that an argument
has finitely many premises. However, having made this observation, for the time being we set it to the
side: Any ordinary argument has finitely many premises—and methods from this chapter are restricted
to the finite case.
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all the premises true but the conclusion false. If no interpretation makes the premises
true and the conclusion not, then by SV the argument is sententially valid. If some
interpretation does make the premises true and the conclusion false, then it is not
valid.
Thus, for example, suppose we want to know whether the following argument is
sententially valid.
.A ! B/ ! C
B

(P)

C
By SV, the question is whether there is an interpretation that makes the premises
true and the conclusion not. So we begin by calculating the values of the premises
and conclusion for each of the possible interpretations of the basic sentences in the
premises and conclusion.
A B C . A ! B/ ! C

B / C

T
T
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

FT
FT
FT
FT

T
T
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
F
T
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

TF
TF
TF
TF

T
T
F
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
T

T
F
T
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

Now we simply look to see whether any interpretation makes all the premises true
but the conclusion not. Interpretations represented by the top row, ones that make A,
B, and C all T, do not make the premises true and the conclusion not, because both
the premises and the conclusion come out true. In the second row, the conclusion is
false, but the first premise is false as well; so not all the premises are true and the
conclusion is false. In the third row, we do not have either all the premises true or the
conclusion false. In the fourth row, though the conclusion is false, the premises are
not true. In the fifth row, the premises are true, but the conclusion is not false. In the
sixth row, the first premise is not true, and in the seventh and eighth rows, the second
premise is not true. So no interpretation makes the premises true and the conclusion
false. So by SV, .A ! B/ ! C , B s C . Notice that the only column that matters
for a complex formula is the one under its main operator—the one that gives the value
of the sentence for each of the interpretations; the other columns exist only to support
the calculation of the value of the whole.
In contrast, Œ.B ! A/ ! B ²s .A ! B/. That is, an argument with
premise, Œ.B ! A/ ! B and conclusion .A ! B/ is not sententially valid.
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A B  Œ.B ! A/ ! B /  .A ! B/

(Q)

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
T
F
T

T
F
T
F

T
T
F
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
F
T
F

F
T
F
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
T

T
F
T
F (

In the first row, the premise is F. In the second, the conclusion is T. In the third,
the premise is F. However, in the last, the premise is T and the conclusion is F. So
there are interpretations (any interpretation that makes A and B both F) that make the
premise T and the conclusion F. So by SV, Œ.B ! A/ ! B ²s .A ! B/, and
the argument is not sententially valid. All it takes is one interpretation that makes all
the premises T and the conclusion F to render an argument not sententially valid. Of
course, there might be more than one, but one is enough!
As a final example, consider table (I) for .A ! B/ ! C on page 69 above.
From the table, there is an interpretation where the sentence is not true. Thus, by SV,
²s .A ! B/ ! C . A sentence is valid only when it is true on every interpretation.
Since there is an interpretation on which it is not true, the sentence is not valid (not a
tautology).
Since all it takes to demonstrate invalidity is one interpretation on which all the
premises are true and the conclusion is false, we do not actually need an entire table to
demonstrate invalidity. You may decide to produce a whole truth table in order to find
an interpretation to demonstrate invalidity. But we can sometimes work “backward”
from what we are trying to show to an interpretation that does the job. Thus, for
example, to find the result from table (Q), we need an interpretation on which the
premise is T and the conclusion is F. That is, we need a row like this:
(R)

A B  Œ.B ! A/ ! B /  .A ! B/
T

F

In order for the premise to be T, the conditional in the brackets must be F. And in
order for the conclusion to be F, the conditional must be T. So we can fill in this much:
(S)

A B  Œ.B ! A/ ! B /  .A ! B/
T

F

F

T

Since there are three ways for an arrow to be T, there is not much to be done with the
conclusion. But since the conditional in the premise is F, we know that its antecedent
is T and consequent is F. So we have:
(T)

A B  Œ.B ! A/ ! B /  .A ! B/
T

T

F F

F

T

That is, .B ! A/ is T and B is F. But now we can fill in the information about B
wherever it occurs. The result is as follows:
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A B  Œ.B ! A/ ! B /  .A ! B/
F T

F T

F

F F

T F

Since the first B in the premise is F, the first conditional in the premise is T irrespective
of the assignment to A. But, with B false, the only way for the conditional in the
argument’s conclusion to be T is for A to be false as well. The result is our completed
row:
(V)

A B  Œ.B ! A/ ! B /  .A ! B/
F F T

F T F

F F T F

F F

And we have recovered the row that demonstrates invalidity—without doing the entire
table. In this case, the full table had only four rows, and we might just as well have
done the whole thing. However, when there are many rows, this “shortcut” approach
can be attractive. A disadvantage is that sometimes it is not obvious just how to
proceed. In this example, each stage led to the next. At stage (S), there were three
ways to make the conditional subformula in the conclusion true. We were able to
proceed insofar as the premise forced the next step. But it might have been that neither
the premise nor the conclusion forced a definite next stage. In this sort of case, you
might decide to do the whole table, just so that you can can grapple with all the
different combinations in an orderly way.
Notice what happens when we try this approach with an argument that is not
invalid. Returning to argument (P) above, suppose we try to find a row where the
premises are T and the conclusion is F. That is, we set out to find a row like this:
(W)

A B C . A ! B/ ! C
T

B / C
T

F

Immediately, we are in a position to fill in values for B and C :
(X)

A B C . A ! B/ ! C
T F

T

T F

B / C
T

F

Since the first premise is a true arrow with a false consequent, its antecedent .A !
B/ must be F. But this requires that A be T and that B be F:
(Y)

A B C . A ! B/ ! C
T F

T

F F/T T F

B / C
T

F

And there is no way to set B to F, as we have already seen that it has to be T in order
to keep the second premise true—and no interpretation makes B both T and F. At this
stage, we know, in our hearts, that there is no way to make both of the premises true
and the conclusion false. In part II we will turn this knowledge into an official mode
of reasoning for validity. However, for now, let us consider a single row of a truth
table (or a marked row of a full table) sufficient to demonstrate invalidity, but require
a full table, exhibiting all the options, to show that an argument is sententially valid.
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You may encounter odd situations where premises are never T, where conclusions
are never F, or whatever. But if you stick to the definition, always asking whether
there is any interpretation of the basic sentences that makes all the premises T and the
conclusion F, all will be well.
E4.3. For each of the following, use truth tables to decide whether the entailment
claims hold. Notice that a couple of the tables are already done from E4.2.
*a. A ! A s A
b. A ! A s A
*c. A ! B, A s B
d. A ! B, B s A
e. .A ! B/ s B
f. s C ! .A ! B/
*g. s ŒA ! .C ! B/ ! Œ.A ! C / ! .A ! B/
h. .A ! B/ ! .B ! A/, A, B s .C ! C /
i. A ! .B ! C /, B ! .C ! D/ s A ! .B ! D/
j. Œ.A ! .B ! C // ! D, D ! A s C

4.1.4

Abbreviations

We turn finally to applications for our abbreviations. Consider, first, a truth table for
P _ Q, that is for P ! Q:
P Q P ! Q

T0 ._/

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
T
T
F

T
F
T
F

P Q P _Q

so that

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
T
T
F

When P is T and Q is T, P _ Q is T; when P is T and Q is F, P _ Q is T; and so
forth. Thus, when P is T and Q is T, we know that P _ Q is T, without going through
all the steps to get there in the unabbreviated form. Just as when P is a formula and
Q is a formula, we move directly to the conclusion that P _ Q is a formula without
explicitly working all the intervening steps, so if we know the truth value of P and the
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truth value of Q, we can move in a tree by the above table to the truth value of P _ Q
without all the intervening steps. And similarly for the other abbreviating sentential
operators. For ^:
P Q  .P !  Q/

T0 .^/

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
F
F
F

T
T
F
F

F
T
T
T

F
T
F
T

P Q P ^Q

T
F
T
F

so that

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
F
F
F

And for ($):
P Q  Œ.P ! Q/ !  .Q ! P /

T0 .$/

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
F
F
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
T

T
F
T
F

F
T
T
F

F
F
T
F

T
F
T
F

T
T
F
T

T
T
F
F

P Q P $Q

so that

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
F
F
T

As a help toward remembering these tables, notice that P _ Q is F only when P is F
and Q is F; P ^ Q is T only when P is T and Q is T; and P $ Q is T only when P
and Q are the same, and F when P and Q are different. The tables T0 ._/, T0 .^/, and
T0 .$/ represent derived additions to the definition for truth.
And nothing prevents direct application of the derived tables in trees. Suppose,
for example, I[A] = T, I[B] = F, and I[C ] = T. Then I[.B ! A/ $ ..A ^ B/ _ C /]
= F.

Some perspective: There are different ways to understand tables for these new
operators: We have understood them as derived from basic tables T() and T(!).
However, as we shall see in ??, it is possible to take tables for operators other than
 and ! as basic—say just T() and T0 ._/, or just T() and T0 .^/—and then
to abbreviate ! in terms of them. Challenge: Find an expression involving just
 and _ that has the same table as !; find one involving just  and ^. Another
option introduces all five as basic. Then the task is not showing that the table for _
is TTTF—that is given; rather we simply notice that P _ Q, say, is redundant with
P ! Q. The latter approach avoids abbreviation. The former options abbreviate
non-basic operators but preserve relative simplicity in the basic language.
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A.T/

A.T/

@

B .F/

C .T/

@
@
@

@
@

.B ! A/.T/

(Z)
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.A ^ B/.F/

T(!); T0 (^), row 2; T()

C .F/

Q

l
l

From I




Q
Q

Q

l

T0 (_), row 4

..A ^ B/ _ C /.F/

l
l
l
l !!
l!

!!
!!
T0 ($), row 2

.B ! A/ $ ..A ^ B/ _ C /.F/

We might get the same result by working through the full tree for the unabbreviated
form. But there is no need. When A is T and B is F, we know that .A ^ B/ is F; when
.A ^ B/ is F and C is F, we know that ..A ^ B/ _ C / is F; and so forth. Thus we
move through the tree directly by the derived tables.
Similarly, we can work directly with abbreviated forms in truth tables.
A B C .B ! A/ $ ..A ^ B/ _  C /

(AA)

T
T
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
T
F
F

T
T
T
T

T
T
T
T

T
T
F
T

T
T
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
T
F
F

T
T
F
T

F
T
F
T

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
T
F
F

F
F
T
T

F
F
F
F

T
F
F
T

F
F
F
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
F
F

F
T
F
T

F
T
F
T

T
F
T
F

Tree (Z) represents just the third row of this table. As before, we construct the table
“vertically,” with tables for abbreviating operators in mind as appropriate.
Finally, given that we have tables for abbreviated forms, we can use them for evaluation of arguments with abbreviated forms. Thus, for example, A $ B, A s A ^ B.
A B .A $ B/

(AB)

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
F
T

T
F
T
F

A / .A ^ B/
T
T
F
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
F
F

T
F
T
F

There is no row where each of the premises is true and the conclusion is false. So the
argument is sententially valid. And, from either of the following rows,
A B C D .B ! A/ ^ . C _ D/

(AC)

F F T T
F F F T

F T F T
F T F T

FT T T
TF T T

.A $  D/ ^ . D ! B/ / B
F T FT
F T FT

T
T

FT T F
FT T F

F
F

we may conclude that .B ! A/ ^ .C _ D/, .A $ D/ ^ .D ! B/ ²s B. In
this case, the shortcut table is attractive relative to the full version with sixteen rows!
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Semantics Quick Reference (sentential)
For any formal language L, starting with a sentence and working up its tree,
the basic sentences are the first sentences that do not have an operator from the
sentential language as main operator. A sentential interpretation assigns a truth
value true or false, T or F, to each basic sentence. Then for any interpretation I,
ST

() For any sentence P , I[P ] = T iff I[P ] = F; otherwise I[P ] = F.
(!) For any sentences P and Q, I[.P ! Q/] = T iff I[P ] = F or I[Q] = T
(or both); otherwise I[.P ! Q/] = F.

And for abbreviated expressions,
ST 0

(^) For any sentences P and Q, I[.P ^ Q/] = T iff I[P ] = T and I[Q] = T;
otherwise I[.P ^ Q/] = F.
(_) For any sentences P and Q, I[.P _ Q/] = T iff I[P ] = T or I[Q] = T
(or both); otherwise I[.P _ Q/] = F.
($) For any sentences P and Q, I[.P $ Q/] = T iff I[P ] = I[Q]; otherwise
I[.P $ Q/] = F.

These conditions result in tables as follows:
P Q

P

T
T
F
F

F
F
T
T

T
F
T
F

P !Q

P _Q

P ^Q

P $Q

T
F
T
T

T
T
T
F

T
F
F
F

T
F
F
T

If  is a set of formulas, I[] = T iff I[P ] = T for each P in . Then, where
the members of  are the formal premises of an argument, and sentence Q is its
conclusion,
SV  sententially entails Q ( s Q) iff there is no sentential interpretation I
such that I[] = T but I[Q] = F.
When  sententially entails Q, the argument with premises  and conclusion Q is
sententially valid. If  has no members and s Q, then Q is a tautology.
We treat a single row of a truth table (or a marked row of a full table) as sufficient
to demonstrate invalidity, but require a full table, exhibiting all the options, to show
that an argument is sententially valid.
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E4.4. For each of the following, use truth tables to decide whether the entailment
claims hold.
a. s A _ A
b. A $ ŒA $ .A ^ A/, A ! .A $ A/ s A ! A
*c. B _ C s B ! C
d. .A ^ B/ s A _ B
e. s .A $ B/ $ .A ^ B/
*f. A _ B, C ! A, .B ^ C / s C
g. A ! .B _ C /, C $ B, C s A
h. A ^ .B ! C / s .A ^ B/ _ .A ^ C /
i. A _ .B ^ C /, .B _ C / ! A s A $ .C _ B/
j. A _ B, D ! .C _ A/ s B $ C
E4.5. Complete the chart below to exhibit and explain step by step how to construct
one or both rows from table (AC).
A B C D .B ! A/ ^ . C _ D/
1.
2.

F

F

.A $  D/ ^ . D ! B/ / B

T
T

T
T

F

F
F

- premises T, conclusion F
- fill in values for B

E4.6. For each of the following, use truth tables to decide whether the entailment
claims hold. Hint: The trick here is to identify the basic sentences; after that,
everything proceeds in the usual way.
*a. 9xAx ! 9xBx, 9xAx s 9xBx
b. 8xAx ! 9x.Ax ^ 8yBy/, 9x.Ax ^ 8yBy/ s 8xAx
E4.7. For each of the following concepts, explain in an essay of about two pages,
so that (high-school age) Hannah could understand. In your essay, you should
(i) identify the objects to which the concept applies, (ii) give and explain the
definition, and give and explicate examples of your own construction (iii) where
the concept applies, and (iv) where it does not. Your essay should exhibit an
understanding of methods from the text.
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Chapter 5

Translation
We have introduced logical validity from chapter 1, along with validity in an axiomatic
derivation system from chapter 3, and semantic validity from chapter 4. But logical
validity applies to arguments expressed in ordinary language, where the other notions
apply to arguments expressed in a formal language. Our guiding idea has been to
use the formal notions with application to ordinary arguments via translation from
ordinary language to formal language. It is to the translation task that we now turn.
After some general remarks in section 5.1, we will take up issues specific to the
sentential (section 5.2), and then the quantificational case (section 5.3).

5.1

General

As speakers of ordinary languages (at least English for those reading this book)
we presumably have some understanding of the conditions under which ordinary
language sentences are true and false. Similarly, we now have an understanding of
the conditions under which sentences of our formal languages are true and false. This
puts us in a position to recognize when the conditions under which ordinary sentences
are true are the same as the conditions under which formal sentences are true. And
that is what we want: Our goal is to translate the premises and conclusion of ordinary
arguments into formal expressions that are true when the ordinary sentences are true,
and false when the ordinary sentences are false. Insofar as validity has to do with
conditions under which sentences are true and false, our translations should thus be
an adequate basis for evaluations of validity.
We can put this point with greater precision. Formal sentences are true and false
relative to interpretations. As we have seen, many different interpretations of a formal
language are possible. In the sentential case, any sentence letter can be true or false—
83
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so that there are 2n ways to interpret any n sentence letters. When we specify an
interpretation, we select just one of the many available options. Thus, for example,
we might set IŒB = T and IŒH  = F. But we might also specify an interpretation as
follows:
B: Bill is happy
(A)
H : Hillary is happy
intending B to take the same truth value as ‘Bill is happy’ and H the same as
‘Hillary is happy’. In this case, the single specification might result in different
interpretations, depending on how the world is: Depending on how Bill and Hillary
are, the interpretation of B might be true or false, and similarly for H. That is,
specification (A) is really a function from ways the world could be (from maximal
and consistent stories) to interpretations of the sentence letters. It results in a specific
or intended interpretation relative to any way the world could be. Thus, where !
ranges over ways the world could be, (A) is a function II which results in an intended
interpretation II! corresponding to any such way—thus II! ŒB is T if Bill is happy at
! and F if he is not.
When we set out to translate some ordinary sentences into a formal language,
we always begin by specifying an interpretation function. In the sentential case, this
typically takes the form of a specification like (A). Then for ! any way the world
can be, there is an intended interpretation II! of the formal language. Given this, for
an ordinary sentence A, the aim is to produce a formal counterpart A0 such that for
any !, II! ŒA0  = T iff A is true at world !. This is the content of saying we want to
produce formal expressions that “are true when the ordinary sentences are true, and
false when the ordinary sentences are false.” In fact, we can turn this into a criterion
of goodness for translation.
CG Given some ordinary sentence A, a translation consisting of an interpretation function II and formal sentence A0 is good iff it captures available sentential/quantificational structure and, where ! is any way the world can be,
II! ŒA0  = T iff A is true at !.
If there is a collection of sentences, a translation consisting of an II and some formal
sentences is good only if each ordinary A of the collection has a formal A0 where
for any !, II! ŒA0  = T iff A is true at !. Set aside the question of what it is
to capture “available” sentential/quantificational structure, this will emerge as we
proceed. For now, the point is simply that we want formal sentences to be true on
intended interpretations when originals are true at corresponding worlds, and false on
intended interpretations when originals are false. CG says that this correspondence is
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necessary for goodness. And, supposing that sufficient structure is reflected, according
to CG such correspondence is sufficient as well.
The situation might be pictured as follows. There is a specification II which
results in an intended interpretation corresponding to any way the world can be. And
corresponding to ordinary sentences P and Q there are formal sentences P 0 and Q0 .
Then with oval for worlds and box for interpretations built on them,
II!1 ŒP 0  = T
II!1 ŒQ0  = T

II!2 ŒP 0  = T
II!2 ŒQ0  = F
II *

II *

#

!1 P : true
Q: true

"

#

!2 P : true
Q: false

!
"

II!3 ŒP 0  = F
II!3 ŒQ0  = T
II *

#

!3 P : false
Q: true

!
"

II!4 ŒP 0  = F
II!4 ŒQ0  = F
II *

#

!4 P : false
Q: false

!
"

!

The interpretation function results in an intended interpretation corresponding to each
world. The intended interpretations make assignments to basic vocabulary (in the
sentential case, to sentence letters). Then a translation is good only if no matter how
the world is, the values of P 0 and Q0 on the intended interpretations match the values
of the ordinary P and Q at the corresponding worlds or stories.
The premises and conclusion of an argument are some sentences. So the translation
of an argument is good iff the translation of the sentences that are its premises and
conclusion is good. And good translations of arguments put us in a position to use
our machinery to evaluate questions of validity. Of course, so far, this is an abstract
description of what we are about to do. But it should give some orientation, and help
you understand what is accomplished as we proceed.

5.2

Sentential

We begin with the sentential case. Again, the general idea is to recognize when the
conditions under which ordinary sentences are true are the same as the conditions
under which formal ones are true. Surprisingly perhaps, the hardest part is on the
side of recognizing truth conditions in ordinary language. With this in mind, let us
begin with some definitions whose application is to expressions of ordinary language;
after that, we will turn to a procedure for translation, and to discussion of particular
operators.

CHAPTER 5. TRANSLATION

5.2.1

86

Some Definitions

In this section, we introduce a series of definitions whose application is to ordinary
language. These definitions are not meant to compete with anything you have learned
in English class. Rather they are specific to our purposes. With the definitions under
our belt, we will be able to say with some precision what we want to do.
First, a declarative sentence is a sentence which has a truth value—a sentence that
is either true or false. ‘Snow is white’ and ‘Snow is green’ are declarative sentences—
the first true and the second false. ‘Study harder!’ and ‘Why study?’ are sentences, but
not declarative sentences. Given this, a sentential operator is an expression containing
“blanks” such that when the blanks are filled with declarative sentences, the result is
a declarative sentence. In ordinary speech and writing, such blanks do not typically
appear (!) however punctuation and expression typically fill the same role. Examples
are,
John believes that
John heard that
it is not the case that
and
‘John believes that snow is white’, ‘John believes that snow is green’, and ‘John
believes that dogs fly’ are all sentences—some more plausibly true than others. Still,
‘Snow is white’, ‘Snow is green’, and ‘Dogs fly’ are all declarative sentences, and
when we put them in the blank of ‘John believes that
’ the result is a declarative
sentence, where the same would be so for any declarative sentence in the blank; so
‘John believes that
’ is a sentential operator. Similarly, ‘Snow is white and dogs
fly’ is a declarative sentence—a false one, since dogs do not fly. And, so long as
we put declarative sentences in the blanks of ‘
and
’ the result is always a
declarative sentence. So ‘
and
’ is a sentential operator. In contrast,
when
is white
are not sentential operators. Though ‘Snow is white’ is a declarative sentence, ‘when
snow is white’ is an adverbial clause, not a declarative sentence. And, though ‘Dogs
fly’ and ‘Snow is green’ are declarative sentences, ‘dogs fly is white snow is green’ is
ungrammatical nonsense. If you can think of even one case where putting declarative
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sentences in the blanks of an expression does not result in a declarative sentence, then
the expression is not a sentential operator. So these are not sentential operators.
Now, as in these examples, we can think of some declarative sentences as generated by the combination of sentential operators with other declarative sentences.
Declarative sentences generated from other sentences by means of sentential operators are compound; all others are simple. Thus, for example, ‘Bob likes Mary’ and
‘Socrates is wise’ are simple sentences, they do not have a declarative sentence in
the blank of any operator. In contrast, ‘John believes that Bob likes Mary’ and ‘Jim
heard that John believes that Bob likes Mary’ are compound. The first has a simple
sentence in the blank of ‘John believes that
’. The second puts a compound in
the blank of ‘Jim heard that
’.
For cases like these, the main operator of a compound sentence is that operator
not in the blank of any other operator. The main operator of ‘John believes that Bob
likes Mary’ is ‘John believes that
’. And the main operator of ‘Jim heard that
John believes that Bob likes Mary’ is ‘Jim heard that
’. The main operator of ‘It
is not the case that Bob likes Sue and it is not the case that Sue likes Bob’ is ‘
and
’, for that is the operator not in the blank of any other. Notice that the main
operator of a sentence need not be the first operator in the sentence. Observe also that
operator structure may not be obvious. Thus, for example, ‘Jim heard that Bob likes
Sue and Sue likes Jim’ is capable of different interpretations. It might be, ‘Jim heard
that Bob likes Sue and Sue likes Jim’ with main operator, ‘Jim heard that
’ and
the compound, ‘Bob likes Sue and Sue likes Jim’ in its blank. But it might be ‘Jim
heard that Bob likes Sue and Sue likes Jim’ with main operator, ‘
and
’. The
question is what Jim heard, and what the ‘and’ joins. As suggested above, punctuation
and expression often serve in ordinary language to disambiguate confusing cases.
These questions of interpretation are not peculiar to our purposes! Rather they are the
ordinary questions that might be asked about meaning. The underline structure serves
to disambiguate claims, to make it very clear how the operators apply.
We shall want to identify the operator structure of sentences. When faced with a
compound sentence, the best approach is start with the whole, rather than the parts. So
begin with blank(s) for the main operator. Thus, as we have seen, the main operator of
‘It is not the case that Bob likes Sue, and it is not the case that Sue likes Bob’ is ‘
and
’. So begin with lines for that operator, ‘It is not the case that Bob likes Sue
and it is not the case that Sue likes Bob’ (leaving space for lines above). Now focus
on the sentence in one of the blanks, say the left; that sentence, ‘It is not the case
that Bob likes Sue’ is a compound with main operator, ‘it is not the case that
’.
So add the underline for that operator, ‘It is not the case that Bob likes Sue and it is
not the case that Sue likes Bob’. The sentence in the blank of ‘it is not the case that
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’ is simple. So turn to the sentence in the right blank of the main operator. That
sentence has main operator ‘it is not the case that
’. So add an underline. In this
way we end up with, ‘It is not the case that Bob likes Sue and it is not the case that
Sue likes Bob’. Thus a complex problem is reduced to ones that are progressively
simpler. Perhaps this problem was obvious from the start. But this approach will serve
you well as problems get more complex!
We come finally to the key notion of a truth functional operator. A sentential
operator is truth functional iff any compound generated by it has its truth value wholly
determined by the truth values of the sentences in its blanks. We will say that the truth
value of a compound is “determined” by the truth values of sentences in blanks just in
case there is no way to switch the truth value of the whole while keeping truth values
of sentences in the blanks constant.
This leads to a test for truth functionality: We show that an operator is not truth
functional, if we come up with some situation(s) where truth values of sentences in
the blanks are the same, but the truth value of the resulting compounds are not. To
take a simple case, consider ‘John believes that
’. If things are pretty much as
in the actual world, ‘There is a Santa’ and ‘Dogs fly’ are both false. But if John is a
small child it may be that,
(B)

John believes that

there is a Santa
dogs fly

T /F

F

John believes there is a Santa, but knows perfectly well that dogs do not fly. So the
compound is true with one in the blank, and false with the other. Thus the truth value
of the compound is not wholly determined by the truth value of the sentence in the
blank. We have found a situation where sentences with the same truth value in the
blank result in a different truth value for the whole. Thus ‘John believes that
’ is
not truth functional. We might make the same point with a pair of sentences that are
true, say ‘Dogs bark’ and ‘There are infinitely many prime numbers’ (be clear in your
mind about how this works).
As a second example, consider, ‘
because
’. Suppose ‘You are happy’,
‘You understand the material’, ‘There are fish in the sea’, and ‘You woke up this
morning’ are all true.
(C)

You are happy
There are fish in the sea

because

T

T /F

you understand the material
you woke up this morning
T

Still, it is natural to think that the truth value of the compound, ‘You are happy because
you understand the material’ may be true, while ‘There are fish in the sea because
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you woke up this morning’ is false. For perhaps understanding the material makes
you happy, but the fish in the sea have nothing to do with your waking up. Thus there
are consistent situations or stories where sentences in the blanks have the same truth
values, but the compounds do not. Thus, by the definition, ‘
because
’ is
not a truth functional operator. To show that an operator is not truth functional it is
sufficient to produce some situation of this sort: where truth values for sentences in
the blanks match, but truth values for the compounds do not. Observe that in order
to meet this condition it would be sufficient to find, say, a case where sentences in
the first blank remain T, sentences in the second remain F but the value of the whole
flips from T to F. To show that an operator is not truth functional, any combination on
which the blanks remain constant but the whole flips value will do.
To show that an operator is truth functional, we need to show that no such cases
are possible. For this, we show how the truth value of what is in the blank determines
the truth value of the whole. As an example, consider first,
it is not the case that

(D)

F
T

T
F

In this table, we represent the truth value of whatever is in the blank by the column
under the blank, and the truth value for the whole by the column under the operator.
If we put something true according to a consistent story into the blank, the resultant
compound is sure to be false according to that story. Thus, for example, in the true
story, ‘Snow is white’, ‘2 2 = 4’, and ‘Dogs bark’ are all true; correspondingly, ‘It is
not the case that snow is white’, ‘It is not the case that 2 2 = 4’, and ‘It is not the
case that dogs bark’ are all false. Similarly, if we put something false according to a
story into the blank, the resultant compound is sure to be true according to the story.
Thus, for example, in the true story, ‘Snow is green’ and ‘2 2 = 3’ are both false.
Correspondingly, ‘It is not the case that snow is green’ and ‘It is not the case that
2 2 = 3’ are both true. It is no coincidence that the above table for ‘it is not the case
that
’ looks like the table for . We will return to this point shortly.
For a second example of a truth functional operator, consider ‘
and
’.
This seems to have table,
and

(E)

T
T
F
F

T
F
F
F

T
F
T
F

Consider a situation where Bob and Sue each love themselves, but hate each other.
Then ‘Bob loves Bob and Sue loves Sue’ is true. But if at least one blank has a
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sentence that is false, the compound is false. Thus in that situation, ‘Bob loves Bob
and Sue loves Bob’ is false; ‘Bob loves Sue and Sue loves Sue’ is false; and ‘Bob
loves Sue and Sue loves Bob’ is false. For a compound, ‘
and
’ to be true,
the sentences in both blanks have to be true. And if they are both true, the compound
is itself true. So the operator is truth functional. Again, it is no coincidence that the
table looks so much like the table for ^. To show that an operator is truth functional,
it is sufficient to produce the table that shows how the truth values of the compound
are fixed by the truth values of the sentences in the blanks.
For an interesting sort of case, consider the operator ‘according to every consistent
story
’, and the following attempted table:
according to every consistent story

(F)

?
F

T
F

Say we put some sentence P that is false according to a consistent story into the
blank. Then since P is false according to that very story, it is not the case that P
according to every consistent story—and the compound is sure to be false. So we
fill in the bottom row under the operator as above. So far, so good. But consider
‘Dogs bark’ and ‘2 2 = 4’. Both are true according to the true story. But only the

Definitions for Translation
DC A declarative sentence is a sentence which has a truth value.
SO A sentential operator is an expression containing “blanks” such that when the blanks
are filled with declarative sentences, the result is a declarative sentence.
CS Declarative sentences generated from other sentences by means of sentential operators
are compound; all others are simple.
MO The main operator of a compound sentence is that operator not in the blank of any
other operator.
TF A sentential operator is truth functional iff any compound generated by it has its truth
value wholly determined by the truth values of the sentences in its blanks.
To show that an operator is not truth functional it is sufficient to produce some situations where truth values for sentences in the blanks are constant, but truth values for the
compounds are not.
To show that an operator is truth functional, it is sufficient to produce the table that shows
how the truth values of the compound are fixed by truth values of the sentences in the
blanks.

CHAPTER 5. TRANSLATION

91

second is true according to every consistent story—we can tell stories where ‘Dogs
bark’ is true and where it is false, but ‘2 2 = 4’ is true in every consistent story. So
the compound is false with the first in the blank, true with the second. So ‘according
to every consistent story
’ is therefore not a truth functional operator. The truth
value of the compound is not wholly determined by the truth value of the sentence in
the blank. Similarly, it is natural to think that ‘
because
’ is false whenever
one of the sentences in its blanks is false. It cannot be true that P because Q if not-P ,
and it cannot be true that P because Q if not-Q. If you are not happy, then it cannot be
that you are happy because you understand the material; and if you do not understand
the material, it cannot be that you are happy because you understand the material. So
far, then, the table for ‘
because
’ is like the table for ‘
and
’.
because

(G)

T
T
F
F

?
F
F
F

T
F
T
F

However, as we saw at (C) above, in contrast to ‘
and
’, compounds generated by ‘
because
’ may or may not be true when sentences in the blanks are
both true. So, although ‘
and
’ is truth functional, ‘
because
’ is
not.
Thus the question is whether we can complete a table of the above sort: If there
is a way to complete the table, the operator is truth functional. The test to show an
operator is not truth functional simply finds some case to show that such a table cannot
be completed.
E5.1. For each of the following, (i) say whether it is simple or compound. If the
sentence is compound, (ii) use underlines to exhibit its operator structure, and (iii)
say what is its main operator.
*a. Bob likes Mary.
*b. Jim believes that Bob likes Mary.
c. It is not the case that Bob likes Mary.
*d. Jane heard that it is not the case that Bob likes Mary.
e. Jane heard that Jim believes that it is not the case that Bob likes Mary.
f. Voldemort is very powerful, but it is not the case that Voldemort kills Harry at
birth.
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g. Harry likes his godfather and Harry likes Dumbledore, but it is not the case
that Harry likes his uncle.
*h. Hermoine believes that studying is good and Hermione studies hard, but Ron
believes studying is good and it is not the case that Ron studies hard.
i. Malfoy believes mudbloods are scum, but it is not the case that mudbloods are
scum; and Malfoy is a dork.
j. Harry believes that Voldemort is evil and Hermione believes that Voldemort is
evil, but it is not the case that Bellatrix believes that Voldemort is evil.
E5.2. Which of the following operators are truth functional and which are not? If
the operator is truth functional, display the relevant table; if it is not, give cases
that flip the value of the compound, with the value in the blanks constant. Explain
your response.
*a. it is a fact that
b. Elmore believes that
*c.

but

d. according to some consistent story
e. although

,

*f. it is always the case that
g. sometimes it is the case that
h.

therefore

i.

however

j. either

5.2.2

or

(or both)

Parse Trees

We are now ready to outline a procedure for translation into our formal sentential
language. In the end, you will often be able to see how translations should go and to
write them down without going through all the official steps. However, the procedure
should get you thinking in the right direction, and remain useful for complex cases.
To translate some ordinary sentences P1 : : : Pn the basic translation procedure is,
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(1) Convert the ordinary P1 : : : Pn into corresponding ordinary equivalents
exposing truth functional and operator structure.
(2) Generate a “parse tree” for each of P1 : : : Pn and specify the interpretation
function II by assigning sentence letters to sentences at the bottom nodes.
(3) Using sentence letters from II and equivalent formal expressions, for
each parse tree construct a parallel tree to generate formal P10 : : : Pn0
corresponding to P1 : : : Pn .

For now at least, the idea behind step (1) is simple: Sometimes all you need to do
is expose operator structure by introducing underlines. In complex cases, this can be
difficult! But we know how to do it. Sometimes, however, truth functional structure
does not lie on the surface. Ordinary sentences are equivalent when they are true
and false in exactly the same consistent stories. And we want ordinary equivalents
exposing truth functional structure. Suppose P is a sentence of the sort,
(H)

Bob is not happy

Is this a truth functional compound? Not officially. There is no declarative sentence in
the blank of a sentential operator; so it is not compound; so it is not a truth functional
compound. But one might think that (H) is short for,
(I)

It is not the case that Bob is happy

which is a truth functional compound. At least (H) and (I) are equivalent in the sense
that they are true and false in the same consistent stories. Similarly, ‘Bob and Carol
are happy’ is not a compound of the sort we have described, with declarative sentences
in the blanks of a sentential operator. However, it is a short step from this sentence to
the equivalent, ‘Bob is happy and Carol is happy’ which is an official truth functional
compound. As we shall see, in some cases, this step can be more complex. But let us
leave it at that for now.
Moving to step (2), in a parse tree we begin with sentences constructed as in step
(1). If a sentence has a truth functional main operator, then it branches downward
for the sentence(s) in its blanks. If these have truth functional main operators, they
branch for the sentences in their blanks; and so forth, until sentences are simple or
have non-truth functional main operators. Then given trees for each of P1 : : : Pn ,
construct the interpretation function II by assigning a distinct sentence letter to each
distinct sentence at a bottom node.
Some simple examples should make this clear. Say we want to translate a collection of four sentences.
1. Bob is happy
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2. Carol is not happy
3. Bob is healthy and Carol is not
4. Bob is happy and John believes that Carol is not healthy
The first is a simple sentence. Thus there is nothing to be done at step (1). And since
there is no main operator, there is no branching and the sentence itself is a completed
parse tree. The tree is just,
(J)

Bob is happy

Insofar as the simple sentence is a complete branch of the tree, it counts as a bottom
node of its tree. It is not yet assigned a sentence letter, so we assign it one. B1 : Bob is
happy. We select this letter to remind us of the assignment.
As it stands, the second sentence is not a truth functional compound. Thus in the
first stage, ‘Carol is not happy’ is expanded to the equivalent, ‘It is not the case that
Carol is happy’. In this case, there is a main operator; since it is truth functional, the
tree has some structure.
It is not the case that Carol is happy

(K)
Carol is happy

The bottom node is simple, so the tree ends. ‘Carol is happy’ is not assigned a letter;
so we assign it one. C1 : Carol is happy.
The third sentence is equivalent to, ‘Bob is healthy and it is not the case that Carol
is healthy’. Again, the operators are truth functional, and the result is a structured
tree.

(L)

Bob is healthy and it is not the case that Carol is healthy

 HHH



H
it is not the case that Carol is healthy
Bob is healthy

Carol is healthy

The main operator is truth functional. So there is a branch for each of the sentences in
its blanks. Observe that underlines continue to reflect the structure of these sentences
(so we “lift” the sentences from their blanks with structure intact). On the left, ‘Bob
is healthy’ has no main operator, so it does not branch. On the right, ‘it is not the
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case that Carol is healthy’ has a truth functional main operator, and so branches. At
bottom, we end up with ‘Bob is healthy’ and ‘Carol is healthy’. Neither has a letter,
so we assign them ones. B2 : Bob is healthy; C2 : Carol is healthy.
The final sentence is equivalent to, ‘Bob is happy and John believes it is not the
case that Carol is healthy’. It has a truth functional main operator. So there is a
structured tree.

(M)

Bob is happy and John believes it is not the case that Carol is healthy
((H
H
((((
(
(
HH
(
(((
John believes it is not the case that Carol is healthy
Bob is happy

On the left, ‘Bob is happy’ is simple. On the right, ‘John believes it is not the case
that Carol is healthy’ is compound. But its main operator is not truth functional. So it
does not branch. We only branch for sentences in the blanks of truth functional main
operators. Given this, we proceed in the usual way. ‘Bob is happy’ already has a letter.
The other does not; so we give it one. J : John believes it is not the case that Carol is
healthy.
And that is all. We have now compiled an interpretation function,
II B1 : Bob is happy

C1 : Carol is happy
B2 : Bob is healthy
C2 : Carol is healthy
J : John believes it is not the case that Carol is healthy
Of course, we might have chosen different letters. All that matters is that we have
a distinct letter for each distinct sentence. For any way the world can be, our interpretation function yields an interpretation on which a sentence letter is true when its
assigned sentence is true in that world, and false when its assigned sentence is false.
In the last case, there is a compulsion to think that we can somehow get down to
the simple sentence ‘Carol is healthy’. But resist temptation! A non-truth functional
operator “seals off” that upon which it operates, and forces us to treat the compound as
a unit. We do not automatically assign sentence letters to simple sentences, but rather
to parts that are not truth functional compounds. Simple sentences fit this description.
But so do compounds with non-truth functional main operators.
E5.3. Use our method to expose truth functional structure and produce parse trees
for each of the following. Use your trees to produce an interpretation function for
the sentences. Hint: Pay attention to punctuation as a guide to structure.
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a. Bingo is spotted, and Spot can play bingo.
b. Bingo is not spotted, and Spot cannot play bingo.
c. Bingo is spotted, and believes that Spot cannot play bingo.
*d. It is not the case that: Bingo is spotted and Spot can play bingo.
e. It is not the case that: Bingo is not spotted and Spot cannot play bingo.
E5.4. Use our method to expose truth functional structure and produce parse trees
for each of the following. Use your trees to produce an interpretation function for
the sentences.
*a. People have rights and dogs have rights, but rocks do not.
b. It is not the case that: rocks have rights, but people do not.
c. Aliens believe that rocks have rights, but it is not the case that people believe
it.
d. Aliens landed in Roswell NM in 1947, and live underground but not in my
backyard.
e. Rocks do not have rights and aliens do not have rights, but people and dogs
do.

5.2.3

Formal Sentences

Now we are ready for step (3) of the translation procedure TP. Corresponding to
each parse tree we construct a parallel tree using the interpretation function and
then equivalent formal expressions to capture the force of ordinary truth functional
operators. An ordinary truth functional operator has a table. Similarly, our formal
expressions have tables. An ordinary truth functional operator is equivalent to some
formal expression containing blanks just in case their tables are the same. Thus
‘
’ is equivalent to ‘it is not the case that
’. They are equivalent insofar as
in each case, the whole has the opposite truth value of what is in the blank. Similarly,
‘
^
’ is equivalent to ‘
and
’. In either case, when sentences in
the blanks are both T the whole is T, and in other cases, the whole is F. Of course,
the complex ‘.
!
/’ takes the same values as the ‘
^
’ that
abbreviates it. So different formal expressions may be equivalent to a given ordinary
one.
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To see how this works, let us return to the sample sentences from above. Again, the
idea is to generate a parallel tree. The parallel tree has exactly one node corresponding
to each node in the parse tree. We begin by using the sentence letters from our
interpretation function for the bottom nodes. The case is particularly simple when the
tree has no structure. ‘Bob is happy’ has a simple unstructured tree, and we assigned
it a sentence letter directly. Thus our original and parallel trees are,
(N)

B1

Bob is happy

So for a simple sentence, we simply read off the final translation from the interpretation
function. So much for the first sentence.
As we have seen, the second sentence is equivalent to ‘It is not the case that Carol
is happy’ with a parse tree as on the left below. We begin the parallel tree on the other
side.
It is not the case that Carol is happy

(O)
C1

Carol is happy

We know how to translate the bottom node. But now we want to capture the force
of the truth functional operator with some equivalent formal expression. For this,
we need a formal expression containing blanks whose table mirrors the table for the
sentential operator in question. In this case, ‘
’ works fine. That is, we have,


it is not the case that
F
T

T
F

F
T

T
F

In each case, when the expression in the blank is T, the whole is F, and when the
expression in the blank is F, the whole is T. So ‘
’ is sufficient as a translation
of ‘it is not the case that
’. Other formal expressions might do just as well. Thus,
for example, we might go with, ‘
’. The table for this is the same as the
table for ‘
’. But it is hard to see why we would do this with  so close at hand.
Now the idea is to apply the equivalent expression to the already translated expression
from the blank. But this is easy to do. Thus we complete the parallel tree as follows:
It is not the case that Carol is happy

C1

Carol is happy

C1

The result is the completed translation, C1 .
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The third sentence has a parse tree as on the left, and resultant parallel tree as on
the right. As usual, we begin with sentence letters from the interpretation function for
the bottom nodes.

(P)

Bob is healthy and it is not the case that Carol is healthy

 HH

HH


it is not the case that Carol is healthy
Bob is healthy

Carol is healthy

.B2 ^ C2 /

B2

@
@
C2

C2

Given translations for the bottom nodes, we work our way up through the tree,
applying equivalent expressions to translations already obtained. As we have seen,
a natural translation of ‘it is not the case that
’ is ‘
’. Thus, working up
from ‘Carol is healthy’, our parallel to ‘it is not the case that Carol is healthy’ is
C2 . But now we have translations for both of the blanks of ‘
and
’. As
we have seen, this has the same table as ‘.
^
/’. So that is our translation.
Again, other expressions might do. In particular, ^ is an abbreviation with the same
table as ‘.
!
/’. In each case, the whole is true when the sentences
in both blanks are true, and otherwise false. Since this is the same as for ‘
and
’, either would do as a translation. But again, the simplest thing is to go with
‘.
^
/’. Thus the final result is .B2 ^ C2 /. With the alternate translation
for the main operator, the result would have been .B2 ! C2 /.
Our last sentence is equivalent to ‘Bob is happy and John believes it is not the
case that Carol is healthy’. Given what we have done, the parallel tree should be easy
to construct.
Bob is happy and John believes it is not the case that Carol is healthy .B1 ^ J /
((H
@
((((
HH
(
(Q)
(
(
@
H
(((
John believes it is not the case that Carol is healthy B1
Bob is happy
J

Given that the tree “bottoms out” on both ‘Bob is happy’ and ‘John believes it is not
the case that Carol is healthy’ the only operator to translate is the main operator ‘
and
’. And we have just seen how to deal with that. The result is the completed
translation, .B1 ^ J /.
Again, once you become familiar with this procedure the full method with trees
may become tedious—and we will often want to set it to the side. But notice: the
method breeds good habits! And the method puts us in a position to translate complex
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expressions, even ones that are so complex that we can barely grasp what they are
saying. Beginning with the main operator, we break expressions down from complex
parts to ones that are simpler. Then we construct translations, one operator at a time,
where each step is manageable.
Also, we should be able to see why the method results in good translations:
Consider some situation with its corresponding intended interpretation. Truth values
for basic parts are the same just by the specification of the interpretation function.
And with equivalent tables, parts built out of them must be the same as well, all the
way up to the truth value of the whole. We satisfy the first part of our criterion CG
insofar as the way we break down sentences in parse trees forces us to capture all the
sentential structure there is to be captured.
For a last example, consider, ‘Bob is happy and Bob is healthy and Carol is happy
and Carol is healthy’. This is true only if ‘Bob is happy’, ‘Bob is healthy’, ‘Carol
is happy’, and ‘Carol is healthy’ are all true. But the method may apply in different
ways. We might, at step one, treat the sentence as a complex expression involving
multiple uses of ‘
and
’; perhaps something like,
(R)

Bob is happy and Bob is healthy and Carol is happy and Carol is healthy

In this case, there is a straightforward move from the ordinary operators to formal
ones in the final step. That is, the situation is as follows:
Bob is happy and Bob is healthy and Carol is happy and Carol is healthy

!
!!

!!PP

Bob is happy and Bob is healthy

@
@
Bob is happy

PP
P

..B1 ^ B2 / ^ .C1 ^ C2 //




PP

Q
Q
Q

Carol is happy and Carol is healthy .B1 ^ B2 /

@
@

Bob is healthy Carol is happy Carol is healthy

A
 A
B1

B2

.C1 ^ C2 /

A
 A
C1

C2

So we use multiple applications of our standard caret operator. But we might have
treated the sentence as something like,
(S)

Bob is happy and Bob is healthy and Carol is happy and Carol is healthy

involving a single four-blank operator, ‘
and
and
and
’, which
yields true only when sentences in all its blanks are true. We have not seen anything
like this before, but nothing stops a tree with four branches all at once. In this case,
we would begin,
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Bob is happy and Bob is healthy and Carol is happy and Carol is healthy



XXX
Q




Q XXXX


Q

Bob is happy

XX

Bob is healthy Carol is happy Carol is healthy

B1

B2

C1

C2

But now we need an equivalent formal expression with four blanks that is true when
sentences in all the blanks are true and otherwise false. Here is something that would
do: ‘..
^
/^.
^
//’. On either of these approaches, then, the
result is ..B1 ^ B2 / ^ .C1 ^ C2 //. Other options might result in something like
...B1 ^ B2 / ^ C1 / ^ C2 /. In this way, there is room for shifting burden between
steps one and three. Such shifting explains how step (1) can be more complex than it
was initially represented to be. Choices about expanding truth functional structure in
the initial stage may matter for what are the equivalent expressions at the end. And
the case exhibits how there are options for different, equally good, translations of the
same ordinary expressions. What matters for CG is that resultant expressions capture
available structure and be true when the originals are true and false when the originals
are false. In most cases, one translation will be more natural than others, and it is
good form to strive for natural translations. If there had been a comma so that the
original sentence was, ‘Bob is happy and Bob is healthy, and Carol is happy and Carol
is healthy’ it would have been most natural to go for an account along the lines of (R).
And it is crazy to use, say, ‘
’ when ‘
’ will do as well.
*E5.5. Construct parallel trees to complete the translation of the sentences from E5.3
and E5.4. Hint: You will not need any operators other than  and ^.
E5.6. Use our method to translate each of the following. That is, for each sentence,
generate a parse tree and interpretation function, and then a parallel tree to produce
a formal equivalent.
a. Plato and Aristotle were great philosophers, but Ayn Rand was not.
b. Plato was a great philosopher and everything Plato said was true, but Ayn
Rand was not a great philosopher and not everything she said was true.
*c. It is not the case that: everything Plato, and Aristotle, and Ayn Rand said was
true.
d. Plato was a great philosopher but not everything he said was true, and Aristotle
was a great philosopher but not everything he said was true.
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e. Not everyone agrees that Ayn Rand was not a great philosopher, and not
everyone thinks that not everything she said was true.

E5.7. Use our method to translate each of the following. That is, for each sentence,
generate a parse tree and interpretation function, and then a parallel tree to produce
a formal equivalent.
a. Bob and Sue and Jim will pass the class.
b. Sue will pass the class, but it is not the case that: Bob will pass and Jim will
pass.
c. It is not the case that: Bob will pass the class and Sue will not.
d. Jim will not pass the class, but it is not the case that: Bob will not pass and
Sue will not pass.
e. It is not the case that: Jim will pass and not pass; and it is not the case that:
Sue will pass and not pass.

5.2.4

Not, And, Or

Our idea has been to recognize when truth conditions for ordinary and formal sentences
are the same. As we have seen, this turns out to require recognizing when tables
for ordinary operators are equivalent to ones for formal expressions. We have had
a lot to say about ‘it is not the case that
’ and ‘
and
’. We now turn
to a more general treatment. We will not be able to provide a complete menu of
ordinary operators. Rather, we will see that some uses of some ordinary operators
can appropriately be translated by our symbols. We should be able to discuss enough
cases for you to see how to approach others on a case-by-case basis. The discussion is
organized around our operators, , ^, _, !, and $, taken in that order.
First, as we have seen, ‘it is not the case that
’ has the same table as . And
various ordinary expressions may be equivalent to expressions involving this operator.
Thus, ‘Bob is not married’ and ‘Bob is unmarried’ might be understood as equivalent
to ‘It is not the case that Bob is married’. Given this, we might assign a sentence letter,
say, M to ‘Bob is married’ and translate M . But the second case calls for comment.
By comparison, consider, ‘Bob is unlucky’. Given what we have done, it is natural to
treat ‘Bob is unlucky’ as equivalent to ‘It is not the case that Bob is lucky’; assign L
to ‘Bob is lucky’; and translate L. But this is not obviously right. Consider three
situations: (i) Bob goes to Las Vegas with $1,000, and comes away with $1,000,000.
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(ii) Bob goes to Las Vegas with $1,000, and comes away with $100, having seen
a show and had a good time. (iii) Bob goes to Las Vegas with $1,000, falls into a
manhole on his way into the casino, and has his money stolen by a light-fingered thief
on the way down. In the first case he is lucky; in the third, unlucky. But, in the second,
one might want to say that he was neither lucky nor unlucky.
(i) Bob is lucky

(ii) Bob is neither lucky nor unlucky
It is not the case that Bob is lucky
(iii) Bob is unlucky
If this is right, ‘Bob is unlucky’ is not equivalent to ‘It is not the case that Bob is
lucky’—for it is not the case that Bob is lucky in both situations (ii) and (iii). Thus
we might have to assign ‘Bob is lucky’ one letter, and ‘Bob is unlucky’ another.1
Decisions about this sort of thing may depend heavily on context, and assumptions
which are in the background of conversation. We will ordinarily assume contexts
where there is no “neutral” state—so that being unlucky is not being lucky, and
similarly in other cases.
Second, as we have seen, ‘
and
’ has the same table as ^. As you may
recall from E5.2, another common operator that works this way is ‘
but
’.
Consider, for example, ‘Bob likes Mary but Mary likes Jim’. Suppose Bob does like
Mary and Mary does like Jim; then the compound sentence is true. Suppose one
of the simples is false, Bob does not like Mary or Mary does not like Jim; then the
compound is false. Thus ‘
but
’ has the table,
but
T
T
F
F

(T)

T
F
F
F

T
F
T
F

and so has the same table as ^. So, in this case, we might assign B to ‘Bob likes Mary’
M to ‘Mary likes Jim’, and translate, .B ^ M /. Of course, the ordinary expression
‘but’ carries a sense of opposition that ‘and’ does not. Our point is not that ‘and’ and
‘but’ somehow mean the same, but rather that compounds formed by means of them
have the same truth function. Another common operator with this table is ‘although
,
’. You should convince yourself that this is so, and be able to find other
ordinary terms that work just the same way.
1 Or

so we have to do in the context of our logic where T and F are the only truth values. Another
option is to allow three values so that the one letter might be T, F, or neither. It is possible to proceed on
this basis—though the two valued (classical) approach has the virtue of relative simplicity. With the
classical approach as background, some such alternatives are developed in Priest, Non-Classical Logics.
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Once again, however, there is room for caution in some cases. Consider, for
example, ‘Bob took a shower and got dressed’. Given what we have done, it is natural
to treat this as equivalent to ‘Bob took a shower and Bob got dressed’; assign letters
S and D; and translate .S ^ D/. But this is not obviously right. Suppose Bob gets
dressed, but then realizes that he is late for a date and forgot to shower, so he jumps
in the shower fully clothed, and air-dries on the way. Then it is true that Bob took a
shower, and true that Bob got dressed. But is it true that Bob took a shower and got
dressed? If not—because the order is wrong—our translation .S ^ D/ might be true
when the original sentence is not. Again, decisions about this sort of thing depend
heavily upon context and background assumptions. And there may be a distinction
between what is said and what is conversationally implied in a given context. Perhaps
what was said corresponds to the table, so that our translation is right, though there are
certain assumptions typically made in conversation that go beyond. But we need not
get into this. Our point is not that the ordinary ‘and’ always works like our operator
^; rather the point is that some (indeed, many) ordinary uses are rightly regarded as
having the same table.2
The operator which is most naturally associated with _ is ‘
or
’. In this
case, there is room for caution from the start. Consider first a restaurant menu which
says that you will get soup or you will get salad with your dinner. This is naturally
understood as ‘You will get soup or you will get salad’ where the sentential operator
is ‘
or
’. In this case, the table would seem to be,
or

(U)

T
T
F
F

F
T
T
F

T
F
T
F

2 The ability to make this point is an important byproduct of our having introduced the formal
operators “as themselves.” Where ^ and the like are introduced as being direct translations of ordinary
operators, a natural reaction to cases of this sort—a reaction had even by some professional logicians
and philosophers—is that “the table is wrong.” But this is mistaken! ^ has its own significance, which
may or may not agree with the shifting meaning of ordinary terms. The situation is no different than for
translation across ordinary languages, where terms may or may not have uniform equivalents.
But now one may feel a certain tension with our account of what it is for an operator to be truth
functional—for there seem to be contexts where the truth values of sentences in the blanks do not
determine the truth value of the whole, even for a purportedly truth functional operator like ‘
and
’. However, we want to distinguish different senses in which an operator may be used (or an
ambiguity as between a bank of a river and a bank where you deposit money)—in this case between
‘
and
’ and ‘
and (then)
’. The first of these has the usual table, but the second is not
truth functional at all. Again, we will ordinarily assume a context where ‘and’, ‘but’, and the like have
tables that correspond to ^.
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The compound is true if you get soup, true if you get salad, but not if you get neither
or both. None of our operators has this table.
But contrast this case with one where a professor promises either to give you an
‘A’ on a paper, or to give you very good comments so that you will know what went
wrong. Suppose the professor gets excited about your paper, giving you both an ‘A’
and comments. Presumably, she did not break her promise! That is, in this case, we
seem to have, ‘I will give you an ‘A’ or I will give you comments’ with the table,
or

(V)

T
T
F
F

T
T
T
F

T
F
T
F

The professor breaks her word just in case she gives you a low grade without comments.
This table is identical to the table for _. For another case, suppose you set out to buy
a power saw, and say to your friend ‘I will go to Home Depot or I will go Lowe’s’.
You go to Home Depot, do not find what you want, so go to Lowe’s and make your
purchase. When your friend later asks where you went, and you say you went to both,
he or she will not say you lied (!) when you said where you were going—for your
statement required only that you would try at least one of those places.
The grading and shopping cases represent the so-called “inclusive” use of ‘or’—
including the case when both components are T; the menu uses the “exclusive” use
of ‘or’—excluding the case when both are T. Ordinarily, we will assume that ‘or’
is used in its inclusive sense, and so is translated directly by _.3 Another operator
that works this way is ‘
unless
’. Again, there are exclusive and inclusive
senses—which you should be able to see by considering restaurant and shopping
examples: ‘You will get soup unless you will get salad’ and ‘I will go to Home Depot
unless I will go to Lowe’s’. And again, we will ordinarily assume that the inclusive
sense is intended. For the exclusive cases, we can generate the table by means of
complex expressions. Thus, for example .P $ Q/ does the job. You should
convince yourself that this is so.
Observe that ‘either
or
’ has the same table as ‘
or
’; and
‘both
and
’ the same as ‘
and
’. So one might think that ‘either’
and ‘both’ play no real role. They do however serve a sort of “bracketing” function:
Consider ‘Neither Bob likes Sue nor Sue likes Bob’. This is naturally understood
3 Again, there may be a distinction between what is said and what is conversationally implied in a
given context. Perhaps what is said generally corresponds to the inclusive table, though many uses are
against background assumptions which automatically exclude the case when both are T. But we need
not get into this. It is enough that some uses are according to the inclusive table.
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as, ‘It is not the case that either Bob likes Sue or Sue likes Bob’ with translation
.B _ S /. Observe that this division is required: An attempt to parse it to ‘It is not
the case that either Bob likes Sue or Sue like Bob’ results in the fragment ‘either Bob
likes Sue’ in the blank for ‘it is not the case that
’. There would be an ambiguity
about the main operator if ‘either’ were missing; but with it there, the only way to
keep complete sentences in the blanks is to make ‘it is not the case that
’ the
main operator. Similarly, ‘Not both Bob likes Sue and Sue likes Bob’ comes to ‘It is
not the case that both Bob likes Sue and Sue likes Bob’ with translation .B ^ S /.
There would be an ambiguity about the main operator if ‘both’ were missing; but with
it there, the only way to keep complete sentences in the blanks is to make ‘it is not the
case that
’ the main operator.
And we continue to work with complex forms on trees. Thus, for example,
consider ‘Neither Bob likes Sue nor Sue likes Bob, but Sue likes Jim unless Jim likes
Mary’. This is a mouthful, but we can deal with it in the usual way. The hard part,
perhaps, is just exposing the operator structure.
It is not the case that either Bob likes Sue or Sue likes Bob but Sue likes Jim unless Jim likes Mary




```
```

`

It is not the case that either Bob likes Sue or Sue likes Bob

```

Sue likes Jim unless Jim likes Mary

(Y)


either Bob likes Sue or Sue likes Bob



Bob likes Sue

HH

HH

Sue likes Jim

HH

Jim likes Mary

HH

Sue likes Bob

Given this, with what we have said above, generate the interpretation function and
then the parallel tree as follows:

B: Bob likes Sue
S : Sue likes Bob

.B _ S / ^ .J _ M /
HHH


H
.J _ M /
.B _ S /

J : Sue likes Jim

B _S

M : Jim likes Mary
B

@
@
S

J

@
@
M
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‘Neither nor’ and ‘Not both’
We have given accounts of ‘neither
nor
’ and ‘not both
and
’
which treat them as combining ordinary negation with conjunction or disjunction.
However, it is possible to see them as unstructured ordinary operators.
So, for example, we might treat ‘neither
tial operator with a table as in (W) below.
neither

(W)

F
F
F
T

nor

P Q  .P _ Q/

nor
T
T
F
F

’ as an unstructured senten-

T
F
T
F

(X)

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
T

T
T
F
F

T
T
T
F

T
F
T
F

Thus ‘Neither Bob likes Sue nor Sue likes Bob’ is true just when ‘Bob likes Sue’
and ‘Sue likes Bob’ are both false, and otherwise the compound is false. No
operator of our formal language has a table which is T just when the components
are both F. Still, we may form complex expressions which work this way. So from
(X), .P _ Q/ has the same table. In this case, with the natural interpretation
function, the parse and parallel trees are,
Neither Bob likes Sue nor Sue likes Bob
H
HH


H
Bob likes Sue
Sue likes Bob

.B _ S /
B

@
@
S

As usual, there is one node in the parallel tree for each node in the parse tree.
Effectively, this strategy unpacks ‘neither
nor
’ in the third stage of TP
rather than the first. Though the resultant tree has a different shape than a tree from
the account of the main text, the result is the same. Another expression with the
same table is P ^ Q. Either is a good translation of ‘neither
nor
’
conceived as an unstructured operator.
Similarly we might treat ‘not both
and
’ as an unstructured sentential
operator whose table is F just when the components are both T. Again, no operator
of our formal language works this way. But we may form complex expressions
that do the job. So, as from the main discussion, .P ^ Q) has the same table.
Another expression that works this way is P _ Q.
Observe that .P _ Q/ for ‘neither nor’ has the same table as P ^ Q; and
.P ^ Q/ for ‘not both’ the same as P _ Q. It is thus a mistake to “distribute”
the tilde of .P _ Q/ to P _ Q—this changes from ‘neither nor’ to ‘not both’.
Similarly it is a mistake to distribute the tilde of .P ^ Q/ to P ^ Q—this
changes from ‘not both’ to ‘neither nor’. Rather, to preserve equivalence, when 
goes into a disjunction, _ flips to ^; and when  goes into a conjunction, ^ flips
to _.
Choices among structured and unstructured approaches to ‘not both’ and ‘neither
nor’ are a matter of taste rather than correctness.
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Given that ‘or’ and ‘unless’ are equivalent to ‘
_
’, everything works as
before. Again, the complex problem is rendered simple if we attack it one operator at
a time.
E5.8. Using the interpretation function below, produce parse trees and then parallel
ones to complete the translation for each of the following.
B: Bob likes Sue
S: Sue likes Bob
B1 : Bob is cool
S1 : Sue is cool
a. Bob likes Sue.
b. Sue does not like Bob.
c. Bob likes Sue and Sue likes Bob.
d. Bob likes Sue or Sue likes Bob.
e. Bob likes Sue unless she is not cool.
*f. Either Bob does not like Sue or Sue does not like Bob.
g. Neither Bob likes Sue, nor Sue likes Bob.
*h. Not both Bob and Sue are cool.
*i. Bob and Sue are cool, and Bob likes Sue but Sue does not like Bob.
j. Although neither Bob nor Sue are cool, either Bob likes Sue or Sue likes Bob.

E5.9. Use our method to translate each of the following. That is, for each sentence,
generate a parse tree and interpretation function, and then a parallel tree to produce
a formal equivalent.4
a. Harry is not a muggle.
b. Neither Harry nor Hermione are muggles.
4 My

source for the information on Quidditch is Kennilworthy Whisp (aka, J.K. Rowling), Quidditch
Through the Ages (2001), along with a daughter who is a rabid fan of all things Potter.
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c. Either Harry’s or Hermione’s parents are muggles.
*d. Neither Harry, nor Ron, nor Hermione are muggles.
e. Not both Harry and Hermione have muggle parents.
f. The game of Quidditch continues unless the Snitch is caught.
g. The Chudley Cannons are not the best Quidditch team ever, however they
hope for the best.
*h. Although blatching and blagging are illegal in Quidditch, the woolongong
shimmy is not.
i. Either the beater hits the bludger or you are not protected from the bludger,
and the bludger is a very heavy ball.
j. Harry won the Quidditch cup in his 3rd year at Hogwarts, but not in his 1st,
2nd, 4th, or 5th.

5.2.5

If, Iff

The operator which is most naturally associated with ! is ‘if
then
’.
Consider some fellow, perhaps of less than sterling character, of whom we assert, ‘If
he loves her, then she is rich’. In this case, the table begins,
if

(Z)

then
T
T
F
F

T
F
?
T

T
F
T
F

If ‘He loves her’ and ‘She is rich’ are both true, then what we said about him is true.
If he loves her, but she is not rich, what we said was wrong. If he does not love her,
and she is poor, then we are also fine, for all we said was that if he loves her, then she
is rich. But what about the other case? Suppose he does not love her, but she is rich.
There is a temptation to say that our conditional assertion is false. But do not give
in! Notice: we did not say that he loves all the rich girls. All we said was that if he
loves this particular girl, then she is rich. So the existence of rich girls he does not
love does not undercut our claim. For another case, say you are trying to find the car
he is driving and say ‘If he is in his own car, then it is a Corvette’. That is, ‘If he is
in his own car then he is in a Corvette’. You would be mistaken if he has traded his
Corvette for a Yugo. But say the Corvette is in the shop and he is driving a loaner
that also happens to be a Corvette. Then ‘He is in his own car’ is F and ‘He is in a
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Corvette’ is T. Still, there is nothing wrong with your claim—if he is in his own car,
then he is in a Corvette. Given this, we are left with the completed table,
if

(AA)

then
T
F
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

which is identical to the table for !. With L for ‘He loves her’ and R for ‘She is
rich’, for ‘If he loves her then she is rich’ the natural translation is .L ! R/. Another
operator which works this way is ‘
only if
’. You should be able to see this
with examples as above: ‘He loves her only if she is rich’ and ‘He is in his own car
only if he is in a Corvette’. So far, perhaps, so good.
But the conditional calls for special comment. First, notice that the table shifts
with the position of ‘if’. Suppose he loves her if she is rich. Intuitively, ‘He loves her
if she is rich’ says the same as ‘If she is rich then he loves her’. Thus, with the above
table and assignments, we end up with translation .R ! L/. Notice that the order is
switched around the arrow. This time, we are mistaken if she is rich and he does not
love her. We can make this point directly from the original claim.
He loves her if she is rich

(AB)

T
T
F
F

T
T
F
T

T
F
T
F

The claim is false just in the case where she is rich but he does not love her. The result
is not the same as the table for !. What we need is an expression that is F in the case
when R is T and L is F, and otherwise T. We get just this with .R ! L/. Of course,
this is just the same result as by intuitively reversing the operator into the regular ‘if
then
’ form.
In the formal language, the order of the components is crucial. In a true material
conditional, the truth of the antecedent guarantees the truth of the consequent. In
ordinary language this role is played, not by the order of the components, but by
operator placement. In general, if by itself is an antecedent indicator; and only if is a
consequent indicator. That is, we get,

(AC)

if P then Q
P if Q
P only if Q
only if P , Q






.P ! Q/
.Q ! P /
.P ! Q/
.Q ! P /
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‘If’, taken alone, identifies what does the guaranteeing, and so the antecedent of our
material conditional; ‘only if’ identifies what is guaranteed, and so the consequent.5
As we have just seen, the natural translation of ‘P if Q’ is Q ! P , and the
translation of ‘P only if Q’ is P ! Q. Thus it should come as no surprise that the
translation of ‘P if and only if Q’ is .P ! Q/ ^ .Q ! P /, where this is precisely
what is abbreviated by .P $ Q/. We can also make this point directly. Consider,
‘He loves her if and only if she is rich’. The operator is truth functional with the table,
He loves her if and only if she is rich

(AD)

T
T
F
F

T
F
F
T

T
F
T
F

It cannot be that he loves her and she is not rich, because he loves her only if she is
rich; so the second row is F. And it cannot be that she is rich and he does not love her,
because he loves her if she is rich; so the third row is F. The biconditional is true just
when both she is rich and he loves her, or neither. Another operator that works this
way is ‘
just in case
’. You should convince yourself that this is so. Notice
that ‘if’, ‘only if’, and ‘if and only if’ play very different roles for translation—you
almost want to think of them as completely different words: if, onlyif, and ifandonlyif,
each with its own distinctive logical role. Do not get the different roles confused!
For an example that puts some of this together consider, ‘She is rich if he loves
her, if and only if he is a cad or very generous’. This comes to the following:

(AE)

She is rich if he loves her if and only if he is a cad or he is very generous
XXXX
XXX



X

She is rich if he loves her
he is a cad or he is very generous
HHH
HHH



H

H
he is very generous
She is rich
he loves her
he is a cad

We begin by assigning sentence letters to the simple sentences at the bottom. Then
the parallel tree is constructed as follows:
5 It

may feel natural to convert ‘P unless Q’ to ‘P if not Q’ and translate .Q ! P /. This is fine
and, as is clear from the abbreviated form, equivalent to .Q _ P /. However, with the extra negation and
concern about direction of the arrow, it is easy to get confused on this approach—so the simple wedge is
less likely to go wrong.
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Cause and Conditional
It is important that the material conditional does not directly indicate causal connection. Suppose we have sentences,
S:
L:

You strike the match
The match will light.

And consider,
(i)
(ii)

If you strike the match then it will light
The match will light only if you strike it

S !L
L!S

with natural translations by our method on the right. Good. But clearly the cause
of the lighting is the striking. So the first arrow runs from cause to effect, and the
second from effect to cause. Why? In (i) we represent the cause as sufficient for
the effect: striking the match guarantees that it will light. In (ii) we represent the
cause as necessary for the effect—the only way to get the match to light, is to strike
it—so if the match lights, it was struck.
There may be a certain tendency to associate the ordinary ‘if’ and ‘only if’ with
cause, so that we say, ‘if P then Q’ when we think of P as a (sufficient) cause of
Q, and say ‘P only if Q’ when we think of Q as a (necessary) cause of P . But
causal direction is not reflected by the arrow, which comes out .P ! Q/ either
way. The material conditional indicates guarantee.
This point is important insofar as certain ordinary conditionals seem inextricably
tied to causation. This is particularly the case with “subjunctive” conditionals
(conditionals about what would have been). Suppose after a game of one-on-one
basketball I brag, ‘If I had played LeBron, I would have won’ where this is,
‘If it were the case that I played LeBron then it would have been that I won the game’.

Intuitively, this is false, LeBron would wipe the floor with me. But contrast,
‘If it were the case that I played Lassie then it would have been that I won the game’.

Now, intuitively, this is true; Lassie has many talents but, presumably, basketball is
not among them—and I could take her. But I have never played LeBron or Lassie,
so both ‘I played LeBron’ and ‘I played Lassie’ are false. Thus the truth value of
the whole conditional changes from false to true though the values of sentences in
the blanks remain the same; and ‘if it were the case that
then it would have
been that
’ is not even truth functional. Subjunctive conditionals do offer a
sort of guarantee, but the guarantee is for situations alternate to the way things
actually are. So actual truth values do not determine the truth of the conditional.
Conditionals other than the material conditional are a central theme of Priest, NonClassical Logics. As usual, we simply assume that ‘if’ and ‘only if’ are used in
their truth functional sense, and so are given a good translation by !.
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..L ! R/ $ .C _ G//
HHH


H
.L ! R/
(C _ G/

C : He is a cad
G: He is very generous

R

@
@
L

C

@
@
G

Observe that ‘She is rich if he loves her’ is equivalent to .L ! R/, not the other way
around. Then the wedge translates ‘
or
’, and the main operator has the
same table as $.
Notice again that our procedure for translating, one operator or part at a time, lets
us translate even where the original is so complex that it is difficult to comprehend.
The method forces us to capture all available sentential structure, and the resultant
translation is good insofar as, given its interpretation function, a formal sentence
comes out true on precisely the intended interpretations that correspond to stories
on which the original is true. It does this because the formal and informal sentences
work the same way. Eventually, you want to be able to work translations without the
trees. (And maybe you have already begun to do so.) In fact, it will be natural to
generate translations simultaneously with a (mental) parse tree. The result produces
translations from the top down, rather than from the bottom up, building the translation
operator-by-operator as you take the sentence apart from the main operator down. But,
of course, the result should be the same no matter how you do it.
From definition AR on page 5, an argument is some sentences, one of which (the
conclusion) is taken to be supported by the remaining sentences (the premises). In
some courses on logic or critical reasoning, one might spend a great deal of time
learning to identify premises and conclusions in ordinary discourse. However, we
have taken this much as given, representing arguments in standard form, with premises
listed as complete sentences above a line, and the conclusion under. Thus, for example,

(AF)

If you strike the match, then it will light
The match will not light
You did not strike the match

is a simple argument of the sort we might have encountered in chapter 1. By the
chapter 1 validity test VT, this argument is logically valid.
We get the same result by our formal methods: To translate the argument, we
produce a translation for the premises and conclusion, retaining the “standard-form”
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structure. Thus we might end up with an interpretation function and translation as
below,
S !L
S : You strike the match
L
(AG)
L: The match will light
S
The result is an object to which we can apply truth tables and derivations in a straightforward way. Thus by a truth table and (chapter 3) derivation,
LS S !L
T
T
F
F

(AH)

T
F
T
F

T
T
F
T

L / S
F
F
T
T

F
T
F
T

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

S !L
L
.S ! L/ ! .L ! S/
L ! S
S

prem
prem
T3.13
3,1 MP
4,2 MP

both S ! L; L s S and S ! L; L `ADs S . If you have not yet seen
derivations, do not worry about it for now.
And these results are just what we want. For the table, recall that (i) for any way
a world (consistent story) can be, an interpretation function results in an intended
interpretation; and (ii) on a good translation, the truth value of an ordinary sentence at
an arbitrary world is the same as its formal counterpart on the corresponding intended
interpretation. For some good formal translation of premises and conclusion: Suppose
an argument is sententially valid; then by SV there is no interpretation on which the
premises are true and the conclusion is false; so no intended interpretation from (i)
makes the premises true and the conclusion is false; so with (ii) no consistent story
makes the premises true and conclusion false; so by LV the original argument is
logically valid. So if an argument is sententially valid, then it is logically valid. We
will make this point again, in some detail, in ??.6 For now, notice that our formal
methods, derivations and truth tables, apply to arguments of arbitrary complexity. So
we are in a position to demonstrate validity for arguments that would have set us on
our heels in chapter 1. With this in mind, consider again the butler case (B) from page
2. Demonstration that the argument is logically valid is entirely straightforward by a
good translation and then a truth table to demonstrate semantic validity.
E5.10. Using the interpretation function below, produce parse trees and then parallel
ones to complete the translation for each of the following.
L: Lassie barks
T : Timmy is in trouble
6 And

it remains for ?? to show how derivations matter for logical validity.

CHAPTER 5. TRANSLATION

114

P : Pa will help
H : Lassie is healthy
a. If Timmy is in trouble, then Lassie barks.
b. Timmy is in trouble if Lassie barks.
*c. Lassie barks only if Timmy is in trouble.
d. If Timmy is in trouble and Lassie barks, then Pa will help.
*e. If Timmy is in trouble, then if Lassie barks Pa will help.
f. If Pa will help only if Lassie barks, then Pa will help if and only if Timmy is
in trouble.
g. Pa will help if Lassie barks, just in case Lassie barks only if Timmy is in
trouble.
h. If Timmy is in trouble and Pa will not help, then Lassie is not healthy or does
not bark.
*i. If Timmy is in trouble, then either Lassie is not healthy or if Lassie barks then
Pa will help.
j. If Lassie neither barks nor is healthy, then Timmy is in trouble if Pa will not
help.

E5.11. Use our method, with or without parse trees, to produce a translation, including
interpretation function for the following.
a. If animals feel pain, then animals have intrinsic value.
b. Animals have intrinsic value only if they feel pain.
c. Although animals feel pain, vegetarianism is not right.
d. Animals do not have intrinsic value unless vegetarianism is not right.
e. Vegetarianism is not right only if animals do not feel pain or do not have
intrinsic value.
f. If you think animals feel pain, then vegetarianism is right.
*g. If you think animals do not feel pain, then vegetarianism is not right.
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h. If animals feel pain, then if animals have intrinsic value if they feel pain, then
animals have intrinsic value.
*i. Vegetarianism is right only if both animals feel pain, and animals have intrinsic
value just in case they feel pain; but it is not the case that animals have intrinsic
value just in case they feel pain.
j. If animals do not feel pain if and only if you think animals do not feel pain,
but you do think animals feel pain, then you do not think that animals feel
pain.

E5.12. For each of the following arguments: (i) Produce a good translation, including
interpretation function and translations for the premises and conclusion. Then (ii)
use truth tables to determine whether the argument is sententially valid.
*a. Our car will not run unless it has gasoline
Our car has gasoline
Our car will run
b. If Bill is president, then Hillary is first lady
Hillary is not first lady
Bill is not president
c. Snow is white and snow is not white
Dogs can fly
d. If Mustard murdered Boddy, then it happened in the library.
The weapon was the pipe if and only if it did not happen in the library, and
the weapon was not the pipe only if Mustard murdered him.
Mustard murdered Boddy
e. There is evil
If god is good, there is no evil unless god has morally sufficient reasons for
allowing it.
If god is omnipotent, then god does not have morally sufficient reasons for
allowing evil.
God is not both good and omnipotent.
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E5.13. For each of the arguments in E5.12 that is sententially valid, produce a derivation to show that it is valid in AD.

E5.14. Use a translation and truth table to show that the butler argument (B) from
page 2 is semantically valid.

E5.15. For each of the following concepts, explain in an essay of about two pages,
so that (high-school age) Hannah could understand. In your essay, you should
(i) identify the objects to which the concept applies, (ii) give and explain the
definition, and give and explicate examples of your own construction (iii) where
the concept applies, and (iv) where it does not. Your essay should exhibit an
understanding of methods from the text.
a. Good translations.
b. Truth functional operators
c. Parse trees, interpretation functions and parallel trees

5.3

Quantificational

Chapter 6

Natural Deduction
Natural deduction systems are so-called because their rules formalize patterns of
reasoning that occur in relatively ordinary “natural” contexts. Thus, initially at least,
the rules of natural deduction systems are easier to motivate than the axioms and rules
of axiomatic systems. By itself, this is sufficient to give natural deduction a special
interest. As we shall see, natural deduction is also susceptible to proof strategies in
a way that (primitive) axiomatic systems are not. If you have had another course in
formal logic, you have probably been exposed to natural deduction. So, again, it may
seem important to bring what we have done into contact what you have encountered
in other contexts. After some general remarks about natural deduction in section 6.1,
we turn to the sentential part of our natural derivation system NDs (section 6.2), then
the full version with quantifiers and equality ND (section 6.3), and finally consider
some applications to arithmetic (??).

6.1

General

This section develops some concepts required for NDs and ND. The first part develops
a “toy” system to introduce the very idea of a derivation and a derivation rule. We
then turn to some concepts required for the particular rules of ND.1

6.1.1

Derivations as Games

Derivations can be seen as a kind of game—with the aim of getting from a starting
point to a goal by rules. In their essential nature, these rules are defined in terms of
1 Parts

of this section are reminiscent of 3.1 and, especially if you skipped over that section, you
may want to look it over now as additional background.
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form: the forms of expressions authorize “moves” in the game. Given this, there is
no immediate or obvious connection between derivations and semantic validity or
truth. All the same, even though the rules are not defined by a relation to validity and
truth, ultimately we shall be able to establish relations between the derivation rules
and these notions.
We begin introducing natural derivations purely in their essential nature as games.
Thus, for example, consider a preliminary system NP with the following rules:
NP

R1 P ! Q, P
Q

R2 P _ Q

R3 P ^ Q

Q

P

R4 P
P _Q

In this system, R1: given formulas of the form P ! Q and P , you may move to Q;
R2: given a formula of the form P _ Q, you may move to Q; R3: given a formula of
the form P ^ Q, you may move to P ; and R4: given a formula P you may move to
P _ Q for any Q. For now, at least, the game is played as follows: You begin with
some starting formulas and a goal. The starting formulas are like “cards” in your hand.
You then apply the rules to obtain more formulas, to which the rules may be applied
again and again. You win if you eventually obtain the goal formula.
Let us consider some examples. At this stage, do not worry about strategy, about
why we do what we do, as much as about how the rules work and the way the game
is played. A game always begins with starting premises at the top, and goal on the
bottom.
1. A ! .B ^ C /
2. A

P(remise)
P(remise)

(A)
B _D

(goal)

The formulas on lines (1) and (2) are of the form P ! Q and P , where P maps to A
and Q to .B ^ C /; so we are in a position to apply rule R1 to get the Q.
1. A ! .B ^ C /
2. A

P(remise)
P(remise)

3. B ^ C

1,2 R1

B _D

(goal)

The justification for our move—the way the rules apply—is listed on the right; in this
case, we use the formulas on lines (1) and (2) according to rule R1 to get B ^ C ; so
that is indicated by the notation. Now B ^ C is of the form P ^ Q. So we can apply
R3 to it in order to obtain the P , namely B.
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1. A ! .B ^ C /
2. A

P(remise)
P(remise)

3. B ^ C
4. B
B _D

1,2 R1
3 R3
(goal)
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Notice that one application of a rule is independent of another. It does not matter what
formula was P or Q in a previous move for evaluation of this one. Finally, where P
is B, B _ D is of the form P _ Q. So we can apply R4 to get the final result.
1. A ! .B ^ C /
2. A

P(remise)
P(remise)

3. B ^ C
4. B
5. B _ D

1,2 R1
3 R3
4 R4 Win!

Notice that R4 leaves the Q unrestricted: Given some P , we can move to P _ Q for
any Q. Since we reached the goal from the starting sentences, we win! In this simple
derivation system, any line of a successful derivation is either given as a premise, or
justified from lines before it by the rules.
Here are a couple more examples, this time of completed derivations:
1. A ^ C
2. .A _ B/ ! D

(B)

3.
4.
5.
6.

A
A_B
D
D _ .R ! S/

P
P
1 R3
3 R4
2,4 R1
5 R4 Win!

A ^ C is of the form P ^ Q. So we can apply R3 to obtain the P , in this case A.
Then where P is A, we use R4 to add on a B to get A _ B. .A _ B/ ! D and A _ B
are of the form P ! Q and P ; so we apply R1 to get the Q, that is D. Finally, where
D is P , D _ .R ! S / is of the form P _ Q; so we apply R4 to get the final result.
Notice again that the Q may be any formula whatsoever. Now the second example:
1. .A ^ B/ ^ D
2. .A ^ B/ ! C
3. A ! .C ! .B ^ D//

(C)

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

A^B
C
A
C ! .B ^ D/
B ^D
B

P
P
P
1 R3
2,4 R1
4 R3
3,6 R1
7,5 R1
8 R3 Win!
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You should be able to follow the steps. In this case, we use A ^ B on line (4) twice;
once as part of an application of R1 to get C , and again in an application of R3 to get
the A. Once you have a formula in your “hand” you can use it as many times and
whatever way the rules will allow. Also, the order in which we worked might have
been different. Thus, for example, we might have obtained A on line (5) and then
C after. You win if you get to the goal by the rules; how you get there is up to you.
Finally, it is tempting to think we could get B from, say, A ^ B on line (4). We will
able to do this in our official system. But the rules we have so far do not let us do so.
R3 lets us move just to the left conjunct of a formula of the form P ^ Q.
When there is a way to get from the premises of some argument to its conclusion
by the rules of derivation system N, the premises prove the conclusion in system N. In
this case, where  is the set of premises and P the conclusion, we write  `N P . If
 `N P the argument is valid in derivation system N. Notice the distinction between
this “single turnstile” ` and the double turnstile  associated with semantic validity.
As usual, if Q1 : : : Qn are the members of , we sometimes write Q1 : : : Qn `N P in
place of  `N P . If  has no members then we simply write `N P . In this case, P is
a theorem of derivation system N.
One can imagine setting up many different rule sets, and so many different games
of this kind. In the end, we want our game to serve a specific purpose. That is, we
want to use the game in the identification of valid arguments. In order for our games
to be an indicator of validity, we would like it to be the case that  `N P iff   P ,
that  proves P iff  entails P . In ?? we will show that our official derivation games
have this property. For now, we can at least see how this might be: Roughly, we
impose the following condition on rules: We require of our rules that the inputs always
semantically entail the outputs. Then if some premises are true, and we make a move
to a formula, the formula we move to must be true; and if the formulas in our “hand”
are all true, and we add some formula by another move, the formula we add must be
true; and so forth for each formula we add until we get to the goal, which will have to
be true as well. So if the premises are true, the goal must be true as well.
Notice that our rules R1, R3, and R4 each meet the proposed requirement on rules,
but R2 does not.
P Q

(D)

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

R1
P !Q
T
F
T
T

P / Q
T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

R2
P _Q / Q
T
T
T
F

T
F
T
F

R3
P ^Q / P
T
F
F
F

T
T
F
F

R4
P / P _Q
T
T
F
F

T
T
T
F

R1, R3, and R4 have no row where the input(s) are T and the output is F. But for
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R2, the second row has input T and output F. So R2 does not meet our condition.
This does not mean that one cannot construct a game with R2 as a part. Rather, the
point is that R2 will not help us accomplish what we want to accomplish with our
games. So long as rules meet the condition, a win in the game always corresponds to
an argument that is semantically valid. Thus, for example, derivation (C), in which
R2 does not appear, corresponds to the result that .A ^ B/ ^ D, .A ^ B/ ! C ,
A ! .C ! .B ^ D// s B.
A B C D .A ^ B/ ^ D

(E)

.A ^ B/ ! C

A ! .C ! .B ^ D// / B

T
T
T
T

T
T
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
T
T
T

T
F
T
F

T
T
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
T

T
F
T
T

T
F
T
F

T
T
T
T

T
T
T
T

F
F
F
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

F
F
F
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
T
T

F
F
T
T

F
F
T
T

F
F
F
F

F
F
F
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
T
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

F
F
F
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
T
T

T
T
T
T

T
F
T
T

T
F
T
F

T
T
T
T

F
F
F
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
F
F
F

F
F
F
F

F
F
F
F

T
T
T
T

T
T
T
T

F
F
T
T

F
F
F
F

F
F
F
F

There is no row where the premises are T and the conclusion is F. As the number of
rows goes up, we may decide that the games are dramatically easier to complete than
the tables. And similarly for the quantificational case, where we have not yet been
able to demonstrate semantic validity at all.
E6.1. Show that each of the following is valid in NP. Complete (a)–(d) using just
rules R1, R3, and R4. You will need an application of R2 for (e).
*a. .A ^ B/ ^ C `NP A
b. .A ^ B/ ^ C , A ! .B ^ C / `NP B
c. .A ^ B/ ! .B ^ A/, A ^ B `NP B _ A
d. R, ŒR _ .S _ T / ! S `NP S _ T
e. A `NP A ! C
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*E6.2. (i) For each of the arguments in E6.1, use a truth table to decide if the argument
is sententially valid. (ii) To what do you attribute the fact that a win in NP is not a
sure indicator of semantic validity?

6.1.2

Auxiliary Assumptions

Having introduced the idea a derivation by our little system NP, we now turn to some
additional concepts that are background to the rules of our official derivation system
ND. So far, our derivations have had the following form:

(F)

a. A
::
:
b. B

P(remise)

P(remise)

::
:
c. G

(goal)

We have some premise(s) at the top, and a conclusion at the bottom. The premises are
against a line which indicates the range or scope over which the premises apply. In
each case, the line extends from the premises to the conclusion, indicating that the
conclusion is derived from them. It is always our aim to derive the conclusion under
the scope of the premises alone. But our official derivation system will allow appeal
to certain auxiliary assumptions in addition to premises. Any such assumption comes
with a scope line of its own—indicating the range over which it applies. Thus, for
example, derivations might be structured as follows:
a. A

P(remise)

b. B

P(remise)

a. A

P(remise)

b. B

P(remise)

c.

(G)

c.

C

A(ssumption)

(H)

d.

C

A(ssumption)
D

A(ssumption)

e.
d.
f.
e. G

(goal)
g. G

(goal)

In each, there are premises A through B at the top and goal G at the bottom. As indicated by the main leftmost scope line, the premises apply throughout the derivations,
and the goal is derived under them. In case (G), there is an additional assumption at
(c). As indicated by its scope line, that assumption applies from (c)–(d). In (H), there
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are a pair of additional assumptions. As indicated by the associated scope lines, the
first applies over (c)–(f), and the second over (d)–(e). We will say that an auxiliary
assumption, together with the formulas that fall under its scope, is a subderivation.
Thus (G) has a subderivation on (c)–(d). (H) has a pair of subderivations, one on
(c)–(f), and another on (d)–(e). A derivation or subderivation may include various
other subderivations. Any subderivation begins with an auxiliary assumption. In
general we cite a subderivation by listing the line number on which it begins, then a
dash, and the line number on which its scope line ends.
In contexts without auxiliary assumptions, we have been able freely to appeal to
any formula already in our “hand.” Where there are auxiliary assumptions, however,
we may appeal only to accessible subderivations and formulas. A formula is accessible
at a given stage when it is obtained under assumptions all of which continue to apply.
But scope lines indicate the range over which assumptions apply. In practice then,
for justification of a formula at line number i we can appeal only to formulas which
appear immediately against scope lines extending as far as i —these are the formulas
obtained under assumptions that continue to apply. Thus, for example, with the scope
structure as in (I) below, in the justification of line (6),
1.

P

1.

P

2.
3.

A

2.
3.

A

4.

A

4.

A

5.

(I)

6. 
7.

5.
A

(J)

6.
7.

8.

8.

9.

9.

10.

A

10.

11.

11. 

12.

12.

A

A

we could appeal only to formulas at (1), (2), and (3), for these are the only ones
immediately against scope lines extending as far as (6). To see this, notice that scope
lines extending as far as (6) are ones cut by the arrow at (6). Formulas at (4) and (5)
are not against a line extending that far. Similarly, as indicated by the arrow in (J),
for the justification of (11), we could appeal only to formulas at (1), (2), and (10).
Formulas at other line numbers are not immediately against scope lines extending as
far as (11). The accessible formulas are ones derived under assumptions all of which
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continue to apply.
It may be helpful to think of a completed subderivation as a sort of “box.” So long
as you are under the scope of an assumption, the box is open and you can “see” the
formulas under its scope. However, once you exit from an assumption, the box is
closed, and the formulas inside are no longer available.

(I0 )

1.

1.

2.
3.

2.
3.

4.

4.

5.

5.

6. 
7.

(J0 )

6.
7.

8.

8.

9.

9.

10.

10.

11.

11. 

12.

12.

Thus, again, at line (6) of (I0 ) the formulas at (4)–(5) are locked away so that the only
accessible lines are (1)–(3). Similarly, at line (11) of (J0 ) all of (3)–(9) is unavailable.
Our aim is always to obtain the goal against the leftmost scope line—under
the scope of the premises alone—and if the only formulas accessible for the goal’s
justification are also against the leftmost scope line, it may appear mysterious why
we would ever introduce auxiliary assumptions and subderivations at all. What is
the point of auxiliary assumptions, if formulas under their scope are inaccessible for
justification of the formula we want? The answer is that though the formulas inside a
box are unavailable the box may still be useful. Some of our rules will appeal to entire
subderivations (to the boxes), rather than to the formulas in them. A subderivation
is accessible at a given stage when it is obtained under assumptions all of which
continue to apply. In practice, what this means is that for a formula at line i , we can
appeal to a box (to a subderivation) only if it (its scope line) is against a line which
extends down to i .
Thus at line (6) of (I0 ), we would not be able to appeal to the formulas on lines (4)
and (5)—they are inside the closed box. However, we would be able to appeal to the
box on lines (4)–(5), for it is against a scope line cut by the arrow. Similarly, at line
(11) of (J0 ) we are not able to appeal to formulas on any of the lines (3)–(9), for they
are inside the closed boxes. Similarly, we cannot appeal to the boxes on (4)–(5) or
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(7)–(8) for they are locked inside the larger box. However, we can appeal to the larger
subderivation on (3)–(9) insofar as it is against a line cut by the arrow. Observe that
one can appeal to a box only after it is closed—so, for example, at (11) of (J0 ) there
is not (yet) a closed box at (10)–(11) and so no available subderivation to which one
may appeal. When a box is closed, its assumption is discharged.
So we have an answer to our question about the point of subderivations for
reaching a conclusion: In our example, the justification for the conclusion at line (12)
might appeal to the formulas on lines (1) and (2) or to the subderivations on lines
(3)–(9) and (10)–(11). Again line (12) does not have access to the formulas inside the
subderivations from lines (3)–(9) and (10)–(11). So the subderivations are accessible
even where the formulas inside them are not.
First rule of NDs. All this will become more concrete as we turn now to the rules
of our official system ND and its initial fragment NDs. Let us set aside rules of the
preliminary system NP and begin rules of NDs from scratch. We can reinforce the
point about accessibility of formulas by introducing the first, and simplest, rule of
NDs. If a formula P appears on an accessible line a of a derivation, we may repeat it
by the rule reiteration, with justification a R.
a. P

R
P

aR

It should be obvious why reiteration satisfies our basic condition on rules. If P is true,
of course P is true. So this rule could never lead from a formula that is true to one

Definitions for Auxiliary Assumptions
SD An auxiliary assumption, together with the formulas that fall under its scope, is a
subderivation.
FA A formula is accessible at a given stage when it is obtained under assumptions all of
which continue to apply.
SA A subderivation is accessible at a given stage when it (as a whole) is obtained under
assumptions all of which continue to apply.
In practice, what this means is that for justification of a formula at line i we can appeal to
another formula only if it is immediately against a scope line extending as far as i.
And in practice, for justification of a formula at line i , we can appeal to a subderivation
only if its whole scope line is itself immediately against a scope line extending as far as i .
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that is not. Observe, though, that the line a must be accessible. Given scope lines
as in (I) and leaving aside assumption lines (which are always justified ‘A’), if the
assumption at line (3) were a formula P , we could conclude P with justification 3 R
at lines (5), (6), (8), or (9). We could not obtain P with the same justification at (11)
or (12) without violating the rule, because (3) is not accessible for justification of (11)
or (12). You should be clear about why this is so.
*E6.3. Consider a derivation with the following structure:
1.

P

2.

A

3.
4.

A

5.

A

6.
7.
8.

For each of the lines (3), (6), (7), and (8) which lines are accessible? which
subderivations (if any) are accessible? That is, complete the following table:
accessible lines

accessible subderivations

line 3
line 6
line 7
line 8
*E6.4. Suppose in a derivation with structure as in E6.3 we have obtained a formula
A on line (3). (i) On what lines would we be allowed to conclude A by 3 R?
Suppose there is a formula B on line (4). (ii) On what lines would we be allowed
to conclude B by 4 R? Hint: This is just a question about accessibility, asking
where it is possible to use lines (3) and (4).

6.2

Sentential

We introduced the idea of a derivation by the preliminary system NP. We have
introduced notions of accessibility. And, setting aside the rules of NP, we have seen
the first rule R of NDs. We now turn to the rest of the rules of NDs, including rules
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for arbitrary sentential forms—for arbitrary forms involving  and ! (and so ^, _,
and $). Of course expressions of a quantificational language may have sentential
forms, and if this is so the rules apply to them. For the most part, though, we simply
focus on expressions of our sentential language Ls . In a derivation, each formula
is either a premise, an auxiliary assumption, or is justified by the rules. In addition
to reiteration, NDs includes two rules for each of the five sentential operators—for
a total of eleven rules. For each of the operators, there is an ‘I’ or introduction rule,
and an ‘E’ or exploitation rule.2 As we will see, this division helps structure the way
we approach derivations. There are sections to introduce the rules (6.2.1–6.2.3), for
discussion of strategy (6.2.4), and for an extended system NDs+ (6.2.5).

6.2.1

! and ^

Let us start with the I- and E-rules for ! and ^. We have already seen the exploitation
rule for !. It is R1 of system NP. If formulas P ! Q and P and appear on accessible
lines a and b of a derivation, we may conclude Q with justification a,b !E.
!E

a. P ! Q
b. P
Q

a,b !E

Intuitively, if it is true that if P then Q and it is true that P , then Q must be true as
well. And on table (D) we saw that if both P ! Q and P are true, then Q is true.
Notice that we do not somehow get the P from P ! Q. Rather, we exploit P ! Q
when, given that P also is true, we use P together with P ! Q to conclude Q. So
this rule requires two input “cards.” The P ! Q card sits idle without a P to activate
it. The order in which P ! Q and P appear does not matter so long as they are
both accessible. However, you should cite them in the standard order—line for the
conditional first, then the antecedent. As in the axiomatic system from chapter 3, this
rule is sometimes called modus ponens.
Here is an example. We show, L, L ! .A ^ K/, .A ^ K/ ! .L ! P / `NDs P .

(K)

2 I-

1. L
2. L ! .A ^ K/
3. .A ^ K/ ! .L ! P /

P
P
P

4. A ^ K
5. L ! P
6. P

2,1 !E
3,4 !E
5,1 !E

and E-rules are often called introduction and elimination rules. This can lead to confusion as
E-rules do not necessarily eliminate anything.
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L ! .A^K/ and L and are of the form P ! Q and P where L is the P and A^K is
Q. So we use them to conclude A ^ K by !E on (4). But then .A ^ K/ ! .L ! P /
and A ^ K are of the form P ! Q and P , so we use them to conclude Q, in this
case, L ! P , on line (5). Finally L ! P and L are of the form P ! Q and P , and
we use them to conclude P on (6).
Notice that,
(L)

1. .A ! B/ ^ C
2. A

P
P

3. B

1,2 !E

!Mistake!

misapplies the rule. .A ! B/ ^ C is not of the form P ! Q—the main operator
being ^, so that the formula is of the form P ^ Q. The rule !E applies just to
formulas with main operator !. If we want to use .A ! B/ ^ C with A to conclude
B, we would first have to isolate A ! B on a line of its own. We introduce a rule for
this just below (and we might have done it in NP). But we do not yet have the required
rule in NDs.
!I is our first rule that requires a subderivation. Once we understand this rule,
the rest are mere variations on a theme. !I takes as its input an entire subderivation.
Given an accessible subderivation which begins with assumption P on line a and
ends with Q against the assumption’s scope line at b, one may conclude P ! Q with
justification a-b !I.

!I

a.

P

b.

Q
P !Q

A (Q, !I)

a.

or
a-b !I

b.

P

A (g, !I)

Q
P !Q

a-b !I

So P ! Q is justified by a subderivation that begins with assumption P and ends
with Q. Note that the auxiliary assumption comes with a parenthetical exit strategy:
In this case the exit strategy includes the formula Q with which the subderivation is
to end, and an indication of the rule (!I) by which exit is to be made. We might
write out the entire formula inside the parentheses as indicated on the left. In practice,
however, this is tedious, and it is easier just to write the formula at the bottom of the
scope line where we will need it in the end. Thus in the parentheses on the right ‘g’ is
a simple pointer to the goal formula at the end of the scope line. Note that the pointer
is empty unless there is a formula to which it points, and the exit strategy therefore
is not complete unless the goal formula is stated. In this case, the strategy includes
the pointer to the goal formula, along with the indication of the rule (!I) by which
exit is to be made. Again, at the time we make the assumption, we write the Q down
as part of the strategy for exiting the subderivation. But this does not mean the Q is
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justified! The Q is rather introduced as a new goal. Notice also that the justification
a-b !I does not refer to the formulas on lines a and b. These are inaccessible. Rather,
the justification appeals to the subderivation which begins on line a and ends on line
b—where this subderivation is accessible even though the formulas in it are not. So
there is a difference between the comma and the dash, as they appear in justifications.
For this rule, we assume the antecedent, reach the consequent, then discharge the
assumption and conclude to the conditional by !I. Intuitively, if an assumption P
leads to Q then we know that if P then Q. On truth tables, if there is a sententially
valid argument from some premises A1 : : : An and P to conclusion Q, then there
is no row where A1 : : : An are true and P is true but Q is false—but this is just to
say that there is no row where A1 : : : An are true and P ! Q is false; so A1 : : : An
entail P ! Q.
For an example, suppose we are confronted with the following:

(M)

1. A ! B
2. B ! C

P
P

A!C

In general, we use an introduction rule to produce some formula—typically one
already given as a goal. !I generates P ! Q given a subderivation that starts with
the P and ends with the Q. Thus to reach A ! C , we need a subderivation that starts
with A and ends with C . So we set up to reach A ! C with the assumption A and
an exit strategy to produce A ! C by !I. For this we set the consequent C as a
subgoal.
1. A ! B
2. B ! C
3.

A

P
P
A (g, !I)

C
A!C

3- !I

Again, we have not yet reached C or A ! C . Rather, we have assumed A and set
C as a subgoal, with the strategy of terminating our subderivation by an application
of !I. This much is stated in the exit strategy. We are not in a position to fill in the
entire justification for A ! C , but there is no harm filling in what we can, to remind
us where we are going. As it happens, the new goal C is easy to get.
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1. A ! B
2. B ! C

P
P

3.

A

A (g, !I)

4.
5.

B
C

1,3 !E
2,4 !E

A!C
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3- !I

Having reached C , and so completed the subderivation, we are in a position to execute
our exit strategy and conclude A ! C by !I.
1. A ! B
2. B ! C

P
P

3.

A

A (g, !I)

4.
5.

B
C

1,3 !E
2,4 !E

6. A ! C

3-5 !I

We appeal to the subderivation that starts with the assumption of the antecedent, and
reaches the consequent. Notice that the !I setup is driven, not by the premises, but by
where we want to get. We will say something more systematic about strategy once we
have introduced all the rules. But here is the fundamental idea: think goal directedly.
We begin with A ! C as a goal. Our idea for producing it leads to C as a new goal.
And the new goal is relatively easy to obtain.
Here is another example, one that should illustrate the above point about strategy
as well as the rule. Say we want to show A `NDs B ! .C ! A/.
1. A

P

(N)
B ! .C ! A/

Since the goal is of the form P ! Q, we set up to get it by !I.
1. A
2.

P
B

A (g, !I)

C !A
B ! .C ! A/

2- !I

We need a subderivation that starts with the antecedent and ends with the consequent.
So we assume the antecedent, and set the consequent as a new goal. In this case, the
new goal C ! A has main operator !, so we set up again to reach it by !I.

CHAPTER 6. NATURAL DEDUCTION
1. A

P
A (g, !I)

B

2.
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A (g, !I)

C

3.

A
C !A

3- !I

B ! .C ! A/

2- !I

The pointer g in an exit strategy points to the goal formula at the bottom of its scope
line. Thus g for assumption B at (2) points to C ! A at the bottom of its line, and g
for assumption C at (3) points to A at the bottom of its line. Again, for the conditional,
we assume the antecedent, and set the consequent as a new goal. And this last goal is
particularly easy to reach. It follows immediately by reiteration from (1). Then it is a
simple matter of executing the exit strategies with which our auxiliary assumptions
were introduced.
1. A

P
A (g, !I)

B

2.
3.

C

A (g, !I)

4.

A

1R

C !A

3-4 !I

6. B ! .C ! A/

2-5 !I

5.

The subderivation which begins on (3) and ends on (4) begins with the antecedent
and ends with the consequent of C ! A. So we conclude C ! A on (5) by 3-4 !I.
The subderivation which begins on (2) and ends at (5) begins with the antecedent and
ends with the consequent of B ! .C ! A/. So we reach B ! .C ! A/ on (6) by
2-5 !I. Notice again how our overall reasoning is driven by the goals, rather than
the premises and assumptions. It is sometimes difficult to motivate strategy when
derivations are short and relatively easy. But this sort of thinking will serve you well
as problems get more difficult!
Given what we have done, the E- and I-rules for ^ are completely straightforward.
If P ^ Q appears on some accessible line a of a derivation, then you may move to the
P or to the Q with justification a ^E.
a. P ^ Q

^E

P

a. P ^ Q
a ^E

Q

a ^E

Either qualifies as an instance of the rule. The left-hand case was R3 from NP.
Intuitively, ^E should be clear. If P and Q is true, then P is true. And if P and Q is
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true, then Q is true. We saw a table for the left-hand case in (D). The other is similar.
The ^ introduction rule is equally straightforward. If P and Q appear on accessible
lines a and b of a derivation, then you may move to P ^ Q with justification a,b ^I.
^I

a. P
b. Q
P ^Q

a,b ^I

The order in which P and Q appear is irrelevant, though you should cite them in the
specified order, line for the left conjunct first, and then for the right. If P is true and
Q is true, then P and Q is true. Similarly, on a table, any line with both P and Q
true has P ^ Q true.
Here is a simple example, demonstrating the associativity of conjunction.
1. A ^ .B ^ C /

(O)

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

A
B ^C
B
C
A^B
.A ^ B/ ^ C

P
1 ^E
1 ^E
3 ^E
3 ^E
2,4 ^I
6,5 ^I

Notice that we could not get the B alone or the C alone without first isolating B ^ C
on (3). As before, our rules apply just to the main operator. In effect, we take apart
the premise with the E-rule, and put the conclusion together with the I-rule. Of course,
as with !I and !E, rules for other operators do not always let us get to the parts and
put them together in this simple and symmetric way.
A final example brings together all of the rules so far (except R).
1. A ! C

(P)

P

2.

A^B

A (g, !I)

3.
4.
5.
6.

A
C
B
B ^C

2 ^E
1,3 !E
2 ^E
5,4 ^I

7. .A ^ B/ ! .B ^ C /

2-6 !I

We set up to obtain the overall goal by !I. This generates B ^ C as a subgoal. We
get B ^ C by getting the B and the C .
Here is our guiding idea for strategy (which may now seem obvious): As you
focus on a goal, to generate a formula with any main operator, consider producing
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it by the corresponding introduction rule. Thus if the main operator of a goal or
subgoal is !, consider producing the formula by !I; if the main operator of a goal
is ^, consider producing it by ^I. You make use of a formula with main operator
! by !E and of a formula with main operator ^ with ^E. This much should be
sufficient for you to approach the following exercises. As you approach these and
other derivations, you may find the NDs quick reference on page 148 helpful. As you
work the derivations, it is good simply to leave plenty of space on the page for your
derivation as you state goal formulas, and let there be blank lines if room remains.3

Words to the wise:
 A common mistake made by beginning students is to assimilate other rules
to ^E and ^I—moving, say, from P ! Q alone to P or Q, or from P
and Q to P ! Q. Do not forget what you have learned! Do not make this
mistake! The ^ rules are particularly easy. But each operator has its own
special character. Thus !E requires two “cards” to play. And !I takes a
subderivation as input.
 Another common mistake is to assume a formula P merely because it would
be nice to have access to P . Do not make this mistake! An assumption
always comes with an exit strategy, and is useful only for application of the
exit rule. At this stage, then, the only reason to assume P is to produce a
formula of the sort P ! Q by !I.
 Our little system NP introduced the idea of a derivation game. But we
are introducing ND from scratch. At this stage, then, the only rules for
derivations in NDs are R, !I, !E, ^I, and ^E.

E6.5. Complete the following derivations in NDs by filling in justifications for each
line. Hint: It may be convenient to print or xerox the problems, and fill in your
answers directly on the copy.
3 Typing on a computer it is easy to push lines down if you need more room. It is not so easy
with pencil and paper, and worse with pen. Though it requires some startup effort and is not a “what
you see is what you get” processor, an especially flexible electronic option is LATEX—for this see
https://tonyroyphilosophy.net/symbolic-logic/. Compare page ??, note ??.
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a. 1. .A ^ B/ ! C
2. B ^ A
3.
4.
5.
6.

B
A
A^B
C

b. 1. .R ! L/ ^ Œ.S _ R/ ! .T $ K/
2. .R ! L/ ! .S _ R/
3.
4.
5.
6.

*c.

1. B
2. .A ! B/ ! .B ! .L ^ S//
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

d.

R!L
S _R
.S _ R/ ! .T $ K/
T $K

A
B
A!B
B ! .L ^ S/
L^S
S
L
S ^L

1. A ^ B
2.

C

3.
4.

A
A^C

5. C ! .A ^ C /
6. C
7.
8.

B
B ^C

9. C ! .B ^ C /
10. ŒC ! .A ^ C / ^ ŒC ! .B ^ C /
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e. 1. .A ^ S/ ! C
2.

A

3.

S

4.
5.

A^S
C

6.

S !C

7. A ! .S ! C /

E6.6. The following are not legitimate NDs derivations. In each case, explain why.
*a. 1. .A ^ B/ ^ .C ! B/

P
1 ^E

2. A

b. 1. .A ^ B/ ^ .C ! A/
2. C

P
P

3. A

1,2 !E

c. 1. .R ^ S/ ^ .C ! A/
2. C ! A
3. A

d. 1. A ! B
2.

A^C

3.

A

P
1 ^E
2 !E

P
A (g, !I)
2 ^E
1,3 !E

4. B

e. 1. A ! B

P

2.

A^C

A (g, !I)

3.
4.
5.
6.

A
B
C
B ^C

2 ^E
1,3 !E
2 ^E
4,5 ^I

Hint: This last problem (e) does not break any derivation rule. However, it still
fails to derive B ^ C from the premise. Explain why.
E6.7. Provide derivations to show each of the following.
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a. A ^ B `NDs B ^ A
*b. A ^ B, B ! C `NDs C
c. A ^ .A ! .A ^ B// `NDs B
d. A ^ B, B ! .C ^ D/ `NDs A ^ D
*e. A ! .A ! B/ `NDs A ! B
f. A, .A ^ B/ ! .C ^ D/ `NDs B ! C
g. C ! A, C ! .A ! B/ `NDs C ! .A ^ B/
*h. A ! B, B ! C `NDs .A ^ K/ ! C
i. A ! B `NDs .A ^ C / ! .B ^ C /
j. D ^ E, .D ! F / ^ .E ! G/ `NDs F ^ G
k. O ! B, B ! S , S ! L `NDs O ! L
*l. A ! B `NDs .C ! A/ ! .C ! B/
m. A ! .B ! C / `NDs B ! .A ! C /
n. A ! .B ! C /, D ! B `NDs A ! .D ! C /
o. A ! B `NDs A ! .C ! B/

6.2.2  and _
Now let us consider the I- and E-rules for  and _. The two rules for  are quite
similar to one another. Each appeals to a single subderivation. For I, given an
accessible subderivation which begins with assumption P on line a, and ends with a
formula of the form Q ^ Q against its scope line on line b, one may conclude P
by a-b I. For E, given an accessible subderivation which begins with assumption
P on line a, and ends with a formula of the form Q ^ Q against its scope line on
line b, one may conclude P by a-b E.

I

a.

P

b.

Q ^ Q
P

A (c, I)

E
a-b I

a.

P

b.

Q ^ Q
P

A (c, E)

a-b E
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I introduces an expression with main operator tilde, adding tilde to the assumption
P . E exploits the assumption P , with a result that takes the tilde off. For these
rules, the formula Q may be any formula, so long as Q is it with a tilde in front.
Because Q may be any formula, when we declare our exit strategy for the assumption,
we might have no particular goal formula in mind. So, where g always points to
a formula written at the bottom of a scope line, c is not a pointer to any particular
formula. Rather, when we declare our exit strategy, we merely indicate our intent to
obtain some contradiction, and then to exit by I or E.
Intuitively, if an assumption leads to a result that is false, the assumption is wrong.
So if the assumption P leads to both Q and Q and so to Q ^ Q, then we can
discharge the assumption and conclude P ; and if the assumption P leads to Q
and Q and so Q ^ Q, then we discharge the assumption and conclude P . On
tables, there can be no row where both Q and Q are true; so if every row where
premises A1 : : : An and P are true would have to make both Q and Q true, there is
no row where A1 : : : An and P are true; so on a row where A1 : : : An are true P
is true. Similarly when the assumption is P , a row where premises A1 : : : An are
true has P true.
Here are some examples of these rules. Notice that, again, we introduce subderivations with the overall goal in mind.
1. A ! B
2. A ! B

(Q)

P
P

3.

A

A (c, I)

4.
5.
6.

B
B
B ^ B

1,3 !E
2,3 !E
4,5 ^I

7. A

3-6 I

We begin with the goal of obtaining A. The natural way to obtain this is by I. So
we set up a subderivation with that in mind. Since the goal is A, we begin with A
and go for a contradiction. In this case, the contradiction is easy to obtain by a couple
applications of !E and then ^I.
Here is another case that may be more interesting:
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1. A
2. B ! A

(R)

P
P

3.

L^B

A (c, I)

4.
5.
6.

B
A
A ^ A

3 ^E
2,4 !E
5,1 ^I

7. .L ^ B/
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3-6 I

This time, the original goal is .L ^ B/. It is of the form P , so we set up to
obtain it with a subderivation that begins with the P , that is, L ^ B. In this case, the
contradiction is A ^ A. Once we have the contradiction, we simply apply our exit
strategy.
A simplification. For any sentential or quantificational language L let ? (bottom)
abbreviate some sentence of the form Z ^ Z—for Ls let ? just be Z ^ Z. Adopt
a rule ?I as on the left below,

?I

1. Q
2. Q

a. Q
b. Q
?

(S)
a,b ?I

3.

?

A (c, E)

4.

Q ^ Q

1,2 ^I

5. ?

3-4 E

Given Q and Q on accessible lines, we move directly to ? by ?I. This is an example
of a derived rule. For given Q and Q, we can always derive ? as in (S) on the
right. Thus we allow ourselves to shortcut the routine by introducing ?I as a derived
rule. We will see examples of additional derived rules in section 6.2.5. For now, the
important thing is that since ? abbreviates Z ^ Z we operate with ? as we might
operate with Z ^ Z. Especially, given this abbreviation, our I and E rules appear
in forms,

I

a.

P

b.

?
P

A (c, I)

a.

E
a-b I

b.

P

A (c, E)

?
P

a-b E

Since ? is (abbreviates) Z ^ Z, the subderivations for I and E are appropriately
concluded with ?.4 With ? as their last line, subderivations for I and E have a
4 ? is often introduced as a primitive symbol. We have chosen not to extend the primitives, and so
to treat it as an abbreviation. On the above account, then, one might derive ? from Z and Z by ^I; or
use ^E to conclude Z or Z from ?.
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particular goal sentence very much like !I. However, the Q and Q required to
obtain ? by ?I are the same as would be required for Q ^ Q on the original form of
the rules. For this reason, we declare our exit strategy with a c rather than g any time
the goal is ?. At one level, this simplification is a mere notational convenience: having
obtained Q and Q, we move to ?, instead of writing out the complex conjunction
Q ^ Q. However, there are contexts where it will be convenient to have a particular
contradiction as goal. Thus this is the standard form in which we use these rules.
Here is an example of the rules in this form, this time for E.
1. A

(T)

2.

A

3.

?

4. A

P
A (c, E)
2,1 ?I
2-3 E

It is no surprise that we can derive A from A. This is how to do it in NDs. Again,
we begin from the goal. In this case the goal is A, and we can get it with a subderivation
that starts with A, by a E exit strategy. In this case the Q and Q for ?I are A
and A—that is A and A with a tilde in front of it. Though very often (at least
in the beginning) an atomic and its negation will do for your contradiction, Q and
Q need not be simple. Observe that E is a strange and powerful rule: Though an
E-rule, effectively it can be used in pursuit of any goal whatsoever—to obtain formula
P by E, all one has to do is obtain a contradiction from the assumption of P with a
tilde in front. As in this last example (T), E is particularly useful when the goal is an
atomic formula, and thus without a main operator, so that there is no straightforward
way for regular introduction rules to apply. In this way, it plays the role of a sort of
“backdoor” introduction rule.
The _I and _E rules apply methods we have already seen. For _I, given an
accessible formula P on line a, one may move to either P _ Q or to Q _ P for any
formula Q, with justification a _I.
a. P

_I

P _Q

a. P
a _I

Q_P

a _I

The left-hand case was R4 from NP. Table (D) exhibits the left-hand case. And the
other side should be clear as well: Any row of a table where P is true has both P _ Q
and Q _ P true.
Here is a simple example:
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(U)

1. P
2. .P _ Q/ ! R

P
P

3. P _ Q
4. R

1 _I
2,3 !E
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It is easy to get R once we have P _ Q. And we build P _ Q directly from
the P . Note that we could have done the derivation as well if (2) had been, say,
(P _ ŒK ^ .L $ T // ! R and we used _I to add ŒK ^ .L $ T / to the P all at
once.
The inputs to _E are a formula of the form P _ Q and two subderivations. Given
an accessible formula of the form P _ Q on line a, with an accessible subderivation
beginning with assumption P on line b and ending with conclusion C against its
scope line at c, and an accessible subderivation beginning with assumption Q on line
d and ending with conclusion C against its scope line at e, one may conclude C with
justification a,b-c,d-e _E.
a. P _ Q
b. P

_E

c.

C

d.

Q

A (g, a_E)

A (g, a_E)

C

e.
C

a,b-c,d-e _E

Given a disjunction P _ Q, one subderivation begins with P , and the other with
Q; both conclude with C. This time our exit strategy includes markers for the new
subgoals, along with a notation that we exit by appeal to the disjunction on line a and
_E. Intuitively, if we know it is one or the other, and both lead to some conclusion, then
the conclusion must be true. Here is an example a student gave me near graduation
time: She and her mother were shopping for a graduation dress. They narrowed it
down to dress A or dress B. Dress A was expensive, and if they bought it, her mother
would be mad. But dress B was ugly and if they bought it the student would complain
and her mother would be mad. Conclusion: her mother would be mad—and this
without knowing which dress they were going to buy! On a truth table, if rows where
P is true have C true, and rows where Q is true have C true, then any row with P _ Q
true must have one of P or Q true and so C true as well.
Here are a couple of examples. The first is straightforward, and illustrates both
the _I and _E rules.
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1. A _ B
2. A ! C

(V)

P
P

3.

A

A (g, 1_E)

4.
5.

C
B _C

2,3 !E
4 _I

6.

B

A (g, 1_E)

7.

B _C

8. B _ C
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6 _I
1,3-5,6-7 _E

We have the disjunction A _ B as premise, and original goal B _ C . And we set up to
obtain the goal by _E. For this, one subderivation starts with A and ends with B _ C ,
and the other starts with B and ends with B _ C . As it happens, these subderivations
are easy to complete.
Very often, beginning students resist using _E—no doubt because it is relatively
messy. But this is a mistake—_E is your friend! In fact, with this rule, we have a
case where it pays to look at accessible formulas for general strategy. If you have an
accessible line of the form P _ Q, go for your goal, whatever it is, by _E. Here is
why: As you go for the goal in the first subderivation, you have whatever sentences
were accessible before, plus P ; and as you go for the goal in the second subderivation,
you have whatever sentences were accessible before plus Q. So you can only be better
off in your quest to reach the goal. In many cases where an accessible formula has
main operator _, there is no way to complete the derivation except by _E. The above
example (V) is a case in point.
Here is a relatively messy example, which should help you be sure you understand
the _ rules. It illustrates the associativity of disjunction.
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1. A _ .B _ C /

(W)

P

2.

A

A (g, 1_E)

3.
4.

A_B
.A _ B/ _ C

2 _I
3 _I

5.

B _C

A (g, 1_E)

6.

B

A (g, 5_E)

7.
8.

A_B
.A _ B/ _ C

6 _I
7 _I

9.

C

A (g, 5_E)

.A _ B/ _ C

9 _I

10.
11.

.A _ B/ _ C

12. .A _ B/ _ C
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5,6-8,9-10 _E
1,2-4,5-11 _E

The premise has main operator _. So we set up to obtain the goal by _E. This gives
us subderivations starting with A and B _ C , each with .A _ B/ _ C as goal. The
first is easy to complete by a couple instances of _I. But the assumption of the second,
B _ C has main operator _. So we set up to obtain its goal by _E. This gives us
subderivations starting with B and C , each again having .A _ B/ _ C as goal. Again,
these are easy to complete by application of _I. The final result follows by the planned
applications of _E. If you have been able to follow this case, you are doing well!
E6.8. Complete the following derivations by filling in justifications for each line.
Hint: Begin by identifying the exit strategy for auxiliary assumptions; then the
rest will be easy.
a. 1. B
2. .A _ C / ! .B ^ C /
3.

A

4.
5.
6.
7.

A _ C
B ^C
B
?

8. A
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b. 1. R
2. .S _ T /
3.

R!S

4.
5.
6.

S
S _T
?

7. .R ! S/

c.

1. .R ^ S/ _ .K ^ L/
2.

R^S

3.
4.
5.
6.

R
S
S ^R
.S ^ R/ _ .L ^ K/

7.

K ^L

8.
9.
10.
11.

K
L
L^K
.S ^ R/ _ .L ^ K/

12. .S ^ R/ _ .L ^ K/

d.

1. A _ B
2.

A
A!B

3.

B

4.
5.

.A ! B/ ! B

6.

B

7.
8.
9.

A!B
B
.A ! B/ ! B

10. .A ! B/ ! B
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1. B
2. A ! .A _ B/
3.

A

4.
5.

A_B
A

6.

A

7.

B
A

8.

?

9.
A

10.

A
?

11.
12.
13. A

E6.9. The following are not legitimate NDs derivations. In each case, explain why.
a. 1. A _ B

P
1 _E

2. B

b. 1. A
2. B ! A

P
P

3.

B

A (c, I)

4.

A

2,3 !E

5. B

*c. 1. W
2.
3.
4.

3-4 I
P

R

A (c, I)

W

A (c, E)

?

1,3 ?I

W

3-4 E

6. R

2-5 I

5.
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d. 1. A _ B

P

2.

A

A (g, 1_E)

3.

A

2R

4.

B

A (g, 1_E)

5.

A

3R
1,2-3,4-5 _E

6. A

e. 1. A _ B

P

2.

A

A (g, 1_E)

3.

A

2R

4.

A

A (g, !I)

5.

B

A (g, 1_E)

6.

A

4R

7.
8. A

A

4R
1,2-3,5-6 _E

E6.10. Produce derivations to show each of the following.
a. A `NDs .A ^ B/
b. A `NDs A
*c. A ! B, B `NDs A
d. A ! B `NDs .A ^ B/
e. A ! B, B ! A `NDs A
f. A ^ B `NDs .R $ S / _ B
*g. A _ .A ^ B/ `NDs A
h. S , .B _ C / ! S `NDs B
i. A _ B, A ! B, B ! A `NDs A ^ B
j. A ! B, .B _ C / ! D, D ! A `NDs A
k. A _ B `NDs B _ A
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*l. A ! B `NDs B ! A
m. .A ^ B/ ! A `NDs A ! B
n. A _ B `NDs A _ B
o. A _ B, B `NDs A

6.2.3

$

We complete our presentation of rules for NDs with the rules $E and $I. Given that
P $ Q abbreviates the same as .P ! Q/ ^ .Q ! P /, it is not surprising that rules
for $ work like ones for arrow, but going two ways. For $E, if formulas P $ Q
and P appear on accessible lines a and b of a derivation, we may conclude Q with
justification a,b $E; and similarly but in the other direction, if formulas P $ Q
and Q appear on accessible lines a and b of a derivation, we may conclude P with
justification a,b $E.

$E

a. P $ Q
b. P
Q

a. P $ Q
b. Q
a,b $E

P

a,b $E

P $ Q thus works like either P ! Q or Q ! P . Intuitively given P if and only
if Q, then if P is true, Q is true. And given P if and only if Q, then if Q is true P
is true. On tables, if P $ Q is true, then P and Q have the same truth value. So if
P $ Q is true and P is true, Q is true as well; and if P $ Q is true and Q is true,
P is true as well.
Given that P $ Q can be exploited like P ! Q or Q ! P , it is not surprising
that introducing P $ Q is like introducing both P ! Q and Q ! P . The
input to $I is two subderivations. Given an accessible subderivation beginning with
assumption P on line a and ending with conclusion Q against its scope line on b, and
an accessible subderivation beginning with assumption Q on line c and ending with
conclusion P against its scope line on d , one may conclude P $ Q with justification,
a-b,c-d $I.
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$I

a.

P

b.

Q

c.

Q

d.

P
P $Q
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A (g, $I)

A (g, $I)

a-b,c-d $I

Intuitively, if an assumption P leads to Q and the assumption Q leads to P , then we
know that P only if Q, and P if Q—which is to say that P if and only if Q. On truth
tables, if there is a sententially valid argument from premises A1 : : : An and P to
conclusion Q, then there is no row where A1 : : : An are true and P is true and Q is
false; and if there is a sententially valid argument from A1 : : : An and Q to conclusion
P , then there is no row where A1 : : : An are true and Q is true and P is false; so on
rows where A1 : : : An are true, it is not the case that one of P or Q is true and the
other is false; so the biconditional P $ Q is true.
Here are a couple of examples. The first is straightforward, and exercises both the
$I and $E rules. We show, A $ B, B $ C `NDs A $ C .
1. A $ B
2. B $ C

(X)

P
P

3.

A

A (g, $I)

4.
5.

B
C

1,3 $E
2,4 $E

6.

C

A (g, $I)

7.
8.

B
A

2,6 $E
1,7 $E

9. A $ C

3-5,6-8 $I

Our original goal is A $ C . So it is natural to set up subderivations to get it by $I.
Once we have done this, the subderivations are easily completed by applications of
$E.
Here is an interesting case that again exercises both rules. We show, A $ .B $
C /, C `NDs A $ B.

CHAPTER 6. NATURAL DEDUCTION

148

NDs Quick Reference
R (reiteration)

I (negation intro)

a. P

a.

P

aR

b.

E (negation exploit)
A (c, I)

P
Q ^ Q .?/
P

P

a.
b.

a-b I

Q ^ Q .?/
P

A (c, E)

a-b E

^I (conjunction intro)

^E (conjunction exploit)

^E (conjunction exploit)

a. P
b. Q

a. P ^ Q

a. P ^ Q
a ^E

P
P ^Q

a ^E

Q

a,b ^I

_I (disjunction intro)

_I (disjunction intro)

_E (disjunction exploit)

a. P

a. P

a. P _ Q
b. P

P _Q

a _I

!I (conditional intro)
a.
b.

P
Q
P !Q

A (g, !I)

a-b !I

$I (biconditional intro)
a.

P

b.

Q

c.

Q

A (g, $I)

Q_P

!E (conditional exploit)
a. P ! Q
b. P

c.

C

d.

Q

e.

C

a,b !E

Q

P
P $Q

$E (biconditional exploit)

$E (biconditional exploit)

a. P $ Q
b. P

a. P $ Q
b. Q

Q

a,b $E

a,b $E

P

A (g, $I)

a-b,c-d $I

A (g, a_E)

a,b-c,d-e _E

C

?I (bottom intro)
d.

A (g, a_E)

a _I

derived rule:

a. Q
b. Q
?

a,b ?I
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1. A $ .B $ C /
2. C

(Y)

P
P

3.

A

A (g, $I)

4.
5.

B$C
B

1,3 $E
4,2 $E

6.

B

A (g, $I)

7.

B

A (g, $I)

8.

C

2R

9.

C

A (g, $I)

B

6R

10.
11.
12.

B$C
A

13. A $ B
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7-8,9-10 $I
1,11 $E
3-5,6-12 $I

We begin by setting up the subderivations to get A $ B by $I. The first is easily
completed with a couple applications of $E. To reach the goal for the second by
means of the premise (1) we need B $ C as our second “card.” So we set up to
reach that. As it happens, the extra subderivations at (7)–(8) and (9)–(10) are easy
to complete. Again, if you have followed so far, you are doing well. We will be in a
better position to create such derivations after our discussion of strategy.
So much for the rules of NDs. Before we turn in the next section to strategy, let
us note a couple of features of the rules that may so-far have gone without notice.
First, premises are not always necessary for NDs derivations. Thus, for example,
`NDs A ! A.
(Z)
A!A

(goal)

1.

A

A (g, !I)

2.

A

1R

3. A ! A

1-2 !I

If there are no premises, do not panic! Begin in the usual way. In this case, the original
goal is A ! A. So we set up to obtain it by !I. And the subderivation is particularly
simple. Notice that our derivation of A ! A corresponds to the fact from truth tables
that s A ! A. And we need to be able to derive A ! A from no premises if there
is to be the right sort of correspondence between derivations in NDs and semantic
validity—if we are to have  s P iff  `NDs P .
Second, observe again that every subderivation comes with an exit strategy. The
exit strategy says whether you intend to complete the subderivation with a particular
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goal or by obtaining a contradiction, and then how the subderivation is to be used
once complete. There are just five rules which appeal to a subderivation: !I, I, E,
_E, and $I. You will complete the subderivation, and then use it by one of these
rules. So these are the only rules which may appear in an exit strategy. If you do not
understand this, then you need to go back and think about the rules until you do.
Finally, it is worth noting a strange sort of case, with application to rules that can
take more than one input of the same type. Consider a simple demonstration that
A `NDs A ^ A. We might proceed as in (AA) on the left,
(AA)

1. A

P

2. A
3. A ^ A

1R
1,2 ^I

(AB)

1. A

P

2. A ^ A

1,1 ^I

We begin with A, reiterate so that A appears on different lines, and apply ^I. But we
might have proceeded as in (AB) on the right. The rule requires an accessible line
on which the left conjunct appears—which we have at (1)—and an accessible line on
which the right conjunct appears which we also have on (1). So the rule takes an input
for the left conjunct and an input for the right—they just happen to be the same thing.
A similar point applies to rules _E and $I which take more than one subderivation
as input. Suppose we want to show A _ A `NDs A.5
1. A _ A

(AC)

P

2.

A

A (g, 1_E)

3.

A

2R

4.

A

A (g, 1_E)

5.

A

4R

6. A

1. A _ A

(AD)

P

2.

A

A (g, 1_E)

3.

A

2R

4. A

1,2-3,2-3 _E

1,2-3,4-5 _E

In (AC), we begin in the usual way to get the main goal by _E. This leads to the
subderivations (2)–(3) and (4)–(5), the first moving from the left disjunct to the goal,
and the second from the right disjunct to the goal. But the left and right disjuncts are
the same. So we might have simplified as in (AD). _E still requires three inputs: First
an accessible disjunction, which we find on (1); second an accessible subderivation
which moves from the left disjunct to the goal, which we find on (2)–(3); third a
subderivation which moves from the right disjunct to the goal—but we have this
on (2)–(3). So the justification at (4) of (AD) appeals to the three relevant facts, by
5I

am reminded of a character in Groundhog Day (film, 1993) who repeatedly asks, “Am I right or
am I right?” If he is right or he is right, it follows that he is right.
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appeal to the same subderivation twice. Similarly one could imagine a quick-and-dirty
demonstration that `NDs A $ A.
E6.11. Complete the following derivations by filling in justifications for each line.
a. 1. A $ B
2.

A

3.

B

4. A ! B

b. 1. A $ B
2. B
3.

A

4.
5.

B
?

6. A

c. 1.

A $ A

2.

A

3.
4.

A
?

5.
6.
7.

A
A
?

8. .A $ A/

d.

1.

A

2.

A

3.

A

4.

A ! A

5.

A ! A

6.

A

7.
8.

A
?

9.

A

10. A $ .A ! A/
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1. A
2. B
3.

A

4.

B

5.

?

6.

B

7.

B
A

8.

?

9.
10.

A

11. A $ B

E6.12. The following are not legitimate NDs derivations. In each case, explain why.
a. 1. A
2. B

P
P

3. A $ B

1,2 $I

b. 1. A ! B
2. B

P
P

3. A

1,2 !E

*c. 1. A $ B

P
1 $E

2. A

d. 1. B

P

2.

A

A (g, $I)

3.

B

1R

4.

B

A (g, $I)

5.

A

2R

6. A $ B

2-3,4-5 $I

CHAPTER 6. NATURAL DEDUCTION
e. 1. A
2.

P
A (g, !I)

B

3.

A

A (g, $I)

4.

B

2R

5.

B

6. B ! B
7. B
8.

A

9. A $ B

2R
2-5 !I
A (g, $I)
1R
3-4,7-8 $I

E6.13. Produce derivations to show each of the following.
*a. .A ^ B/ $ A `NDs A ! B
b. A $ .A _ B/ `NDs B ! A
c. A $ B, B $ C , C $ D, A `NDs D
d. A $ B `NDs .A ! B/ ^ .B ! A/
*e. A $ .B ^ C /, B `NDs A $ C
f. .A ! B/ ^ .B ! A/ `NDs A $ B
g. A ! .B $ C / `NDs .A ^ B/ $ .A ^ C /
h. A $ B, C $ D `NDs .A ^ C / $ .B ^ D/
i. `NDs A $ A
j. `NDs .A ^ B/ $ .B ^ A/
*k. `NDs A $ A
l. `NDs .A $ B/ ! .B $ A/
m. .A ^ B/ $ .A ^ C / `NDs A ! .B $ C /
n. A ! B, A ! B `NDs A $ B
o. A, B `NDs A $ B
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Strategy

It is natural to introduce derivation rules, as we have, with relatively simple cases.
And you may or may not have been able to see from the start in some cases how
derivations would go. But derivations are not always simple, and it is beyond human
power always to see how they go. Perhaps this has already been an issue! However,
as with chess or other games of strategy, it is possible to say a good deal about how to
approach problems effectively. We have said quite a bit already. In this section, we
pull together some of the themes and present the material more systematically.
In doing derivations there are two fundamentally different contexts. In the one
case, you have some accessible lines, and want a definite goal sentence. In the other,
there are some accessible lines, and you want a contradiction.
a. A
b. B
G

a. A
b. B
(goal sentence)

?

(contradiction)

The different contexts motivate separate strategies for a goal and strategies for a
contradiction. In the first case, strategies for a goal help reach a known goal formula.
But in the other case you want some Q and Q, where it may not be clear what this
Q should be; thus strategies for a contradiction help discover the formula you need.
First, strategies for a goal.
Strategies for a Goal
For natural derivation systems, the overriding strategy is to work goal directedly.
What you do at any stage is directed primarily, not by what you have, but by where
you want to be. Suppose you are trying to show that  `NDs P . You are given P as
your goal. Perhaps it is tempting to begin by using E-rules to “see what you can get”
from the members of . There is nothing wrong with a bit of this in order to simplify
your premises (like arranging the cards in your hand into some manageable order),
but the main work of doing a derivation does not begin until you focus on the goal.
This is not to say that your premises play no role in strategic thinking. Rather, it is to
rule out doing things with them which are not purposefully directed at the end. In the
ordinary case, applying the strategies for your goal dictates some new goal; applying
strategies for this new goal dictates another; and so forth, until you come to a goal
that is easily achieved.
The following strategies for a goal are arranged in rough priority order:
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1. If accessible lines contain explicit contradiction, use E to reach goal.
2. Given an accessible formula with main operator _, use _E to reach goal.
3. If goal is “in” accessible lines (set goals and) attempt to exploit it out.
4. To reach goal with main operator ?, use ?I (careful with _).
5. Try E (especially for atomics and sentences with _ as main operator).

If a high priority strategy applies, use it. If one does not apply, simply “fall through”
to the next. The priority order is not necessarily a frequency order. The frequency will
likely be something like SG4, SG3, SG5, SG2, SG1. But high priority strategies are
such that you should adopt them if they are available—even though most often you
will fall through to ones that are more frequently used. I take up the strategies in the
priority order.
If accessible lines contain explicit contradiction, use E to reach goal. For
goal B, with an explicit contradiction accessible, you can simply assume B, use
your contradiction, and conclude B.
SG 1.

a. A
b. A

given

B

a. A
b. A
c. B

use

d.

(goal)

?
B

A (c, E)
a,b ?I
c-d E

That is it! No matter what your goal is, given an accessible contradiction, you can
reach that goal by E. Since this strategy always delivers, you should jump on it
whenever it is available. As an example, try to show, A, A `NDs .R ^ S / ! T . Your
derivation need not involve !I. (This section will be most valuable if you do work
these examples, and so think through the steps.) Here it is in two stages:
1. A
2. A

(AE)

3.

Œ.R _ S/ ! T 
.R _ S/ ! T

P
P

1. A
2. A

A (c, E)

3.

Œ.R _ S/ ! T 

A (c, E)

4.

?

1,2 ?I

3- E

5. .R _ S/ ! T

P
P

3-4 E

As soon as we see the accessible contradiction, we assume the negation of our goal,
with a plan to exit by E. This is accomplished on the left. Then it is a simple matter
of applying the contradiction, and going to the conclusion by E.
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For this strategy, it is not required that accessible lines “contain” a contradiction
only when you already have Q and Q for ?I. However, the intent is that there should
be some straightforward way to obtain them from accessible lines. If you can do this,
then your derivation is over: assume the opposite, extract the contradiction, and apply
E to reach the goal. If there is no simple way to obtain a contradiction, fall through
to the next strategy.
SG 2. Given an accessible formula with main operator _, use _E to reach goal.
As suggested above, you may prefer to avoid _E. But this is a mistake—_E is your
friend! Suppose you have some accessible lines including a disjunction A _ B with
goal C. If you go for that very goal by _E, the result is a pair of subderivations
with goal C—where, in the one case, all those very same accessible lines and A are
accessible, and in the other case, all those very same lines and B are accessible. So,
in each subderivation, you can only be better off in your attempt to reach C.

a. A _ B
b. A
a. A _ B

given

A (g, a_E)

c.

C

(goal)

d.

B

A (g, a_E)

e.

C

(goal)

use
C

(goal)

a,b-c,d-e _E

C

As an example, try to show, A ! B, A _ .A ^ B/ `NDs A ^ B. Try showing it
without _E! Here is the derivation in two stages:
1. A ! B
2. A _ .A ^ B/
3.

(AF)

A

P
P

1. A ! B
2. A _ .A ^ B/

A (g, 2_E)

3.

A

A (g, 2_E)

4.
5.

B
A^B

1,3 !E
3,4 ^I

6.

A^B

A (g, 2_E)

7.

A^B

6R

A^B
A^B

A (g, 2_E)

A^B
A^B

2,3- , _E

8. A ^ B

P
P

2,3-5,6-7 _E

When we start, there is no accessible contradiction. So we fall through to SG2. Since
a premise has main operator _, we set up to get the goal by _E. This leads to a pair of
simple subderivations. Once we do this, we treat the disjunction as effectively “used
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up” so that SG2 does not apply to it again. Notice that there is almost nothing one
could do except set up this way—and that once you do, it is easy!
SG 3.

If goal is “in” accessible lines (set goals and) attempt to exploit it out. In most
derivations, you will work toward goals which are successively closer to what can be
obtained directly from accessible lines. And you finally come to a goal which can be
obtained directly. If it can be obtained directly, do so! In some cases, however, you
will come to a stage where your goal exists in accessible lines but can be obtained
only by means of some other result. In this case, you can set that other result as a new
goal. A typical case is as follows:
a. A ! B

a. A ! B

given

use
B

b. A
B

(goal)

(goal)
a,b !E

The B exists in the premises. You cannot get it without the A. So you set A as a
new goal and use it to get the B. This strategy applies whenever the complete goal
exists in accessible lines, and can be obtained by reiteration, by an E-rule, or by an
E-rule with some new goal. Observe that the strategy would not apply in case you
have A ! B and are going for A. Then the goal exists as part of a premise all right.
But there is no obvious result such that obtaining it would give you a way to exploit
A ! B to get the A.
As an example, let us try to show .A ! B/ ^ .B ! C /, A $ .L $ S /,
.L $ S / ^ H `NDs C . Here is the derivation in four stages:

(AG)

1. .A ! B/ ^ .B ! C /
2. A $ .L $ S/
3. .L $ S/ ^ H

P
P
P

1. .A ! B/ ^ .B ! C /
2. A $ .L $ S/
3. .L $ S/ ^ H

P
P
P

4. B ! C

1 ^E

4. B ! C
5. A ! B

1 ^E
1 ^E

B
C

4, !E

A
B
C

5, !E
4, !E

The original goal C exists in the premises, as the consequent of the right conjunct of
(1). It is easy to isolate the B ! C , but this leaves us with the B as a new goal to
get the C . B also exists in the premises, as the consequent of the left conjunct of (1).
Again, it is easy to isolate A ! B, but this leaves us with A as a new goal.
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1. .A ! B/ ^ .B ! C /
2. A $ .L $ S/
3. .L $ S/ ^ H

P
P
P

1. .A ! B/ ^ .B ! C /
2. A $ .L $ S/
3. .L $ S/ ^ H

4. B ! C
5. A ! B
L$S
A
B
C

1 ^E
1 ^E

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

2, $E
5, !E
4, !E

B!C
A!B
L$S
A
B
C

P
P
P
1 ^E
1 ^E
3 ^E
2,6 $E
5,7 !E
4,8 !E

But A also exists in the premises, at the left side of (2); to get it, we set L $ S as a
goal. But L $ S exists in the premises, and is easy to get by ^E. So we complete
the derivation with the steps that motivated the subgoals in the first place. Observe
the way we move from one goal to the next, until finally there is a stage where SG3
applies in its simplest form, so that L $ S is obtained directly. Another example
of this strategy is derivation (Y) above where we needed A to complete the second
subderivation and so set B $ C as goal.
SG 4. To reach goal with main operator ?, use ?I (careful with _). This is the
most frequently used strategy, the one most likely to structure your derivation as a
whole. E to the side, the basic structure of I-rules and E-rules in NDs gives you just
one way to generate a formula with main operator ?, whatever that may be. In the
ordinary case, then, you can expect to obtain a formula with main operator ? by the
corresponding I-rule. Thus, for a typical example,

a.

given

A

A (g, !I)

B

(goal)

use
A!B

(goal)

b.

A!B

a-b !I

And this is not the only context where SG4 applies. It makes sense to consider it
for formulas with any main operator. Be cautious, however, for formulas with main
operator _. There are cases where it is possible to prove a disjunction, but not to
prove it by _I—as one might have conclusive reason to believe the butler or the maid
did it, without conclusive reason to believe the butler did it, or conclusive reason to
believe the maid did it (perhaps the butler and maid were the only ones with means
and motive). You should consider the strategy for _. But it does not always work.
As an example, let us show D `NDs A ! .B ! .C ! D//. Here is the
derivation in four stages:
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A
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P

1. D

A (g, !I)

2.

P
A (g, !I)

A

A (g, !I)

B

3.

(AH)
C !D
B ! .C ! D/
A ! .B ! .C ! D//

B ! .C ! D/
2- !I

A ! .B ! .C ! D//

3- !I
2- !I

Initially, there is no contradiction or disjunction in the premises, and neither do we
see the goal. So we fall through to strategy SG4 and, since the main operator of the
goal is !, set up to get it by !I. This gives us B ! .C ! D/ as a new goal. Since
this has main operator !, and it remains that other strategies do not apply, we fall
through to SG4, and set up to get it by !I. This gives us C ! D as a new goal.
1. D
2.
3.
4.

A
B
C

P

1. D

A (g, !I)

2.

A (g, !I)

3.

A (g, !I)

4.

4- !I

6.

3- !I

7.

B ! .C ! D/

3-6 !I

2- !I

8. A ! .B ! .C ! D//

2-7 !I

D
C !D
B ! .C ! D/
A ! .B ! .C ! D//

5.

P
A (g, !I)

A

A (g, !I)

B
C

A g, !I)

D

1R

C !D

4-5 !I

As before, with C ! D as the goal, there is no contradiction on accessible lines,
no accessible formula has main operator _, and the goal does not itself appear on
accessible lines. Since the main operator is !, we set up again to get it by !I. This
gives us D as a new subgoal. But D does exist on an accessible line. Thus we are
faced with a particularly simple instance of strategy SG3. To complete the derivation,
we simply reiterate D from (1), and follow our exit strategies as planned.
SG 5. Try E (especially for atomics and sentences with _ as main operator). The
previous strategy has no application to atomics, because they have no main operator,
and we have suggested that it is problematic for disjunctions. This last strategy applies
particularly in those cases. So it is applicable in cases where other strategies seem not
to apply.
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a.

given

A

A (c, E)

use
A

b.

(goal)

?
a-b E

A

It is possible to obtain any formula by E, by assuming its negation and going for
a contradiction. So this strategy is generally applicable. It cannot hurt: If you could
have reached goal A anyway, you can still obtain A under the assumed A and use
the resultant contradiction to reach A outside of the subderivation. And it may help:
As for _E, all the lines from before plus the new assumption are accessible; in many
cases, the assumption puts you in a position to make progress you would not have
been able to make before.
As a simple example of the strategy, try showing A ! B, B `NDs A. Here is
the derivation in two stages:
1. A ! B
2. B

(AI)

A

3.

P
P

1. A ! B
2. B

A (c, E)

3.

A

A (c, E)

4.
5.

B
?

1,3 !E
4,2 ?I

?
A

3- E

6. A

P
P

3-5 E

There is no contradiction in the premises, no formula has main operator _ and, though
A is the antecedent of (1), there is no obvious way to exploit the premise to isolate
the A. The goal A has no operators, so it has no main operator and strategy SG4 does
not apply. So we fall through to strategy SG5, and set up to get the goal by E. In this
case, the subderivation is particularly easy to complete.
Sometimes the occasion between this strategy and SG1 can seem obscure (and,
in the end, it may not be all that important to separate them). However, for the
first strategy, accessible lines by themselves are sufficient for a contradiction and so
motivate the assumption. In this example, from the premises we have B, but cannot
get the B and so do not have a contradiction from the premises alone. So SG1 does
not apply. For SG5, in contrast to SG1, the contradiction becomes available only after
you make the assumption.
Here is an extended example which combines a number of the strategies considered
so far. We show that B _A `NDs A ! B. You want especially to absorb the strategybased mode of thinking as a way to approach exercises.
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P

(AJ)
A ! B

There is no contradiction in the premise; so strategy SG1 is inapplicable. Strategy SG2
tells us to go for the goal by _E. Another option is to fall through to SG4 and go for
A ! B by !I and then apply _E to get the B, but !I has lower priority and let us
follow the official procedure.
1. B _ A
2.

B

P
A (g, 1_E)
Given an accessible line with main operator _,

A ! B
A

A (g, 1_E)

use _E to reach goal.

A ! B
A ! B

1,2- , _E

Having set up for _E on line (1), we treat B _ A as effectively “used up” and so out
of the picture. Concentrating, for the moment, on the first subderivation, there is no
contradiction on accessible lines; neither is there another accessible disjunction; and
the goal is not in accessible lines. So we fall through to SG4.
1. B _ A
2.

B

A (g, 1_E)
A

3.

P

A (g, !I)

B
A ! B

3- !I

A

A (g, 1_E)

To reach goal with main operator !, use !I.

A ! B
A ! B

1,2- , _E

In this case, the subderivation is easy to complete. The new goal, B exists as such on
an accessible line. So we are faced with a simple instance of SG3, and so can complete
the subderivation.
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P
A (g, 1_E)

3.

A

A (g, !I)

4.

B

2R

The first subderivation is completed by reiterating B from line (2), and following the exit

5.

A ! B

3-4 !I

6.

A

A (g, 1_E)

strategy.

A ! B
A ! B

1,2-5,6- _E

For the second main subderivation lines (2)–(5) are inaccessible. Tick off in your
head: there is no accessible contradiction; neither is there another accessible formula
with main operator _; and the goal is not in accessible lines. So we fall through to
strategy SG4.
1. B _ A
2.

B

3.
4.

P
A (g, 1_E)

A

A (g, !I)

B

2R

5.

A ! B

3-4 !I

6.

A

A (g, 1_E)

7.

A

To reach goal with main operator !, use !I.

A (g, !I)

B
A ! B
A ! B

7- !I
1,2-5,6- _E

But this time there is an accessible contradiction at (6) and (7). So SG1 applies, and
we are in a position to complete the derivation as follows:
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1. B _ A
2.

B

3.
4.

P
A (g, 1_E)

A

A (g, !I)

B

2R

5.

A ! B

3-4 !I

6.

A

A (g, 1_E)

7.

A

8.
9.
10.
11.
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A (g, !I)

B

A (c, E)

?

6,7 ?I

B
A ! B

12. A ! B

If accessible lines contain explicit contradiction,
use E to reach goal.

8-9 E
7-10 !I
1,2-5,6-11 _E

This derivation is fairly complicated! But we did not need to see how the whole thing
would go from the start. Indeed, it is hard to see how one could do so. Rather it was
enough to see, at each stage, what to do next. That is the beauty of our goal-oriented
approach.
A brief remark before we turn to exercises: In going for a contradiction, as from
SG4 or SG5, the new goal is not a definite formula—any contradiction is sufficient for
the rule and for a derivation of ?. But each of our strategies for a goal presupposes a
known goal sentence. In going for a contradiction there is no definite goal formula—so
this presupposition is not met, and strategies for a goal do not apply. This motivates
the “strategies for a contradiction” of the next section. For now, I will say just this: If
there is a contradiction to be had, and you can reduce formulas on accessible lines to
atomics and negated atomics, the contradiction will appear at that level. So one way
to go for a contradiction is simply by applying E-rules to accessible lines, to generate
what atomics and negated atomics you can.
Proofs for the following theorems are left as exercises. You should not start them
now, but wait for the assignment in E6.16. The first three may remind you of axioms
from chapter 3 and the fourth has an application in ??. The others foreshadow rules
from the system NDs+, which we will see shortly.
T6.1. `NDs P ! .Q ! P /
T6.2. `NDs .O ! .P ! Q// ! ..O ! P / ! .O ! Q//
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*T6.3. `NDs .Q ! P / ! ..Q ! P / ! Q/
T6.4. A ! .B ! C/; D ! .C ! E/; D ! B `NDs A ! .D ! E/
T6.5. A ! B, B `NDs A
T6.6. A ! B, B ! C `NDs A ! C
T6.7. A _ B, A `NDs B
T6.8. A _ B, B `NDs A
T6.9. A $ B, A `NDs B
T6.10. A $ B, B `NDs A
T6.11. `NDs .A ^ B/ $ .B ^ A/
T6.12. `NDs .A $ B/ $ .B $ A/
*T6.13. `NDs .A _ B/ $ .B _ A/
T6.14. `NDs .A ! B/ $ .B ! A/
T6.15. `NDs ŒA ! .B ! C/ $ Œ.A ^ B/ ! C
T6.16. `NDs ŒA ^ .B ^ C/ $ Œ.A ^ B/ ^ C
T6.17. `NDs A $ A

164

CHAPTER 6. NATURAL DEDUCTION

165

T6.18. `NDs A $ .A ^ A/
T6.19. `NDs A $ .A _ A/
T6.20. `NDs ŒA _ .B _ C/ $ Œ.A _ B/ _ C
E6.14. For each of the following, (i) which goal strategy applies? and (ii) what is the
next step? If the strategy calls for a new subgoal, show the subgoal; if it calls for a
subderivation, set up the subderivation. In each case, explain your response. Hint:
Each goal strategy applies once.
*a. 1. A _ B

P
P

2. A

B

b. 1. J ^ S
2. S ! K

P
P

K

*c. 1. A $ B

P

B $ A

d. 1. A $ B

P
P

2. A
B

e. 1. A ^ B
2. A

P
P

K _J

E6.15. Produce derivations to show each of the following. If you get stuck, you will
find strategy hints in the Answers to Selected Exercises.
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*a. A $ .A ! B/ `NDs A ! B
*b. .A _ B/ ! .B $ D/, B `NDs B ^ D
*c. .A ^ C /, .A ^ C / $ B `NDs A _ B
*d. A ^ .C ^ B/, .A _ D/ ! E `NDs E
*e. A ! B, B ! C `NDs A ! C
*f. .A ^ B/ ! .C ^ D/ `NDs Œ.A ^ B/ ! C  ^ Œ.A ^ B/ ! D
*g. A ! .B ! C /, .A ^ D/ ! E, C ! D `NDs .A ^ B/ ! E
*h. .A ! B/ ^ .B ! C /, Œ.D _ E/ _ H  ! A, .D _ E/ ^ H `NDs C
*i. A ! .B ^ C /, C `NDs .A ^ D/
*j. A ! .B ! C /, D ! B `NDs A ! .D ! C /
*k. A ! .B ! C / `NDs C ! .A ^ B/
*l. .A ^ B/ ! A `NDs A ! B
*m. A `NDs A ! B
*n. B $ A, C ! B, A ^ C `NDs K
*o. A $ B `NDs A $ B
*p. .A _ B/ _ C , B $ C `NDs C _ A
*q. `NDs A ! .A _ B/
*r. `NDs A ! .B ! A/
*s. `NDs .A $ B/ ! .A ! B/
*t. `NDs .A ^ A/ ! .B ^ B/
*u. `NDs .A ! B/ ! Œ.C ! A/ ! .C ! B/
*v. `NDs Œ.A ! B/ ^ B ! A
*w. `NDs A ! ŒB ! .A ! B/
*x. `NDs A ! Œ.B ^ A/ ! C 
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*y. `NDs .A ! B/ ! ŒB ! .A ^ D/
*E6.16. Produce derivations to demonstrate each of T6.1–T6.20. These are a mix—
some repetitious, some challenging. But when we need the results later, we will
be glad to have done them now. Hint: Do not worry if one or two get a bit longer
than you are used to—they should!

Strategies for a Contradiction
We come now to our second set of strategies. Each of our strategies for a goal
presupposes a known goal sentence—the strategies for a goal say how to go about
reaching this goal or that. In going for a contradiction, however, the Q and Q may
not be known. Where the goal is unknown, our strategies for a goal do not apply. This
motivates strategies for a contradiction. Again, the strategies are in rough priority
order.
SC

1. Break accessible formulas down into atomics and negated atomics.
2. Given an available disjunction, go for ? by _E.
3. Set as goal the opposite of some negation (something that cannot itself be
broken down); then apply strategies for a goal to reach it.
4. For some P such that both P and P lead to contradiction: Assume P
(P ), obtain the first contradiction, and conclude P (P ); then obtain
the second contradiction—this is the one you want.

Again, the priority order is not the frequency order. The frequency is likely to be
something like SC1, SC3, SC4, SC2. Also sometimes, but not always, SC3 and SC4
coincide: in deriving the opposite of some negation, you end up assuming a P such
that P and P lead to contradiction.
SC 1. Break accessible formulas down into atomics and negated atomics. As we
have already said, if there is a contradiction to be had, and you can break accessible
formulas into atomics and negated atomics, the contradiction will appear at that level.
Thus, for example,
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1. A ^ B
2. C ! B
C

3.

P
P

1. A ^ B
2. C ! B

A (c, I)

3.

C

A (c, I)

4.
5.
6.
7.

B
A
B
?

2,3 !E
1 ^E
1 ^E
6,4 ?I

(AK)

?
C
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3- I

8. C

P
P

3-7 I

Our strategy for the main goal is SG4 with an application of I. Then the aim is
to obtain a contradiction. And our first thought is to break accessible lines down
to atomics and negated atomics. Perhaps this example is too simple. And you may
wonder about the point of getting A at (5)—there is no need for A at (5). But this
merely illustrates the point: If you can get to atomics and negated atomics (“randomly”
as it were) the contradiction will appear in the end.
As another example, try showing A^.B ^C /, F ! D, .A^D/ ! C `NDs F .
Here is the derivation completed in two stages:
1. A ^ .B ^ C /
2. F ! D
3. .A ^ D/ ! C
F

4.

P
P
P

1. A ^ .B ^ C /
2. F ! D
3. .A ^ D/ ! C

A (c, E)

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

(AL)

?
F

4- E

12. F

P
P
P

F

A (c, E)

D
A
A^D
C
B ^ C
C
?

2,4 !E
1 ^E
6,5 ^I
3,7 !E
1 ^E
9 ^E
8,10 ?I
4-11 E

This time, our strategy for the goal falls through to SG5. After that, again, our goal is
to obtain a contradiction—and our first thought is to break accessible formulas down
to atomics and negated atomics. The assumption F gets us D with (2). We can get
A from (1), and then C with the A and D together. Then C follows from (1) by a
couple applications of ^E. You might proceed to get the atomics in a different order,
but the basic idea of any such derivation is likely to be the same.
SC 2. Given an available disjunction, go for ? by _E. In many cases, you will have
applied _E by SG2 prior to setting up for E or I. Then the disjunction is “used
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up” and unavailable for this strategy. Sometimes, however, a disjunction remains or
becomes available inside a subderivation for a tilde rule. In any such case, SC2 has
high priority for the same reasons as SG2: You can only be better off in your attempt
to reach a contradiction inside the subderivations for _E than before. So the strategy
says to take the ? you need for E or I, and go for it by _E.

a.

P

b.

A_B

given

a.

P

A (c, I)

b.
c.

A_B
A

A (c, b_E)

d.

?

(goal)

e.

B

A (c, b_E)

f.

?

(goal)

A (c, I)

use

?
P

a- I
?

g.

b,c-d,e-f _E

P

a-g I

We go for ? in each of the subderivations for _E. Since the subderivations for _E
have goal ?, they have exit strategy c rather than g.
Here is an example. We show A ^ B `NDs .A _ B/. The derivation is in
four stages.
1. A ^ B
2.

A_B

P

1. A ^ B

A (c, I)

2.

A_B

3.

A

P
A (c, I)
A (c, 2_E)

?

(AM)

B

A (c, 2_E)

?
?
.A _ B/

?
2- I

.A _ B/

2,3- , _E
2- I

In this case, our strategy for the goal is SG4. We might obtain A and B from (1)
but after that, there are no more atomics or negated atomics to be had. However the
assumption line is itself a disjunction available for _E. So SC2 applies, and we set up
with ? as the goal for _E.
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P

1. A ^ B

A (c, I)

2.

A_B

P

2.

A_B

3.

A

A (c, 2_E)

3.

A

A (c, 2_E)

4.
5.

A
?

1 ^E
3,4 ?I

4.
5.

A
?

1 ^E
3,4 ?I

6.

B

A (c, 2_E)

6.

B

A (c, 2_E)

7.
8.

B
?

1 ^E
6,7 ?I

?
?

2,3-5,6- _E

.A _ B/

9.

2- I

A (c, I)

?

2,3-5,6-8 _E

10. .A _ B/

2-9 I

With ? as goal, strategies for a contradiction continue to apply. The first subderivation
is easily completed from atomics and negated atomics. And the second is completed
the same way. Observe that it is only because of our assumptions for _E that we
are able to get the contradictions at all. And we expose another advantage of our
standard use of ?: While ? is a particular sentence, we obtained it by A and A in
one subderivation and B and B in the other. _E would not apply to subderivations
concluding with different contradictions A ^ A and B ^ B. But once we have
obtained ? in each, we are in a position to exit by _E in the usual way and so to apply
I.
SC 3.

Set as goal the opposite of some negation (something that cannot itself be
broken down); then apply strategies for a goal to reach it. You will find yourself using
this strategy often. In the ordinary case, if accessible formulas cannot be broken into
atomics and negated atomics, it is because complex forms are “sealed off” by main
operator . The tilde blocks SC1 or SC2. But you can turn this lemon to lemonade:
Taking the complex Q as one half of a contradiction, set Q as goal. For some
complex Q,
a. Q
b. A

a. Q
b. A

A (c, I)

given

A (c, I)

use
?
A

b- I

c.
d.

Q
?

(goal)
c,a ?I

A

b-d I

We are after a contradiction. Supposing that we cannot break Q into its parts, our
efforts to apply other strategies for a contradiction are frustrated. But SC3 offers an
alternative: Set Q itself as a new goal and use this with Q to reach ?. Then strategies
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for the new goal take over. If we reach the new goal, we have the contradiction we
need.
As an example, try showing B, .A ! B/ `NDs A. Here is the derivation in
four stages:
1. B
2. .A ! B/
3.

A

P
P

1. B
2. .A ! B/

A (c, I)

3.

P
P
A (c, I)

A

(AN)
A!B
?

?
A

3- I

A

,2 ?I
3- I

Our strategy for the goal is SG4; for main operator  we set up to get the goal by
I. So we need a contradiction. In this case, there is nothing to be done by way of
obtaining atomics and negated atomics, and there is no disjunction. So we fall through
to strategy SC3. .A ! B/ on (2) has main operator , so we set A ! B as a new
subgoal with the idea to use it for contradiction.
1. B
2. .A ! B/
3.
4.

A
A

P
P

1. B
2. .A ! B/

A (c, I)

3.

A (g, !I)

4.

A

A (g, !I)

5.

B

1R

B
A!B
?
A

P
P
A (c, I)

A

4- !I
,2 ?I

6.
7.

A!B
?

3- I

8. A

4-5 !I
6,2 ?I
3-7 I

Since A ! B is a definite subgoal, we proceed with strategies for the goal in the
usual way. The main operator is ! so we set up to get it by !I. The subderivation
is particularly easy to complete. And we finish by executing the exit strategies as
planned.
SC 4. For some P such that both P and P lead to contradiction: Assume P
(P ), obtain the first contradiction, and conclude P (P ); then obtain the second
contradiction—this is the one you want.
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a.

a.

A

b.

P

c.

?

A (c, I)

A (c, I)

use

given
?
A

A (c, I)

A

P

b-c I

a- I
d.

?
A

a-d I

The essential point is that both P and P somehow lead to contradiction. Given this,
you can assume one of them and use the first contradiction to obtain the other; and
once you have obtained this other formula, the desired contradiction results from it.
The intuition behind this strategy is like that for the _E rule: P has to be one way
or the other; if both ways lead to contradiction, contradiction follows. The strategy
shows how to extract that contradiction—and is often a powerful way of making
progress when none seems possible by other means.
Let us try to show A $ B, B $ C , C $ A `NDs K. Here is the derivation in
four stages:
1. A $ B
2. B $ C
3. C $ A
4.

K

P
P
P

1. A $ B
2. B $ C
3. C $ A

A (c, E)

4.

K

A (c, E)

5.

A

A (c, I)

P
P
P

(AO)
?
A
?

?
K

5- I

4- E

K

4- E

Our strategy for the goal falls through to SG5 (or we might see it as an obscure instance
of SG1). We assume the negation of the goal, and go for a contradiction. In this case,
there are no atomics or negated atomics to be had, there is no disjunction, and no
formula is itself a negation such that we could build up to the opposite. So we fall
through to SC4. This requires a formula such that both it and its negation lead to
contradiction. Finding such a formula can be difficult! However, in this case, A does
the job: Given A we can use $E to reach A and so contradiction; and given A
we can use $E to reach A and so contradiction. So, following SC4, we assume one
of them to get the other.
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3. C $ A
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P
P
P

1. A $ B
2. B $ C
3. C $ A

P
P
P

4.

K

A (c, E)

4.

K

A (c, E)

5.

A

A (c, I)

5.

A

A (c, I)

6.
7.
8.
9.

B
C
A
?

1,5 $E
2,6 $E
3,7 $E
5,8 ?I

6.
7.
8.
9.

B
C
A
?

1,5 $E
2,6 $E
3,7 $E
5,8 ?I

5-9 I

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

4- E

15. K

A

10.

?
K

A
C
B
A
?

5-9 I
3,10 $E
2,11 $E
1,12 $E
13,10 ?I
4-14 E

The first contradiction appears easily at the level of atomics and negated atomics. This
gives us A. And with A, the second contradiction also comes easily, at the level
of atomics and negated atomics.
Though it can be useful, as we have said, this strategy is often difficult to see. And
there is no obvious way to give a strategy for using the strategy! The best thing to say
is that you should look for it when the other strategies seem to fail.
Let us consider an extended example which combines some of the strategies. We
show that A ! B `NDs B _ A.
1. A ! B

P

(AP)
B _A

To start, there is a definite goal. We do not see a contradiction in the premises; there is
no formula with main operator _ in the premises; and the goal does not appear in the
premises. So we might try going for the goal by _I in application of SG4. This would
require getting a B or an A. It is reasonable to go this way, but it turns out to be a
dead end. (You should convince yourself that this is so.) Thus we fall through to SG5.
1. A ! B
2.

.B _ A/

P
A (c, E)

Especially considering our goal has main operator _, set up to get the goal by E.

?
B _A

2- E
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Now we need a contradiction. For this, our first thought is to go for atomics and
negated atomics. But there is nothing to be done. Similarly, there is no formula with
main operator _. So we fall through to SC3 and continue as follows:
1. A ! B
2.

.B _ A/

P
A (c, E)

Given a negation that cannot be broken down,
set up to get the contradiction by building up to

B _A
?
B _A

the opposite.
,2 ?I
2- E

It might seem that we have made no progress, since our new goal is no different
than the original! But there is progress insofar as we have an accessible formula not
available before (more on this in a moment). At this stage, we can get the goal by _I.
Either side will work, but it is easier to start with the A. So we set up for that.
1. A ! B
2.

.B _ A/

P
A (c, E)
For a goal with main operator _, go for the goal

A
B _A
?
B _A

by _I
_I
,2 ?I
2- E

Now the goal is atomic. Again, there is no contradiction or formula with main operator
_ on accessible lines. The goal is not on accessible lines in any form we can hope to
exploit. And the goal has no main operator. So, again, we fall through to SG5.
1. A ! B
2.
3.

.B _ A/
A

P
A (c, E)
A (c, E)
Especially for atomics, go for the goal by E

?
A
B _A
?
B _A

3- E
_I
,2 ?I
2- E

Again, to obtain the contradiction, our first thought is to get atomics and negated
atomics. We can get B from lines (1) and (3) by !E. But that is all. So we will not
get a contradiction from atomics and negated atomics alone. There is no formula with
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main operator _. However, the possibility of getting a B suggests that we can build
up to the opposite of line (2). That is, we complete the subderivation as follows, and
follow our exit strategies to complete the whole.
1. A ! B
2.

.B _ A/

P
A (c, E)

3.

A

A (c, E)

4.
5.
6.

B
B _A
?

1,3 !E
4 _I
5,2 ?I

7.
8.
9.

A
B _A
?

10. B _ A

Get the contradiction by building up to the opposite of an existing negation.

3-6 E
7 _I
8,2 ?I
2-9 E

A couple of comments: First, observe that we build up to the opposite of .B _ A/
twice, coming at it from different directions. First we obtain the left side B and use _I
to obtain the whole, then the right side A and use _I to obtain the whole. This “double
use” is typical with negated disjunctions. Second, note that this derivation might be
reconceived as an instance of SC4. A gets us B, and so B _ A, which contradicts
.B _ A/. But A gets us B _ A which again contradicts .B _ A/. So both A and
A lead to contradiction; so we assume one (A), and get the first contradiction; this
gets us A, from which the second contradiction follows.
The general pattern of this derivation is typical for goal formulas with main
operator _. For P _ Q we may not be able to prove either P or Q from scratch—so
that the formula is not directly provable by _I. However, it may be indirectly provable.
If it is provable at all, it must be that the negation of one side forces the other. So it
must be possible to get the P or the Q under the additional assumption that the other
is false. This makes possible an argument of the following form:
a.

(AQ)

.P _ Q/

A (c, E)

b.

P

A (c, E)

c.
d.
e.

::
:
Q
P _Q
?

c _I
d,a ?I

f.
g.
h.

P
P _Q
?

i. P _ Q

b-e E
f _I
g,a ?I
a-h E
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The “work” in this routine is getting from the negation of one side of the disjunction
to the other. Thus if from the assumption P it is possible to derive Q, all the rest
is automatic. We have just seen an extended example (AP) of this pattern. It may be
seen as an application of SC3 or SC4 (or both). Where a disjunction may be provable
but not provable by _I, it will work by this method. Observe that _I still plays an
essential role—only not as the main strategy. In difficult cases when the goal is a
disjunction, it is wise to think about whether you can get one side from the negation
of the other. If you can, set up as above. (And reconsider this method when we get to
a simplified version in the extended system NDs+.)
This example was fairly difficult! You may see some longer, but you will not see
many harder. The strategies are not a cookbook for performing all derivations—doing
derivations remains an art. But the strategies will give you a good start, and take you
a long way through the exercises that follow. The theorems immediately below again
foreshadow rules of NDs+.
*T6.21. `NDs .A ^ B/ $ .A _ B/
T6.22. `NDs .A _ B/ $ .A ^ B/
T6.23. `NDs .A ! B/ $ .A _ B/
T6.24. `NDs .A ! B/ $ .A _ B/
T6.25. `NDs ŒA ^ .B _ C/ $ Œ.A ^ B/ _ .A ^ C/
T6.26. `NDs ŒA _ .B ^ C/ $ Œ.A _ B/ ^ .A _ C /
T6.27. `NDs .A $ B/ $ Œ.A ! B/ ^ .B ! A/
T6.28. `NDs .A $ B/ $ Œ.A ^ B/ _ .A ^ B/
T6.29. `NDs ŒA $ .B $ C/ $ Œ.A $ B/ $ C

CHAPTER 6. NATURAL DEDUCTION

177

E6.17. Each of the following begins with a simple application of I or E. Complete
the derivations, and explain your use of strategies for a contradiction. Hint: Each
of the strategies for a contradiction is used at least once.
*a. 1. A ^ B
2. .A ^ C /
C

3.

P
P
A (c, I)

?
C

3- I

b. 1. .B _ A/ ! D

P
P

2. C ^ D
B

3.

A (c, E)

?
3- E

B

c. 1. A ^ B

P

A _ B

2.

A (c, I)

?
.A _ B/

d. 1. A $ A
B

2.

2- I
P
A (c, I)

?
B

e. 1. .A ! B/
A

2.

2- I
P
A (c, E)

?
A

2- E

E6.18. Produce derivations to show each of the following.
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*a. A ! .B ^ C /, B ! C `NDs A ! B
*b. `NDs .A ! A/ ! A
*c. A _ B `NDs .A ^ B/
*d. .A ^ B/, .A ^ B/ `NDs A
*e. `NDs A _ A
*f. `NDs A _ .A ! B/
*g. A _ B, A _ B `NDs B
*h. A $ .B _ C /, B ! C `NDs A
*i. A $ B `NDs .C $ A/ $ .C $ B/
*j. A $ .B $ C /, .A _ B/ `NDs C
*k. ŒC _ .A _ B/ ^ .C ! E/, A ! D, D ! A `NDs C _ B
*l. .A ! B/, .B ! C / `NDs D
*m. C ! A, .B ^ C / `NDs .A _ B/ ! C
*n. .A $ B/ `NDs A $ B
*o. A $ B, B $ C `NDs .A $ C /
*p. A _ B, B _ C , C `NDs A
*q. .A _ C / _ D, D ! B `NDs .A ^ B/ ! C
*r. A _ D, D $ .E _ C /, .C ^ B/ _ ŒC ^ .F ! C / `NDs A
*s. .A _ B/ _ .C ^ D/; .A $ E/ ^ .B ! F /; G $ .E _ F /; C ! B `NDs G
*t. .A _ B/ ^ C , C ! .D ^ A/, B ! .A _ E/ `NDs E _ F

*E6.19. Produce derivations to demonstrate each of T6.21–T6.28. Note that demonstration of T6.29 (from left to right) is left for E6.20e.

E6.20. Produce derivations to show each of the following. These are particularly
challenging. If you can get them, you are doing very well!
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a. .A _ B/ ! .A _ C / `NDs A _ .B ! C /
b. A ! .B _ C / `NDs .A ! B/ _ .A ! C /
c. .A $ B/ $ .C $ D/ `NDs .A $ C / ! .B ! D/
d. .A $ B/, .B $ C /, .C $ A/ `NDs K
e. A $ .B $ C / `NDs .A $ B/ $ C

6.2.5

The System NDs+

We turn now to some derived rules that will be useful for streamlining derivations.
NDs+ includes all the rules of NDs, with some additional inference rules and new
replacement rules. It is not possible to derive anything in NDs+ that cannot already be
derived in NDs. Thus the new rules do not add extra derivation power. They are rather
“shortcuts” for things that can already be done in NDs. This is particularly obvious in
the case of the inference rules.
We have already seen ?I as a first example of a derived rule. As described on
page 138 it is possible to derive ? from any Q and Q. It is possible also to introduce
a companion ?E as below and justified by the derivation on the right.
1. ?
a. ?

?E

(AR)
a ?E

P

P

2.

P

A (c, E)

3.

?

1R

4. P

2-3 E

From a contradiction, one can derive anything.6 Again, the justification for this rule is
that it does not let you do anything that you could not already do in NDs. In contexts
where SG1 applies, this rule shortcuts a step, and cleans out a distracting subderivation.
For other new rules, suppose in an NDs derivation we have P ! Q and Q and
want to reach P . No doubt, we would proceed as follows:
1. P ! Q
2. Q

(AS)

P
P

3.

P

A (c, I)

4.
5.

Q
?

1,3 !E
4,2 ?I

6. P

3-5 I

6 This rule is sometimes known as ex falso quodlibet, which translates, “from falsehood anything
(follows).”
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We assume P , get the contradiction, and conclude by I. Perhaps you have done
this so many times that you can do it in your sleep. In NDs+ you are given a way
to shortcut the routine, and go directly from an accessible P ! Q on a, and an
accessible Q on b to P with justification a,b MT (modus tollens).
MT

a P !Q
b Q
P

a,b MT

Again, the justification for this is that the rule does not let you do anything that you
could not already do in NDs. So if the rules of NDs preserve truth, this rule preserves
truth. And, as a matter of fact, we already demonstrated that P ! Q, Q `NDs P
in T6.5.
NB

a P $Q
b P
Q

a P $Q
b Q
a,b NB

P

a,b NB

NB (negated biconditional) lets you move from a biconditional and the negation of
one side, to the negation of the other. It is like MT, but with the arrow going both
ways. The parts are justified in T6.9 and T6.10.
DS

a P _Q
b P
Q

a P _Q
b Q
a,b DS

P

a,b DS

DS (disjunctive syllogism) lets you move from a disjunction and the negation of one
side, to the other side of the disjunction. The two parts are justified by T6.7 and T6.8.
HS

a O!P
b P !Q
O!Q

a,b HS

HS (hypothetical syllogism) is a principle of transitivity by which you may string a
pair of conditionals together into one. It is justified by T6.6.
Each of these rules should be clear and easy to use. Here is an example that puts
most of the new rules together into one derivation:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

(AT)

1.
2.
3.
4.

A$B
B
A _ .C ! D/
D!B

P
P
P
P

5.
6.
7.
8.

A
C !D
C !B
C

1,2 NB
3,5 DS
6,4 HS
7,2 MT

A$B
B
A _ .C ! D/
D!B
A

P
P
P
P
A (g, 3_E)

6.

C

A (c, I)

7.
8.

B
?

1,5 $E
7,2 ?I

9.

C

6-8 I

C !D

A (g, 3_E)

10.
11.

C

A (c, I)

12.
13.
14.

D
B
?

10,11 !E
4,12 !E
13,2 ?I

15.

C

16. C

11-14 I
3,5-9,10-15 _E

We can do it by our normal methods purely with the rules of NDs as on the right.
But it is easier with the shortcuts from NDs+ as on the left. It may take you some
time to “see” applications of the new rules when you are doing derivations, but the
simplification makes it worth getting used to them.
The replacement rules of NDs+ are different from ones we have seen before in
two respects. First, replacement rules go in two directions. Consider the following
simple rule:
DN

P GF P

According to DN (double negation), given P on an accessible line a, you may move
to P with justification a DN; and given P on an accessible line a, you may
move to P with justification a DN. This two-way rule is justified by T6.17, in which
we showed `NDs P $ P . Given P we could use the routine from one half of the
derivation to reach P , and given P we could use the routine from the other
half of the derivation to reach P .
But further, we can use replacement rules to replace a subformula that is just a
proper part of another formula. Thus, for example, in the following list, we could
move in one step by DN from the formula on the left to any of the ones on the right,
and from any of the ones on the right to the one on the left.
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ŒA ^ .B ! C /
A ^ .B ! C /
A ^ .B ! C /
A ^ .B ! C /
A ^ .B ! C /

A ^ .B ! C /

The first application is of the sort we have seen before, in which the whole formula is
replaced. In the second, the replacement is between the subformulas A and A. In
the third, between the subformulas .B ! C / and .B ! C /. The fourth switches
B and B, and the last C and C . Thus the DN rule allows the substitution of
any subformula P with one of the form P , and vice versa.
The application of replacement rules to subformulas is not so easily justified as
their application to whole formulas. A complete justification that NDs+ does not let
you go beyond what can be derived in NDs will have to wait for ??. Roughly, though,
the idea is this: Given a complex formula, we can take it apart, do the replacement,
and then put it back together. Here is a very simple example from above:

(AV)

1. A ^ .B ! C /

P

2. A ^ .B ! C /

1 DN

1. A ^ .B ! C /

P

2. A
3. B ! C
4. .B ! C /

1 ^E
1 ^E
A (c, I)

5.

?

6. .B ! C /
7. A ^ .B ! C /

3,4 ?I
4-5 I
2,6 ^I

On the left, we make the move from A ^ .B ! C / to A ^ .B ! C / in one
step by DN. On the right, using ordinary inference rules, we begin by taking off the
A. Then we convert B ! C to .B ! C /, and put it back together with the
A. Though we will not be able to show that this sort of thing is generally possible
until ??, for now I will continue to say that replacement rules are “justified” by the
corresponding biconditionals. As it happens, for replacement rules, the biconditionals
play a crucial role in the demonstration that  `NDs P iff  `NDs P .
The rest of the replacement rules work the same way.
P ^ Q GF Q ^ P

Com

P _ Q GF Q _ P
P $ Q GF Q $ P

Com (commutation) lets you reverse the order of formulas in a conjunction, disjunction, or biconditional. By Com you could go from, say, A ^ .B _ C / to .B _ C / ^ A,
switching the order around ^, or from A ^ .B _ C / to A ^ .C _ B/, switching the

CHAPTER 6. NATURAL DEDUCTION

183

order around _. You should be clear about why this is so. The different forms are
justified by T6.11, T6.13, and T6.12.
O ^ .P ^ Q/ GF .O ^ P / ^ Q

Assoc

O _ .P _ Q/ GF .O _ P / _ Q
O $ .P $ Q/ GF .O $ P / $ Q

Assoc (association) lets you shift parentheses for conjunctions, disjunctions, and
biconditionals. The different forms are justified by T6.16, T6.20, and T6.29.
Idem

P GF P ^ P
P GF P _ P

Idem (idempotence) exposes the equivalence between P and P ^ P , and between P
and P _ P . The two forms are justified by T6.18 and T6.19.
Impl

P ! Q GF P _ Q
P ! Q GF P _ Q

Impl (implication) lets you move between a conditional and a corresponding disjunction. Thus, for example, by the first form of Impl you could move from A ! .B_C /
to A _ .B _ C /, using the rule from left to right, or to A ! .B ! C /, using the
rule from right to left. As we will see, this rule can be particularly useful. The two
forms are justified by T6.23 and T6.24.
Trans

P ! Q GF Q ! P

Trans (transposition) lets you reverse the antecedent and consequent around a conditional—subject to the addition or removal of negations. From left to right, this rule
should remind you of MT, as Trans plus !E has the same effect as one application of
MT. Trans is justified by T6.14.
DeM

.P ^ Q/ GF P _ Q
.P _ Q/ GF P ^ Q

DeM (DeMorgan) should remind you of equivalences we learned in chapter 5, for not
both (the first form) and neither nor (the second form). This rule also can be very
useful. The two forms are justified by T6.21 and T6.22.
Exp

O ! .P ! Q/ GF .O ^ P / ! Q

Exp (exportation) is another equivalence that may have arisen in translation. It is
justified by T6.15.
Equiv

P $ Q GF .P ! Q/ ^ .Q ! P /
P $ Q GF .P ^ Q/ _ .P ^ Q/
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Equiv (equivalence) converts between a biconditional and the corresponding pair
of conditionals, or converts between a biconditional and a corresponding pair of
conjunctions. The two forms are justified by T6.27 and T6.28.
Dist

O ^ .P _ Q/ GF .O ^ P / _ .O ^ Q/
O _ .P ^ Q/ GF .O _ P / ^ .O _ Q/

Dist (distribution) works something like the mathematical principle for multiplying
across a sum. In each case, moving from left to right, the operator from outside
attaches to each of the parts inside the parenthesis, and the operator from inside
becomes the main operator. The two forms are justified by T6.25 and T6.26.
Thus end the rules of NDs+. They are a lot to absorb at once. But you do not need
to absorb all the rules at once. Again, the rules do not let you do anything you could
not already do in NDs. For the most part, you should proceed as if you were in NDs. If
an NDs+ shortcut occurs to you, use it. You will gradually become familiar with more
and more of the special NDs+ rules. Perhaps, though, we can make a few observations
about strategy that will get you started. First, again, do not get too distracted by
the extra rules! You should continue with the overall goal-directed approach from
NDs. There are, however, a few contexts where special rules from NDs+ can make a
substantive difference. I comment on three.
First, as we have seen, in NDs formulas with _ can be problematic. _E is awkward
to apply, and _I does not always work. In simple cases, DS can get you out of _E. But
this is not always so, and you will want to keep _E among your standard strategies.
More importantly, Impl can convert between awkward goal formulas with main
operator _ and more manageable ones with main operator !. Although a disjunction
may be derivable, but not by _I, if a conditional is derivable, it is derivable by !I.
Thus to reach a goal with main operator _, consider going for the corresponding !,
and converting with Impl.

given

use
A_B

(goal)

a.

A

A (g, !I)

b.

B

(goal)

c. A ! B
A_B

a-b !I
c Impl

And the other form of Impl may be helpful for a goal of the sort A _ B. Here is a
quick example:
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NDs+ Quick Reference
NDs+ includes all the rules of NDs and,
Inference Rules
?I (bottom intro)

?E (bottom exploit)

a. Q
b. Q

a. ?
P

?

a ?E

a,b ?I

MT (Modus Tollens)

NB (Negated Biconditional)

NB (Negated Biconditional)

a P !Q
b Q

a P $Q
b P

a P $Q
b Q

P

a,b MT

Q

a,b NB

P

a,b NB

DS (Disjunctive Syllogism)

DS (Disjunctive Syllogism)

HS (Hypothetical Syllogism)

a P _Q
b P

a P _Q
b Q

a O!P
b P !Q

Q

a,b DS

P

O!Q

a,b DS

a,b HS

Replacement Rules
DN

P GF P

Idem

P GF P ^ P
P GF P _ P

Assoc

O ^ .P ^ Q/ GF .O ^ P / ^ Q
O _ .P _ Q/ GF .O _ P / _ Q
O $ .P $ Q/ GF .O $ P / $ Q

Com

P ^ Q GF Q ^ P
P _ Q GF Q _ P
P $ Q GF Q $ P

Exp

O ! .P ! Q/ GF .O ^ P / ! Q

Trans

P ! Q GF Q ! P

DeM

.P ^ Q/ GF P _ Q
.P _ Q/ GF P ^ Q

Impl

P ! Q GF P _ Q
P ! Q GF P _ Q

Dist

O ^ .P _ Q/ GF .O ^ P / _ .O ^ Q/
O _ .P ^ Q/ GF .O _ P / ^ .O _ Q/

Equiv

P $ Q GF .P ! Q/ ^ .Q ! P /
P $ Q GF .P ^ Q/ _ .P ^ Q/
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1.

(AW)

1.

A

A (g, !I)

2.

A

1R

3. A ! A
4. A _ A

1-2 !I
3 Impl

.A _ A/

A (c, E)

2.

A

A (c, I)

3.
4.

A _ A
?

2 _I
3,1 ?I

5.
6.
7.

A
A _ A
?

8. A _ A

2-4 I
5 _I
6,1 ?I
1-7 E

The derivation on the left using Impl is completely trivial, requiring just a derivation
of A ! A. But the derivation on the right is not. It falls through to SG5, and then
requires a challenging application of SC3 or SC4. This proposed strategy replaces or
simplifies the pattern (AQ) for disjunctions described on page 175. Observe that the
work—getting from the negation of one side of a disjunction to the other—is exactly
the same. It is only that we use the derived rule to simplify away the distracting and
messy setup.
Second, among the most useless formulas for exploitation in NDs are ones with
main operator . But the combination of DeM, Impl, Equiv, and DN let you “push”
negations into arbitrary formulas. Thus you can convert formulas with main operator
 into a more useful form. To see how these rules can be manipulated, consider the
following sequence:

(AX)

1. .A ! B/

P

2. .A _ B/
3. A ^ B
4. A ^ B

1 Impl
2 DeM
3 DN

We begin with the negation as main operator, and end with a negation only against
an atomic. This sort of thing is often very useful. For example, in going for a
contradiction, you have the option of “breaking down” a formula with main operator
 rather than automatically building up to its opposite, according to SC3.
Finally, observe that derivations which can be conducted entirely be replacement
rules are “reversible.” Thus, for a simple case,
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1.

.A ^ B/

A (g, $I)

2.
3.
4.

A _ B
A _ B
A!B

1 DeM
2 DN
3 Impl

5.

A!B

A (g, $I)

6.
7.
8.

A _ B
A _ B
.A ^ B/

5 Impl
6 DN
7 DeM

9. .A ^ B/ $ .A ! B/
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1-4,5-8 $I

We set up for $I in the usual way. Then the subderivations work by precisely the
same steps, DeM, DN, Impl, but in the reverse order. This is not surprising since
replacement rules work in both directions. Notice that reversal does not generally
work where regular inference rules are involved.
The rules of NDs+ are not a “magic bullet” to make all difficult derivations go
away! Rather, with the derived rules, we set aside a certain sort of difficulty that
should no longer worry us, so that we are in a position to take on new challenges
without becoming overwhelmed by details.
E6.21. Produce derivations to show each of the following.
*a. .H ^ G/ ! .L _ K/, G ^ H `NDs K _ L
*b. `NDs Œ.A ^ B/ ! .B ^ A/ ^ Œ.A ^ B/ ! .B ^ A/
*c. Œ.K ^ J / _ I  _ Y , Y ^ Œ.I _ K/ ! F  `NDs F _ N
*d. L _ .Z _ U /, .U ^ G/ _ H , Z `NDs L ! H
*e. F ! .G _ H /, F ! G, .H _ I / `NDs F ! J
*f. F ! .G ! H /, I ! .F _ H /, F ! G `NDs I _ H
g. G ! .H ^ K/, H $ .L ^ I /, I _ K `NDs G
h. .Z _ X / _ .X ! Y /, X ! Z, Z ! Y `NDs X $ Y
i. `NDs ŒA _ .B _ C / $ ŒC _ .B _ A/
j. `NDs ŒA ! .B $ C / $ .A ! Œ.B _ C / ^ .C _ B//
k. `NDs .A _ ŒB ! .A ! B// $ .A _ Œ.A _ B/ _ B/
l. `NDs ŒA ! .B ! C / ! Œ.A _ B/ _ .B _ C /

CHAPTER 6. NATURAL DEDUCTION

188

m. `NDs .A $ A/ $ Œ.A ! A/ $ .A ! A/
n. `NDs .A ! B/ _ .B ! C /
o. `NDs Œ.A ! B/ ! A ! A

E6.22. For each of the following, produce a good translation including interpretation
function. Then use a derivation to show that the argument is valid in NDs+. The
first two are suggested from the history of philosophy; the last is our familiar case
from page 2.
a. We have knowledge about numbers.
If Platonism is true, then numbers are not in spacetime.
Either numbers are in spacetime, or we do not interact with them.
We have knowledge about numbers only if we interact with them.
Platonism is not true.
b. There is evil.
If god is good, then there is no evil unless god has morally sufficient reasons
for allowing it.
If god is both omnipotent and omniscient, then god does not have morally
sufficient reasons for allowing evil.
God is not good, omnipotent, and omniscient.
c. If Bob goes to the fair, then so do Daniel and Edward. Albert goes to the fair
only if Bob or Carol go. If Daniel goes, then Edward goes only if Fred goes.
But not both Fred and Albert go. So Albert goes to the fair only if Carol goes
too.
d. If I think dogs fly, then I am insane or they have really big ears. But if dogs do
not have really big ears, then I am not insane. So either I do not think dogs fly,
or they have really big ears.
e. If the maid did it, then it was done with a revolver only if it was done in the
parlor. But if the butler is innocent, then the maid did it unless it was done in
the parlor. The maid did it only if it was done with a revolver, while the butler
is guilty if it did happen in the parlor. So the butler is guilty.
E6.23. For each of the following concepts, explain in an essay of about two pages,
so that (high-school age) Hannah could understand. In your essay, you should
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(i) identify the objects to which the concept applies, (ii) give and explain the
definition, and give and explicate examples of your own construction (iii) where
the concept applies, and (iv) where it does not. Your essay should exhibit an
understanding of methods from the text.
a. Derivations as games, and the condition on rules.
b. Accessibility, and auxiliary assumptions.
c. The rules _I and _E.
d. The strategies for a goal.
e. The strategies for a contradiction.

6.3

Quantificational

Part II

Transition: Reasoning About
Logic

190

Introductory
We have expended a great deal of energy learning to do logic. What we have learned
constitutes the complete classical predicate calculus with equality. This is a system of
tremendous power including for reasoning in foundations of arithmetic.
But our work itself raises questions. In chapter 4 we used truth trees and tables for
an account of the conditions under which sentential formulas are true and arguments
are valid. In the quantificational case, though, we were not able to use our graphical
methods for a general account of truth and validity—there were simply too many
branches, and too many interpretations, for a general account by means of trees. Thus
there is an open question about whether and how quantificational validity can be
shown.
And once we have introduced our notions of validity, many interesting questions
can be asked about how they work: Are the arguments that are valid in AD the same as
the ones that are valid in ND? Are the arguments that are valid in ND the same as the
ones that are quantificationally valid? Are the theorems of Q the same as the theorems
of PA? Are theorems of PA the same as the truths on N the standard interpretation for
number theory? Is it possible for a computing device to identify the theorems of the
different logical systems?
It is one thing to ask such questions, and perhaps amazing that there are demonstrable answers. We will come to that. However, in this short section we do not
attempt answers. Rather, we put ourselves in a position to think about answers by
introducing methods for thinking about logic. Thus this part looks both backward
and forward: By our methods we plug the hole left from chapter 4—in chapter 7 we
accomplish what could not be done with the tables and trees of chapter 4, and are able
to demonstrate quantificational validity. At the same time, we lay a foundation to ask
and answer core questions about logic.
Chapter 7 begins with our basic method of reasoning from definitions. Chapter ??
introduces mathematical induction. These methods are important not only for results,
but for their own sakes, as part of the “package” that comes with mathematical logic.
191

Chapter 7

Direct Semantic Reasoning
It is the task of this chapter to think about reasoning directly from definitions. Frequently students who already reason quite skillfully with definitions flounder when
asked to do so explicitly, in the style of this chapter.1 Thus I propose to begin in
a restricted context—one with which we are already familiar, using a fairly rigid
framework as a guide. Perhaps you first learned to ride a bicycle with training wheels,
but eventually learned to ride without them, and so to go faster, and to places other
than the wheels would let you go. Similarly, in the end, we will want to apply our
methods beyond the restricted context in which we begin, working outside the initial
framework. But the framework should give us a good start. In this chapter, then, I
introduce the framework in the context of reasoning for specifically semantic notions,
and against the background of semantic reasoning we have already done.
In chapter 4 we used truth trees and tables for an account of the conditions under
which sentential formulas are true and arguments are valid. In the quantificational case
though, we were not able to use our graphical methods for a general account of truth
and validity—there were simply too many branches, and too many interpretations, for
a general account by means of trees. For a complete account, we will need to reason
more directly from the definitions. But the tables and trees do exhibit the semantic
definitions. So we can build on what we have already done with them. Our goal will
be to move past the tables and trees, and learn to function without them. After some
1 The

ability to reason clearly and directly with definitions is important not only here, but also
beyond. From the (often humorous) Philosopher’s Lexicon, compare the verb to chisholm—after
Roderick Chisholm, who was a master of the technique—where one proposes a definition; considers a
counterexample; modifies to account for the example; considers another counterexample; modifies again;
and so forth. As, “He started with definition (d.8) and kept chisholming away at it until he ended up with
(d.800000000 ).” Such reasoning is impossible to understand apart from explicit attention to consequences of
definitions of the sort we have in mind.
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introductory remarks in section 7.1, we start with the sentential case (section 7.2), and
move to the quantificational (section 7.3).

7.1

Introductory

I begin with some considerations about what we are trying to accomplish, and how it
is related to what we have done. At this stage, do not worry so much about details as
about the overall nature of the project. With this in mind, consider the following row
of a truth table, meant to show that B ! C 6s B:
(A)

B C B ! C / B
T T T T T

F T

Since there is an interpretation on which the premise is true and the conclusion is not,
the argument is not sententially valid. Now, what justifies setting B ! C to T and
B to F? One might respond, “the truth tables.” But the truth tables T(!) and T()
themselves derive from definition ST. And similarly the conclusion that the argument
is not sententially valid derives from SV.
ST () I[P ]
ST (!) I[.P

= T iff I[P ] = F; otherwise I[P ] = F.

! Q/] = T iff I[P ] = F or I[Q] = T (or both); otherwise I[.P ! Q/] = F.

SV  s P iff there is no sentential interpretation I such that IŒ = T but IŒP  = F.

In this case, IŒC  = T; from this, reasoning as by _I, IŒB = F or IŒC  = T; so by
ST (!), IŒB ! C  = T. Similarly, IŒB = T; so by ST (), IŒB = F. And since we
have produced an I such that IŒB ! C  = T but IŒB = F, by SV, B ! C 6s B.
Up to now, we have used tables to express these conditions. But we might have
reasoned directly.

(B)

Consider any interpretation I such that IŒB = T and IŒC  = T. Since IŒC  = T, IŒB = F
or IŒC  = T; so by ST(!), IŒB ! C  = T. But since IŒB = T, by ST(), IŒB = F.
So there is a sentential interpretation I such that IŒB ! C  = T but IŒB = F; so by
SV, B ! C 6s B.

Presumably, all this is “contained” in the one line of the truth table, when we use it to
conclude that the argument is not sententially valid. Our aim is to “expose” reasoning
in this way.
Similarly, consider the following table, meant to show that A s A ! A.
A A / A ! A

(C)

T T F T
F F T F

FT T T
TF F F
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Since there is no row where the premise is true and the conclusion is false, the
argument is sententially valid. Again, ST() and ST(!) justify the way you build the
table. And SV lets you conclude that the argument is sententially valid. Thus the table
represents reasoning as follows:

(D)

For any sentential interpretation either (i) IŒA = T or (ii) IŒA = F. Suppose (i);
then IŒA = T; so IŒA = F or IŒA = T; so by ST(!), IŒA ! A = T; from this
either IŒA = F or IŒA ! A = T; so it is not the case that IŒA = T and
IŒA ! A = F. Suppose (ii); then IŒA = F; so by ST(), IŒA = T; so by ST()
again, IŒA = F; so either IŒA = F or IŒA ! A = T; so it is not the case that
IŒA = T and IŒA ! A = F. From these together, no interpretation makes it the
case that IŒA = T and IŒA ! A = F. So by SV, A s A ! A.

Thus we might recapitulate reasoning in the table. Perhaps we typically “whip through”
tables without explicitly considering all the definitions involved. But the definitions
are involved when we complete the table.
In fact, (D) does not recapitulate the entire table (C). Thus at (i), for the conditional
we do not establish IŒA = F—it is enough that IŒA = T so that IŒA = F or IŒA = T
and by ST(!), IŒA ! A = T. Similarly at (i) there is no need to make the point
that IŒA = T. What matters is that IŒA ! A = T, so that IŒA = F or
IŒA ! A = T, and it is therefore not the case that IŒA = T and IŒA ! A = F.
Such “shortcuts” may reflect what you have already done when you realize that, say,
a true conclusion eliminates the need to think about the premises on some row of a
table. Even so, the idea of reasoning in this way corresponding to a 4, 8, or more (!)
row table remains painful.
But there is a way out. Recall what happens when you apply the chapter 4
“shortcut” table method to valid arguments. You start with the assumption that the
premises are true and the conclusion is not. If the argument is valid, you reach some
conflict so that it is not, in fact, possible to complete the row. Then, as we said on
page 76, you know “in your heart” that the argument is valid. Let us turn this into an
official argument form.

(E)

Suppose A 6s A ! A; then by SV, there is an I such that IŒA = T and
IŒA ! A = F. From the former, by ST(), IŒA = F. But from the latter, by ST(!),
IŒA = T and IŒA = F. So IŒA = T and IŒA = F. This is impossible; reject the
assumption: A s A ! A.

This is better. The assumption that the argument is invalid leads to the conclusion
that for some I, IŒA = T and IŒA = F; but this is impossible and we reject the
assumption. The pattern is like E in ND. This approach is particularly important
insofar as we do not reason individually about each of the possible interpretations. This
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is nice in the sentential case, when there are too many to reason about conveniently.
And in the quantificational case, we will not be able to argue individually about each
of the possible interpretations. So we need to avoid talking about interpretations one
by one.
Thus we arrive at two strategies: To show that an argument is invalid, we produce
an interpretation, and show by the definitions that it makes the premises true and the
conclusion not. That is what we did in (B) above. To show that an argument is valid,
we assume the opposite, and show by the definitions that the assumption leads to
contradiction. Again, that is what we did just above, at (E).
Before we get to the details, let us consider an important point about what we are
trying to do: Our reasoning takes place in the metalanguage, based on the definitions
stated in the metalanguage—where object-level expressions are uninterpreted apart
from their definitions. To see this, ask yourself whether a sentence P conflicts with
P " P . “Well,” you might respond, “I have never encountered this symbol ‘"’ before,
so I am not in a position to say.” But that is the point: whether P conflicts with
P " P depends entirely on a definition for up arrow ‘"’. As it happens, this symbol
is typically read “not both” as given by what might be a further clause of ST.2
ST (")

For any sentences P and Q, IŒ.P " Q/ = T iff IŒP  = F or IŒQ = F (or both);
otherwise IŒ.P " Q/ = F.

The resultant table is,
P Q P " Q

T(")

T
T
F
F

F
T
T
T

T
F
T
F

P " Q is false when P and Q are both T, and otherwise true. Given this, P does
conflict with P " P . Suppose IŒP  = T and IŒP " P  = T; from the latter, by ST ("),
IŒP  = F or IŒP  = F; either way, IŒP  = F; but this is impossible given our assumption
that IŒP  = T. In fact, P " P has the same table as P , and P " .Q " Q/ the same
as P ! Q.
P Q P " .Q " Q/
P P " P

(F)

T
F

2 An

F
T

T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
F
T
T

F
T
F
T

alternative symbol is a simple vertical line, ‘j’. Then it is (the Sheffer) stroke.
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From this, we might have treated  and !, and so ^, _, and $, all as abbreviations
for expressions whose only operator is ". At best, however, this leaves official
expressions incredibly difficult to read. Here is the point that matters: Operators have
their significance entirely from the definitions. In this chapter, we make metalinguistic
claims about object expressions, where these can only be based on the definitions. P
and P " P do not themselves conflict, apart from the definition which makes P with
P " P have the consequence that IŒP  = T and IŒP  = F. And similarly operators
with which we are more familiar gain their significance from the definition. At every
stage, it is the definitions which justify conclusions.

7.2

Sentential

With this much said, it remains possible to become confused about details while
working with the definitions. It is one thing to be able to follow such reasoning—as I
hope you have been able to do—and another to produce it. The idea now is to make
use of something at which we are already good, doing derivations, to further structure
and guide the way we proceed. The result will be a sort of derivation system for
reasoning with metalinguistic expressions. We build up this system in stages.

7.2.1

Truth

Let us begin with some notation. Where the script characters A; B; C; D; : : : represent object expressions in the usual way, let the Fraktur characters A; B; C; D; : : :
represent metalinguistic expressions (‘A’ is the Fraktur ‘A’). Thus A might represent
an expression of the sort IŒB = T. Then ) and , are the metalinguistic conditional
and biconditional respectively; :, M, O, and ? are metalinguistic negation, conjunction, disjunction, and contradiction. In practice, negation is indicated by the slash (²)
as well.
Now consider the following restatement of definition ST. Each clause is given in
both a positive and a negative form. For any sentences P and Q and interpretation I,
ST

() IŒP  = T , IŒP  = T

IŒP  = T , IŒP  = T

(!) IŒP ! Q = T , IŒP  = T O IŒQ = T

IŒP ! Q = T , IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T

Given the new symbols, and that the definitions make a sentence F exactly when it is
not true, this is a simple restatement of ST. As we develop our metalinguistic derivation
system, we will treat the metalinguistic biconditionals both as (replacement) rules and
as axioms. Thus, for example, by the first form of ST() it will be legitimate to move
directly from IŒP  = T to IŒP  = T, moving from left to right across the arrow; and
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similarly but in the other direction from IŒP  = T to IŒP  = T. Alternatively, it will
be appropriate to assert by ST() the entire biconditional, that IŒP  = T , IŒP  = T.
For now, we will mostly use the biconditionals, in the first form, as rules.
To manipulate the definitions, we require some rules. These are like ones you
have seen before, only pitched at the metalinguistic level.
com

.A O B/ , .B O A/

.A M B/ , .B M A/

idm

A , .A O A/

A , .A M A/

dem

:.A M B/ , .:A O :B/

:.A O B/ , .:A M :B/

cnj

dsj

A; B

AMB

AMB

AMB

A

B

A

B

A O B; :A

A O B; :B

AOB

AOB

B

A

A , ::A

neg

A
?
:A

:A
?
A

bot

A; :A
?

Each of these should remind you of rules from ND or ND+. In practice, we will
allow generalized versions of cnj that let us move directly from A1 ; A2 ; : : : ; An to
A1 M A2 M : : : M An . Similarly, we will allow applications of dsj and dem that skip
officially required applications of neg. Thus, for example, instead of going by dem
from :.A M :B/, to :A O ::B and then by neg to :A O B, we might move by
dem directly from :.A M :B/, to :A O B. We will also allow a version of dsj with a
pair of subderivations (as for _E in ND). All this should become more clear as we
proceed.
With definition ST and these rules, we can begin to reason about consequences of
the definition. Suppose we want to show that an interpretation with IŒA = IŒB = T is
such that IŒ.A ! B/ = T.

(G)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

IŒA = T
IŒB = T
IŒB = T
IŒA = T M IŒB = T
IŒA ! B = T
IŒ.A ! B/ = T

prem
prem
2 ST()
1,3 cnj
4 ST(!)
5 ST()

We are given that IŒA = T and IŒB = T. From
the latter, by ST(), IŒB = T; so IŒA = T
and IŒB = T; so by ST(!), IŒA ! B =
T; so by ST(), IŒ.A ! B/ = T.

The reasoning on the left is a metalinguistic derivation in the sense that every step is
either a premise or results by a definition or rule. You should be able to follow each
step. And these derivations can be worked “bottom-up” in the usual way: From the
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main operator, we expect to obtain IŒ.A ! B/ = T by ST(); for this we need
IŒA ! B = T; again by the main operator, we expect to get this by ST(!) and so
set IŒA = T M IŒB = T as goal; this requires both conjuncts; but the first is given,
and the second results from IŒB = T by ST().
On the right, we simply “tell the story” of the derivation—mirroring it step for
step. This latter style is the one we want to develop. As we shall see, it gives us power
to go beyond where the derivations will take us. But the derivations serve a purpose.
If we can do them, we can use them to construct reasoning of the sort we want. Each
stage on one side corresponds to one on the other. So the derivations can guide us as
we construct our reasoning, and constrain the moves we make. Note: First, on the
right, we replace line references with language (“from the latter”) meant to serve the
same purpose. Second, the metalinguistic symbols, ), ,, :, M, O, ?, are replaced
with ordinary language on the right side. Finally, on the right, though we cite every
definition when we use it, we do not cite the additional rules (in this case cnj). To
the extent that you can, it is good to have one line depend on the one before or in
the immediate neighborhood, so as to minimize the need for extended references in
the written version. And in general, as much as possible, you should strive to put the
reader (and yourself at a later time) in a position to follow your reasoning—supposing
just a basic familiarity with the definitions.
Consider now another example. Suppose we want to show that an interpretation
with IŒB = T is such that IŒ.A ! B/ = T.

(H)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

IŒB = T
IŒB = T
IŒA = T O IŒB = T
IŒA ! B = T
IŒ.A ! B/ = T

prem
1 ST()
2 dsj
3 ST(!)
4 ST()

We are given that IŒB = T; so by ST(),
IŒB = T; so IŒA = T or IŒB = T; so
by ST(!), IŒA ! B = T; so by ST(),
IŒ.A ! B/ = T.

Observe how ST(!) requires IŒA = T O IŒB = T to obtain IŒA ! B = T. Thus
we obtain the disjunctive (3) in order to get (4). In contrast, on (5) of (G), ST(!) takes
the conjunctive IŒA = T M IŒB = T for IŒA ! B = T. Keep these cases separate
in your mind: from the left-hand side of ST(!), a disjunction for a true conditional;
and from the right-hand side, a conjunction for a conditional that is not true.
Here is another derivation of the same result, this time beginning with assumption
of the opposite (with justification, ‘assp’) and breaking down to the parts, for an
application of neg.

CHAPTER 7. DIRECT SEMANTIC REASONING

(I)

1. IŒ.A ! B/ = T
2. IŒA ! B = T
3. IŒA = T M IŒB = T
4. IŒB = T
5. IŒB = T
6. IŒB = T
7. ?
8. IŒ.A ! B/ = T

assp
1 ST()
2 ST(!)
3 cnj
4 ST()
prem
5,6 bot
1-7 neg
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Suppose IŒ.A ! B/ = T; then from
ST (), IŒA ! B = T; so by ST (!),
IŒA = T and IŒB = T; so IŒB = T; so
by ST(), IŒB = T. But we are given that
IŒB = T. This is impossible; reject the assumption: IŒ.A ! B/ = T.

Notice again that the conditional which is not true yields a conjunction. This version
takes a couple more lines. But it works as well and provides a useful illustration of
the (neg) rule. As usual, reasoning on the one side mirrors that on the other. So we
can use the metalinguistic derivation as a guide for the reasoning on the right. Again,
we leave out the special metalinguistic symbols. And again we cite all instances of
definitions, but not the additional rules.
These derivations are structurally much simpler than ones you have seen before
from AD and ND. The challenge is accommodating new notation with the different
mix of rules. As you work these and other problems, you may find the sentential
metalinguistic reference on page 208 helpful.

Some perspective: Our reasoning takes place in the metalanguage. Special symbols, M, O,
and such just are the metalinguistic ‘and’, ‘or’, and the like. Thus our work is in the usual
language we use to state definitions. This language comes with its own interpretation. Taken
this way, the metalinguistic derivations themselves constitute metalinguistic reasonings.
It is true that metalinguistic rules are given in terms of form. We thus impose formal
constraints on our reasoning. But we have not introduced a new language whose symbols
require interpretation (as for Lq ), and do not justify inferences by form (as for ND). So we
have not formalized the metalanguage. Rather we have adopted the formal constraints in
order to guide and structure our reasoning.

E7.1. Suppose IŒA = T, IŒB = T, and IŒC  = T. For each of the following, produce
a metalinguistic derivation, and then informal reasoning to demonstrate either that
it is or is not true on I. Hint: You may find a quick row of the truth table helpful to
let you see which you want to show. Also, (e) is much easier than it looks.
*a. B ! C
*b. B ! C
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c. Œ.A ! B/ ! C 
d. ŒA ! .B ! C /
e. A ! Œ..A ! B/ ! C / ! .C ! B/

7.2.2

Validity

So far we have been able to reason about ST and truth. Let us now extend results to
validity. For this, we need to augment our metalinguistic derivation system. Let ‘S ’
be a metalinguistic existential quantifier—it asserts the existence of some object. For
now, ‘S’ will appear only in contexts asserting the existence of interpretations. Thus,
for example, S I.IŒP  = T/ says there is an interpretation I such that IŒP  = T, and
:S I.IŒP  = T/ says it is not the case that there is an interpretation I such that IŒP  = T.
Given this, we can state SV as follows, again in positive and negative forms:
SV

:S I.IŒP1  = T M : : : M IŒPn  = T M IŒQ = T/ , P1 : : : Pn s Q
S I.IŒP1  = T M : : : M IPn  = T M IŒQ = T/ , P1 : : : Pn 6s Q

These should look familiar. An argument is valid when it is not the case that there is
some interpretation that makes the premises true and the conclusion not. An argument
is invalid if there is some interpretation that makes the premises true and the conclusion
not.
Again, we need rules to manipulate the new operator. In general, whenever a
metalinguistic term t first appears outside the scope of a metalinguistic quantifier, it is
labeled arbitrary or particular. For the sentential case, terms will be of the sort I, J,
. . . for interpretations, and mostly labeled ‘particular’ when they first appear apart
from the quantifier S. Say AŒt is some metalinguistic expression in which term t
appears, and AŒu is like AŒt but with free instances of t replaced by u. Perhaps AŒt
is IŒA = T and AŒu is JŒA = T. Then,
exs

AŒu
S tAŒt

u arbitrary or particular

S tAŒt
AŒu

u particular and new

As an instance of the left-hand “introduction” rule, we might move from JŒA = T, for
a J labeled either arbitrary or particular, to S I.IŒA = T/. If interpretation J is such
that JŒA = T, then there is some interpretation I such that IŒA = T. For the other
“exploitation” rule, we may move from S I.IŒA = T/ to the result that JŒA = T so
long as J is identified as particular and is new to the derivation, in the sense required
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for 9E in chapter 6. In particular, it must be that the term does not so-far appear
outside the scope of a metalinguistic quantifier, and does not appear free in current
goal expressions. Given that some I is such that IŒA = T, we set up J as a particular
interpretation for which it is so.3
In addition, it will be helpful to allow a rule which lets us make assertions by
inspection about already given interpretations—and we will limit justifications by
(ins) just to assertions about interpretations (and, later, variable assignments). Thus,
for example, in the context of an interpretation I on which IŒA = T, we might allow,
n. IŒA = T

ins (I particular)

as a line of one of our derivations. In this case, I is a name of the interpretation, and
listed as particular on first use.
Now suppose we want to show that .B ! D/, B 6s D. Recall that our
strategy for showing that an argument is invalid is to produce an interpretation,
and show that it makes the premises true and the conclusion not. So consider an
interpretation J such that JŒB = T and JŒD = T. (A quick row of the truth table might
help to identify this as the interpretation we want to consider.)

(J)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

JŒB = T
JŒB = T O JŒD = T
JŒB ! D = T
JŒB = T
JŒD = T
JŒB ! D = T M JŒB = T M JŒD = T

S I.IŒB ! D = T M IŒB = T M IŒD = T/
B ! D; B 6s D

ins (J particular)
1 dsj
2 ST(!)
1 ST()
ins
3,4,5 cnj
6 exs
7 SV

(1) and (5) are by inspection of the interpretation J, where an individual name is
always labeled “particular” when it first appears. At (6) we have a conclusion about
interpretation J, and at (7) we generalize to the existential, for an application of SV at
(8). Here is the corresponding informal reasoning:
JŒB = T; so either JŒB = T or JŒD = T; so by ST(!), JŒB ! D = T. But since
JŒB = T, by ST(), JŒB = T. And JŒD = T. So JŒB ! D = T and JŒB = T but
JŒD = T. So there is an interpretation I such that IŒB ! D = T and IŒB = T but
IŒD = T. So by SV, B ! D, B 6s D
3 Insofar

as I is bound in S I.IŒA = T/, term I may itself be new in the sense that it does not so-far
appear outside the scope of a quantifier. Thus we may be justified in moving from S I.IŒA = T/ to
IŒA = T, with I particular. However, as a matter of style, we will typically switch terms upon application
of the exs rule.
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It should be clear that this reasoning reflects that of the derivation. We show the
argument is invalid by showing that there exists an interpretation on which the premises
are true and the conclusion is not.
Say we want to show that .A ! B/ s A. To show that an argument is valid, our
idea has been to assume otherwise and show that the assumption leads to contradiction.
So we might reason as follows:

(K)

1. .A ! B/ 6s A
2. S I.IŒ.A ! B/ = T M IŒA = T/
3. JŒ.A ! B/ = T M JŒA = T
4. JŒ.A ! B/ = T
5. JŒA ! B = T
6. JŒA = T M JŒB = T
7. JŒA = T
8. JŒA = T
9. ?
10. .A ! B/ s A

assp
1 SV
2 exs (J particular)
3 cnj
4 ST()
5 ST(!)
6 cnj
3 cnj
7,8 bot
1-9 neg

Suppose .A ! B/ 6s A; then by SV there is some I such that IŒ.A ! B/ = T
and IŒA = T. Let J be a particular interpretation of this sort; then JŒ.A ! B/ = T
and JŒA = T. From the former, by ST(), JŒA ! B = T; so by ST(!), JŒA = T and
JŒB = T. So both JŒA = T and JŒA = T. This is impossible; reject the assumption:
.A ! B/ s A.

At (2) we have the result that there is some interpretation on which the premise is
true and the conclusion is not. At (3), we set up to reason about a particular J for
which this is so. J does not so-far appear in the derivation, and does not appear in the
goal at (9). So we instantiate to it. This puts us in a position to reason by ST. The
pattern is typical. Given that the assumption leads to contradiction, we are justified in
rejecting the assumption, and thus conclude that the argument is valid. It is important
that we are able to show an argument is valid without reasoning individually about
every possible interpretation of the basic sentences!
Notice that we can also reason generally about forms. Here is a case of that sort:
T7.??s. s .Q ! P / ! ..Q ! P / ! Q/
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1. 6s .Q ! P / ! ..Q ! P / ! Q/
2. S I.IŒ.Q ! P / ! ..Q ! P / ! Q/ = T/
3. JŒ.Q ! P / ! ..Q ! P / ! Q/ = T
4. JŒQ ! P  = T M JŒ.Q ! P / ! Q = T
5. JŒ.Q ! P / ! Q = T
6. JŒQ ! P  = T M JŒQ = T
7. JŒQ = T
8. JŒQ = T
9. JŒQ ! P  = T
10. JŒQ = T O JŒP  = T
11. JŒP  = T
12. JŒQ ! P  = T
13. JŒQ = T O JŒP  = T
14. JŒP  = T
15. JŒP  = T
16. ?
17. s .Q ! P / ! ..Q ! P / ! Q/

203
assp
1 SV
2 exs (J particular)
3 ST(!)
4 cnj
5 ST(!)
6 cnj
7 ST()
6 cnj
9 ST(!)
10,8 dsj
4 cnj
12 ST(!)
13,8 dsj
14 ST()
11,15 bot
1-16 neg

Suppose 6s .Q ! P / ! ..Q ! P / ! Q/; then by SV there is some I such that
IŒ.Q ! P / ! ..Q ! P / ! Q/ = T. Let J be a particular interpretation of this
sort; then JŒ.Q ! P / ! ..Q ! P / ! Q/ = T; so by ST(!), JŒQ ! P  = T
and JŒ.Q ! P / ! Q = T; from the latter, by ST(!), JŒQ ! P  = T and JŒQ = T;
from the second of these, by ST(), JŒQ = T. Since JŒQ ! P  = T, by ST(!),
JŒQ = T or JŒP  = T; but JŒQ = T, so JŒP  = T. Since JŒQ ! P  = T, by
ST (!), JŒQ = T or JŒP  = T; but JŒQ = T, so JŒP  = T; so by ST (), JŒP  = T.
This is impossible; reject the assumption: s .Q ! P / ! ..Q ! P / ! Q/.

Observe that the steps represented by (11) and (14) are not by cnj but by the dsj
rule with A O B and :A for the result that B.4 Observe also that contradictions
are obtained at the metalinguistic level. Thus JŒP  = T at (11) does not contradict
JŒP  = T at (14). Of course, it is a short step to the result that JŒP  = T and JŒP  = T
which do contradict. As a general point of strategy, it is much easier to manage a
conditional that is not true than a conditional that is true—for a conditional that is
not true yields a conjunctive result, and one that is true a disjunctive result. Thus we
begin above at (5) and (6) with the conditional that is not true, and use the results to
set up applications of dsj. This is typical. Similarly we can show,
T7.??s. P , P ! Q s Q
4 Or, rather, we have :A O B and A—and thus skip application of neg to obtain the proper ::A
for this application of dsj.
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T7.??s. s P ! .Q ! P /
T7.??s. s .O ! .P ! Q// ! ..O ! P / ! .O ! Q//
T7.??s–T7.??s should remind you of the axioms and rule of the sentential system
ADs from chapter 3. These results (or, rather, analogues for the quantificational case)
play an important role for things to come.
Again to show that an argument is invalid, produce an interpretation; then use
it for a demonstration that there exists an interpretation that makes premises true
and the conclusion not. To show that an argument is valid, suppose otherwise; then
demonstrate that your assumption leads to contradiction. The derivations then provide
the pattern for your informal reasoning.
E7.2. Produce a metalinguistic derivation, and then informal reasoning to demonstrate each of the following. To show invalidity, you will have to produce an
interpretation to which your argument refers.
*a. A ! B, A 6s B
*b. A ! B, B s A
c. A ! B, B ! C , C ! D s A ! D
d. A ! B, B ! A s A
e. A ! B, A ! B 6s .A ! B/
f. .A ! B/ ! A s A ! B
g. A ! B, B s .B ! A/
h. A ! B, B ! A 6s A ! B
i. 6s Œ.A ! B/ ! .A ! C / ! Œ.A ! B/ ! C 
j. s .A ! B/ ! Œ.B ! C / ! .C ! A/
E7.3. Provide demonstrations for T7.??s–T7.??s in the informal style. Hint: You
may or may not find metalinguistic derivations helpful as a guide.
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Derived Clauses

Finally, for this section on sentential forms, we expand the range of our results by
introducing derived clauses to definition ST. For this, we require some rules for )
and ,.
A ) B, A

cnd

bcnd

A

A ) B, B ) C

B

B
A)B

A)C

A , B, A

A , B, B

A ) B; B ) A

A , B, B , C

B

A

A,B

A,C

We will also allow versions of cnd and bcnd which move from, say, A ) B and :B
to :A, and from A , B and :A, to :B (like MT and NB from ND+). And we will
allow generalized versions of these rules moving directly from, say, A ) B, B ) C,
and C ) D to A ) D; and similarly, from A , B, B , C, and C , D to
A , D. In this last case, the natural informal description is, A iff B; B iff C; C iff
D; so A iff D. In real cases, however, repetition of terms can be awkward and get in
the way of reading. In practice, then, the pattern collapses to, A iff B; iff C; iff D; so
A iff D—where this is understood as in the official version.
Also, when demonstrating that A ) B, in many cases, it is helpful to get B by
neg; officially, the pattern is as on the left,
A
:B
?
B
A)B

But the result is automatic
once we derive a contradiction from A and :B; so,
in practice, this pattern collapses into:

A M :B
?
A)B

So to demonstrate a conditional, it is enough to derive a contradiction from the
antecedent and negation of the consequent. Let us also include among our definitions,
(abv) for unpacking abbreviations. This is to be understood as justifying biconditionals
AŒP 0  , AŒP  where P 0 abbreviates P . So, for example, by abv IŒP 0  = T ,
IŒP  = T. Such a biconditional can be used as either an axiom or a rule.
We are now in a position to produce derived clauses for ST. We have already seen
derived tables from chapter 4. Now we demonstrate the conditions.
ST0

(^) IŒP ^ Q = T , IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T
IŒP ^ Q = T , IŒP  = T O IŒQ = T
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(_) IŒP _ Q = T , IŒP  = T O IŒQ = T
IŒP _ Q = T , IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T

($) IŒP $ Q = T , .IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T/ O .IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T/
IŒP $ Q = T , .IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T/ O .IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T/

Again, you should recognize the derived clauses based on what you already know
from truth tables.
First, consider the positive form for ST0 (^). We reason about the arbitrary interpretation. The demonstration begins by abv, and strings together biconditionals to
reach the final result.

(L)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

IŒP ^ Q = T , IŒ.P ! Q/ = T
IŒ.P ! Q/ = T , IŒP ! Q = T
IŒP ! Q = T , IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T
IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T , IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T
IŒP ^ Q = T , IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T

abv (I arbitrary)
ST()
ST(!)
ST()
1,2,3,4 bcnd

This time the interpretation is arbitrary insofar as the reasoning applies to any interpretation whatsoever. This derivation puts together a string of biconditionals
of the form A , B, B , C, C , D, D , E; the conclusion follows by
bcnd. Notice that we use the abbreviation and first two definitions as axioms, to
state the biconditionals. Technically, (4) results from an implicit A , A—that is,
IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T , IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T—followed by ST() as a replacement
rule, substituting IŒQ = T for IŒQ = T on the right-hand side. In the “collapsed”
biconditional form, the result is as follows:
By abv, IŒP ^ Q = T iff IŒ.P ! Q/ = T; by ST(), iff IŒP ! Q = T; by ST(!),
iff IŒP  = T and IŒQ = T; by ST(), iff IŒP  = T and IŒQ = T. So IŒP ^ Q = T iff
IŒP  = T and IŒQ = T.

In this abbreviated form, each stage implies the next from start to finish. But similarly,
each stage implies the one before from finish to start. So one might think of it as
demonstrating conditionals in both directions all at once for eventual application
of bcnd. Because we have just shown a biconditional, it follows immediately that
IŒP ^ Q = T just in case the right hand side fails—just in case one of IŒP  = T or
IŒQ = T. However, we can also make the point directly.
By abv, IŒP ^ Q = T iff IŒ.P ! Q/ = T; by ST(), iff IŒP ! Q = T; by ST(!),
iff IŒP  = T or IŒQ = T; by ST(), iff IŒP  = T or IŒQ = T. So IŒP ^ Q = T iff IŒP  = T
or IŒQ = T.
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Reasoning for ST0 (_) is similar. For ST0 ($) it will be helpful to introduce, as a
derived rule, a sort of distribution principle.
dst

Œ.:A O B/ M .:B O A/ , Œ.A M B/ O .:A M :B/

To show this, our basic idea will be to obtain the conditional going in both directions,
and then apply bcnd. Here is the argument from left to right:
1. Œ.:A O B/ M .:B O A/ M :Œ.A M B/ O .:A M :B/
2. .:A O B/ M .:B O A/
3. :A O B
4. :B O A
5. :Œ.A M B/ O .:A M :B/
6. :.A M B/ M :.:A M :B/
7. :.A M B/
8. :A O :B
9. :.:A M :B/
10. A O B
11.
A
B
12.
13.
:B
?
14.
15. :A
16. :B
17. B
18. ?
19. Œ.:A O B/ M .:B O A/ ) Œ.A M B/ O .:A M :B/

assp
1 cnj
2 cnj
2 cnj
1 cnj
5 dem
6 cnj
7 dem
6 cnj
9 dem
assp
3,11 dsj
8,11 dsj
12,13 bot
11-14 neg
4,15 dsj
10,15 dsj
17,16 bot
1-18 cnd

The conditional is demonstrated in the “collapsed” form, where we assume the
antecedent with the negation of the consequent and go for a contradiction. Note the
little subderivation at (11)–(14); we have accumulated disjunctions at (3), (4), (8), and
(10), but do not have any of the “sides”; to make headway, we assume the negation of
one side; this feeds into dsj and neg (the idea is related to SC4). Demonstration of
the conditional in the other direction is left as an exercise. Given dst, you should be
able to demonstrate ST($), also in the collapsed biconditional style. You will begin
by observing by abv that IŒP $ Q = T iff IŒ..P ! Q/ ! .Q ! P // = T; by
ST () iff. . . . The negative side is relatively straightforward, and does not require dst.
Having established the derived clauses for ST0 , we can use them directly in our
reasoning. Thus, for example, let us show that B _ .A ^ C /, .C ! A/ $ B 6s
.A ^ C /. For this, consider an interpretation J such that JŒA = JŒB = JŒC  = T.
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Metalinguistic Quick Reference (sentential)
DEFINITIONS:
ST

ST0

() IŒP  = T , IŒP  = T

IŒP  = T , IŒP  = T

(!) IŒP ! Q = T , IŒP  = T O IŒQ = T

IŒP ! Q = T , IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T

(^) IŒP ^ Q = T , IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T
IŒP ^ Q = T , IŒP  = T O IŒQ = T

(_) IŒP _ Q = T , IŒP  = T O IŒQ = T
IŒP _ Q = T , IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T

($) IŒP $ Q = T , .IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T/ O .IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T/
IŒP $ Q = T , .IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T/ O .IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T/

SV :S I.IŒP1  = T M : : : M IŒPn  = T M IŒQ = T/ , P1 : : : Pn s Q
S I.IŒP1  = T M : : : M IPn  = T M IŒQ = T/ , P1 : : : Pn 6s Q
abv Abbreviation allows AŒP 0  , AŒP  where P 0 abbreviates P .
RULES:
com .A O B/ , .B O A/

.A M B/ , .B M A/

idm A , .A O A/

A , .A M A/

dem :.A M B/ , .:A O :B/

:.A O B/ , .:A M :B/

AMB

AMB

A

B

B

A O B; :A

A O B; :B

AOB

AOB

B

A

neg A , ::A

A

cnj A; B
AMB
dsj A

?
:A
exs AŒu

u arbitrary or particular

StAŒt

bcnd A , B, A
B

A

bot

A; :A
?

?
A
StAŒt
AŒu

cnd A ) B, A
B

:A

u particular and new

A ) B, B ) C

A M :B

B
A)B

A)C

?
A)B

A , B, B

A ) B; B ) A

A , B, B , C

A

A,B

A,C

dst Œ.:A O B/ M .:B O A/ , Œ.A M B/ O .:A M :B/
ins Inspection allows assertions about interpretations and variable assignments.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

JŒB = T
JŒB = T O JŒA ^ C  = T
JŒB _ .A ^ C / = T
JŒA = T
JŒC  = T O JŒA = T
JŒC ! A = T
JŒC ! A = T M JŒB = T

.JŒC ! A = T M JŒB = T/ O .JŒC ! A = T M JŒB = T/
JŒ.C ! A/ $ B = T
JŒC  = T
JŒA = T M JŒC  = T
JŒA ^ C  = T
JŒ.A ^ C / = T
JŒB _ .A ^ C / = T M JŒ.C ! A/ $ B = T M JŒ.A ^ C / = T
S IŒIŒB _ .A ^ C / = T M IŒ.C ! A/ $ B = T M IŒ.A ^ C / = T
B _ .A ^ C /; .C ! A/ $ B 6s .A ^ C /
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ins (J particular)
1 dsj
2 ST0 (_)
ins
4 dsj
5 ST(!)
10,1 cnj
7 dsj
8 ST0 ($)
ins
4,10 cnj
11 ST0 (^)
12 ST()
3,9,13 cnj
14 exs
15 SV

Since JŒB = T, either JŒB = T or JŒA ^ C  = T; so by ST0 (_), JŒB _ .A ^ C / = T.
Since JŒA = T, either JŒC  = T or JŒA = T; so by ST(!), JŒC ! A = T; so both
JŒC ! A = T and JŒB = T; so either both JŒC ! A = T and JŒB = T or both
JŒC ! A = T and JŒB = T; so by ST0 ($), JŒ.C ! A/ $ B = T. Since JŒA = T and
JŒC  = T, by ST0 (^), JŒA^C  = T; so by ST(), JŒ.A^C / = T. So JŒB _.A^C / = T
and JŒ.C ! A/ $ B = T but JŒ.A ^ C / = T; so there exists an interpretation I such
that IŒB _ .A ^ C / = T and IŒ.C ! A/ $ B = T but IŒ.A ^ C / = T; so by SV,
B _ .A ^ C /, .C ! A/ $ B 6s .A ^ C /.

Observe the use of dsj at (8) to feed into ST0 ($) at (9). This is no different than we
have done before, only with the relatively complex expressions.
Similarly we can show that A ! .B _ C /, C $ B, C s A. As usual, our
strategy is to assume otherwise, and go for contradiction.
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1. A ! .B _ C /; C $ B; C 6s A
2. S I.IŒA ! .B _ C / = T M IŒC $ B = T M IŒC  = T M IŒA = T/
3. JŒA ! .B _ C / = T M JŒC $ B = T M JŒC  = T M JŒA = T
4. JŒC  = T
5. JŒC  = T
6. JŒC  = T O JŒB = T
7. :.JŒC  = T M JŒB = T/
8. JŒC $ B = T
9. .JŒC  = T M JŒB = T/ O .JŒC  = T M JŒB = T/
10. JŒC  = T M JŒB = T
11. JŒA = T
12. JŒA = T
13. JŒA ! .B _ C / = T
14. JŒA = T O JŒB _ C  = T
15. JŒB _ C  = T
16. JŒB = T O JŒC  = T
17. JŒB = T
18. JŒC  = T
19. ?
20. A ! .B _ C /; C $ B; C s A
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assp
1 SV
2 exs (J particular)
3 cnj
4 ST()
5 dsj
6 dem
3 cnj
8 ST0 ($)
9,7 dsj
3 cnj
11 ST()
3 cnj
13 ST(!)
14,12 dsj
15 ST0 (_)
10 cnj
16,17 dsj
18,5 bot
1-20 neg

Suppose A ! .B _ C /, C $ B, C 6s A; then by SV there is some I such that
IŒA ! .B _ C / = T and IŒC $ B = T and IŒC  = T but IŒA = T. Let J be a
particular interpretation of this sort; then JŒA ! .B _ C / = T and JŒC $ B = T and
JŒC  = T but JŒA = T. Since JŒC  = T, by ST(), JŒC  = T; so either JŒC  = T or
JŒB = T; so it is not the case that both JŒC  = T and JŒB = T. But JŒC $ B = T; so by
ST 0 ($), both JŒC  = T and JŒB = T, or both JŒC  = T and JŒB = T; but not the former,
so JŒC  = T and JŒB = T. JŒA = T; so by ST(), JŒA = T. But JŒA ! .B _ C / = T;
so by ST(!), JŒA = T or JŒB _ C  = T; but JŒA = T; so JŒB _ C  = T; so by ST0 (_),
JŒB = T or JŒC  = T; but JŒB = T; so JŒC  = T; but JŒC  = T. This is impossible; reject
the assumption: A ! .B _ C /, C $ B, C s A.

Note the move on lines (5)–(7) where we use dsj with dem to convert JŒC  = T into a
negation useful at (10).
Though the metalinguistic derivations are useful to discipline the way we reason,
in the end, you may find the written versions to be both quicker and easier to follow.
As you work the exercises, try to free yourself from the derivations to work the
informal versions independently—though you should continue to use derivations as a
check for your work.
E7.4. Produce informal reasoning to demonstrate each of the following.
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a. A ! .B ^ C /, C s A
*b. .A $ B/, A, B s C ^ C
*c. .A ^ B/ 6s A ^ B
d. A $ B s B ! A
e. A ^ .B ! C / 6s .A ^ C / _ .A ^ B/
f. Œ.C _ D/ ^ B ! A, D s B ! A
g. 6s A _ ..C ! B/ ^ A/
h. D ! .A ! B/, A ! D, C ^ D s B
i. .A _ B/ ! .C ^ D/, .A _ B/ 6s .C ^ D/
j. A ^ .B _ C /, .C _ D/ ^ .D ! D/ s A ^ B
*E7.5. Complete the demonstration of derived clauses of ST0 by completing the
demonstration for dst from right to left, and providing informal reasoning for both
the positive and negative parts of ST0 (_) and ST0 ($).
E7.6. Extend definition ST as follows:
(") IŒP " Q = T , IŒP  = T O IŒQ = T

IŒP " Q = T , IŒP  = T M IŒQ = T

(compare page 195). Produce informal reasoning to show each of the following.
Again, you may or may not find metalinguistic derivations helpful—but your
reasoning should be no less clean than that guided by the rules.
*a. IŒP " Q = T iff IŒ.P ^ Q/ = T
b. IŒP " P  = T iff IŒP  = T
*c. IŒP " .Q " Q/ = T iff IŒP ! Q = T
d. IŒ.P " P / " .Q " Q/ = T iff IŒP _ Q = T
e. IŒ.P " Q/ " .P " Q/ = T iff IŒP ^ Q = T

7.3

Quantificational
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Index
 tilde, 35
! arrow, 35
_ wedge, 43
^ caret, 43
$ double arrow, 43
` single turnstile, 52, 120
IŒA truth value assignment, 65
T true, 65
F false, 65
 double turnstile, 73
², ¤ (etc.), slash notation, 73
II interpretation function, 84
II! intended interpretation, 84
? bottom, 138, 170
" up arrow, 195
) metalinguistic conditional, 196
, metalinguistic biconditional, 196
: metalinguistic negation, 196
M metalinguistic conjunction, 196
O metalinguistic disjunction, 196
? metalinguistic contradiction, 196
S metalinguistic existential, 200

FA accessible formula, 125
FR formula, sentential, 39
FR 0 sentential formula abbreviated, 44
IS immediate subformula, sentential, 42
IT invalidiey test, 13
LS logical soundness, 12
LV logical validity, 12
MO main operator (informal), 90
MO main operator, sentential, 42
NDs natural derivation sentential, 148
NDs+ natural derivation sentential plus,
185
NP natural derivation preliminary, 118
SA accessible subderivation, 125
SB subformula, sentential, 42
SC strategies for a contradiction (sentential), 167
SD subderivation, 125
SG strategies for a goal (sentential), 155
SO sentential operator, 90
ST sentential truth, 65, 196
ST 0 sentential truth abbreviations, 80, 205
SV sentential validity, 72, 200
TF truth functional operator, 90
TP translation procedure, 93
VC vocabulary, sentential, 35
VT validity test, 17

abbreviation, sentential, 43
ADs axiomatic derivation sentential, 55
AP axiomatic derivation preliminary, 52
AR argument, 5
AS atomic subformula, sentential, 42
AV axiomatic consequence, 52
CG criterion of goodness, 84
CS compound and simple, 90
DC declarative sentence, 90
AB

abv, unpack abbreviation, 55, 205
alternatives to classical logic
multi-valued logic, 102
relevant logic, 28
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INDEX
argument AR, 5
standard form, 5
axiomatic derivation
A , 62
AD
sentential ADs, 55
generic account AL, 51
axiom, 51
axiom schema, 52
consequence AV, 52
cumulative nature, 54, 57–58
derivation, 54
preliminary system AP, 52
proof, 52
rule, 51
theorem, 52
validity, 52
beta function
see recursive functions
biconditional
formal expression, 44
metalinguistic expression, 196
ordinary operator
if and only if, 110
just in case, 110
Church’s thesis
see computability
conditional
and cause, 111
formal expression, 35
antecedent, 41
consequent, 41
material, 41
metalinguistic expression, 196
ordinary operator
if then, 108
only if, 109
subjunctive, 111
conjunction
formal expression, 44
conjunct, 44
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metalinguistic expression, 196
ordinary operator
and, 102
both and, 104
but, 102
contradiction
formal expression, 138
metalinguistic expression, 196
ordinary, 23
countability, 37
decidability, effective, see computability
disjunction
formal expression, 44
disjunct, 44
metalinguistic expression, 196
ordinary operator
either or, 104
or, exclusive, 104
or, inclusive, 104
unless, 104
formal language
basic sentence, 64
expression of, 36
Ls , 36
object language, 36
operator
binary, 41
unary, 41
see also formal language, sentential;
formal language, quantificational
formal language, quantificational
see also formal language
formal language, sentential, 35–48
abbreviation AB, 43
abbreviations, other, 45
atomic formula AS, 42, 44
formula FR , FR0 , 39, 44
immediate subformula IS, 42, 44
main operator MO, 42, 44
sentence, 39
subformula SB, 42, 44

INDEX
unabbreviation, 46–48
vocabulary VC, 35
see also formal language
function
see also set theory; recursive function
Gödel’s first ı̃ncompleteness theorem
see completeness
Gödel’s second ı̃ncompleteness theorem
see consistency
halting problem
see computability
iff, if and only if, 12
ı̃ncompleteness of arithmetic
see completeness
invalidity
logical
test for IT, 13
sentential
and truth table, 75
see also validity
metalanguage
and form, 38
derivations in, 197
formalized, 196, 208
natural, 36–38, 51
rules for reasoning in
biconditional rules bcnd, 205
bottom introduction bot, 197
commutation com, 197
conditional rules cnd, 205
conjunctive rules cnj, 197
DeMorgan dem, 197
disjunctive rules dsj, 197
distribution dst, 207
existential rules exs, 200
idempotence idm, 197
inspection ins, 201
negation rules neg, 197
natural derivation
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accessible formula FA, 125
accessible subderivation SA, 125
auxiliary assumption, 122
discharge of, 125
condition on rules, 120
preliminary system NP, 118
proof, 120
scope line, 122
subderivation SD, 125
exit strategy for, 128, 137, 149
theorem, 120
validity, 120
without premises, 149
see also natural derivation, sentential; natural derivation, quantificational
natural derivation, quantificational
see also natural derivation
natural derivation, sentential
rules of NDs, 126–151
reiteration R, 125
! exploitation !E, 127
! introduction !I, 128
^ exploitation ^E, 131
^ introduction ^I, 132
 exploitation E, 136, 138
 introduction I, 136, 138
_ exploitation _E, 140
_ introduction _I, 139
$ exploitation $E, 146
$ introduction $I, 146
rules of NDs+ (NDs and), 179–187
? introduction ?I, 138
? exploitation ?E, 179
association Assoc, 183
commutation Com, 182
DeMorgan DeM, 183
disjunctive syllogism DS, 180
distribution Dist, 184
double negation DN, 181
equivalence Equiv, 183
exportation Exp, 183
hypothetical syllogism HS, 180

INDEX
idempotence Idem, 183
implication Impl, 183
modus tollens MT, 180
negated biconditional NB, 180
transposition Trans, 183
strategies for a contradiction SC, 167–
176
SC 1, 167
SC 2, 168
SC 3, 170
SC 4, 171
strategies for a goal SG, 154–167
SG1, 155
SG2, 156
SG3, 157
SG4, 158
SG5, 159
strategy for main operator _, 175
in NDs+, 184
see also natural derivation
negation
and quantity, 22
formal expression, 35
metalinguistic expression, 73, 196
ordinary operator
neither nor, 104, 106
not both, 104, 106
not the case that, 101
proof
see also axiomatic derivation; natural
derivation; recursive relations, proof
recursive definition, 39
closure clause, 40
see also recursive function; recursive
relation
recursive function
see also recursive functions
recursive relation
see also recursive relations
relation
see also set theory; recursive relation
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semantic reasoning
derivations for, 197
introductory, 193–196
quantificational, 211
sentential, 196–210
see also metalanguage; semantics sentential; semantics quantificational
semantics, sentential, 64–79
abbreviations, 77–79
characteristic table
T(), 65
T(!), 65
T0 ._/, 77
T0 .^/, 78
T0 .$/, 78
T("), 195
entailment SV
formal, 200
natural, 72
interpretation, 65
tautology, 73
truth on interpretation ST, ST0
formal, 196, 205
natural, 65, 80, 195
truth table
and validity, 73–75, 79
arbitrary interpretations, 67–68
constructing values, 68–71, 79
short method, 75–76, 79
truth tree, 66, 78
validity SV
formal, 200
natural, 72
set theory
set
countable, 35, 37
see also function; recursive function;
relation; recursive relation
soundness
logical LS, 12
and truth, 13, 24–25
stories, and logical validity, 6–12
consistent, 8

INDEX
maximal, 8
successor, see recursive functions
translation
basis for evaluation of validity, 113
criterion of goodness CG, 84
intended interpretation, 84
interpretation function, 84
natural, 100
of argument, 85, 112
see also translation, sentential; translation, quantificational
translation, quantificational
see also tranlsation
translation, sentential, 85–113
compound and simple CS, 87, 90
declarative sentence DC, 86, 90
main operator MO, 87, 90
sentential operator SO, 86, 90
and underlines, 86–88
translation procedure TP, 92
equivalent sentences, 93
equvalent operators, 96
parallel tree, 96
parse tree, 93
results in good translation, 99
, 101–102
^, 102–103
_, 103–105
!, 108–110
$, 110
truth functional operator TF, 88–91
test not truth functional, 88
test truth functional, 89
see also translation; negation; conjunction; disjunction; conditional;
biconditional
tree diagram
consequence in AL, 52
formula, 39, 46
parallel tree, translation, 96
parse tree, translation, 93
sentential truth, 66, 78

217
unabbreviation, 48
truth table, see semantics, sentential
Turing machine
see computability
validity
in axiomatic derivation, 52
in natural derivation, 120
logical LV, 12
alternate formulations, 30
and form, 26
and relevance, 27–29
and truth, 13, 25
test for VT, 17
sentential SV
formal, 200
natural, 72
see also invalidity

